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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1980, the Northwest Power Act ordered "parity" between salmon
protection and hydroelectric generation in the operation of the Federal
Columbia River Power System (FCRPS).' A decade and a half later,
salmon restoration efforts under the 1980 statute were eclipsed by the directives of the Endangered Species Act (ESA). 2 By the mid-1990s, the saga
of Columbia River salmon restoration began to resemble a morality play,
as all three branches of the federal government, as well as the region's
states and Indian tribes, were actively involved in suggesting, romulgating, critiquing, or litigating various salmon plans aimed at reversing the
alarming declines suffered by the region's signature natural resource.
While salmon restoration seemed to have clearly moved beyond the "parity promise" of the Northwest Power Act,3 the attention seemed to do the
salmon little good, as run sizes, particularly those of the endangered
4
Snake River stocks, continued to plummet.
Two landmark judicial opinions called attention to the ineffectiveness
of salmon restoration efforts in 1994. Both the Ninth Circuit and the federal district court of Oregon characterized the plans promulgated by the
Northwest Power Planning Council (Council) under the Northwest Power
Act and the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) under the ESA as
substantively inadequate. The Ninth Circuit faulted the Council's plan for
failing to give proper deference to the views of fishery agencies and for
adopting river flow measures advocated by hydropower interests, despite
what the court considered an "overwhelming consensus among [fishery]
agencies and tribes in favor of sighificantly higher flows and more scientifically-based biological objectives."5 The district court struck down
NMFS's 1993 biological opinion (BiOp) on Columbia Basin hydroelectric
operations because it was "too heavily geared towards a status quo that
has allowed all forms of river activity to proceed in a deficit situation,"
resulting in "relatively small steps, minor improvements and adjust1 Pacific Northwest Electric Power Planning and Conservation Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 839-.
839h (1994) (commonly referred to as the Northwest Power Act). See Michael C. Blumm &
Brad L. Johnson, Promising a Processfor Parity: The Pacific Northwest Electric Power
Planningand ConservationAct and Anadromous Fish Protection, 11 EwvTL. L. 497 (1981)
[hereinafter Blumm & Johnson, PromisingParity];Michael C. Blumm, Fufilling the Parity
Promise:A Perspective on Scientific Proof,Economic Cost, and Indian Treaty Fishing
.Rights in the Approval of the Columbia Basin Fish and Wildlife Program, 13 ENVTL. L. 103
(1982) [hereinafter Blumm, Fufilling Parity].
2 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1994).

3 We do not mean to suggest that the region achieved parity between salmon restoration
and hydropower generation-in fact, this Article shows that the promise of parity is actually
fading in the mid-1990s. By "beyond the parity promise," we mean only that the Northwest
Power Act is no longer the driving force in salmon restoration efforts.
4 For example, the out-migration of Columbia Basin juvenile salmon in 1996 was oneseventh of that just four years before. See iqfra notes 33, 165.
5 Northwest Resource Info. Ctr., Inc. v., Northwest Power Planning Council, 35 F.3d
1371, 1389 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 50 (1995).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2982177

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

[Vol. 27:21

ments-when the situation literally cries out for a major overhaul. 6 This
unusual judicial impatience with state and federal restoration plans followed widespread claims that the plans relied too heavily on artificial
transport of juvenile salmon by barge and truck, instead of restructuring
the hydroelectric system to make the river a safer environment for migrat7
ing salmon.

In part, the apparent ineffectiveness of restoration efforts was due
simply to the fact that the plans are new, and the salmon life cycle'is long.

Even successful plans will take at least four or five years, and no doubt
longer, to bear fruit. This inherent time lag makes meaningful evaluation

of remedial measures impossible in the short run, and difficult over the

long run.8 The lack of feedback as to what is and is not-working helped to
6 Idaho Dep't of Fish & Game v. National Marine Fisheries Serv., 850 F. Supp. 886, 900
(D! Or. 1994), vacated as moot 56 F.3d 1071 (9th Cir. 1995): The direct service industries
(DSIs) and the Pacific Northwest Generating Cooperative had.intervened as defendants in
the case and later appealed the decision. The Ninth Circuit dismissed their claim as moot,
since the new 1995 BiOp had already been released and was now the appropriate BiOp to
legally challenge. Idaho Dep't of Fish & Game v. National Marine Fisheries Serv., 56 F.3d
1071, 1074-75 (9th Cir.. 1995).
7 See COLUMBIA BASIN INDIAN TRIBES & THE STATE & FED. FiSH & WILDLIFE AGENCIES,
DETAILED FISHERY OPERATING PLAN wrrIH 1994 OPERATING CRITERIA 3, 20-24 (1993) (technical

recommendations for operating the FCRPS submitted by tribes and fishery agencies, concluding that transportation both 1) does not substitute or mitigate for poor inriver conditions created by the FCRPS and 2) has not halted the decline of threatened and endangered
salmon in the basin); NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL. ET AL., CHANGING THE CURRENT:
AFFORDABLE STRATEGIES FOR SALMON RESTORATION IN THE COLUMBIA RIVER BASIN 6 (Dec. 1994)
[hereinafter CHANGING THE CURRENT] (noting that the tribes and fishery agencies, originally
supporters of barging, no longer support transportation of juveniles as a salmon recovery
measure because declines in salmon populations "intensified as the use of barging increased"); PHiuip R. MUNDY ET AL., TRANSPORTATION OF JUVENILE SALMONIDS FROM HYDROELECTRIC PROJECTS IN THE COLUMBIA RIVER BASIN: AN INDEPENDENT PEER REVIEW at viii (May 1994)

(noting that available evidence does not support using barging as either a primary or supporting method for salmon recovery in the Columbia Basin); see also THEINDEPENDENT SCIENTIFIC GROUP, RETURN TO THE RIVER: RESTORATION OF SALMONID FISHES IN THE COLUMBIA

RIVER ECOSYSTEM 5, 516 (Sept. 1996) [hereinafter ISG REPORT] (a report to the Council, criticizing the implementation of barging without a mechanism for evaluating the success of
transportation); infra notes 656, 671, 672 and accompanying text.
8 See, e.g., NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, UPSTREAM: SALMON AND SOCIETY IN THE PACIFIC

NORTHWEST 24-39 (1995) (discussing the salmon life cycle and the ecology of river basins and
the Pacific Ocean). The uncertainty of the effect of ocean conditions on' Columbia Basin
salmon populations is a troublesome issue and difficult to resolve scientifically. See id. at
33-38; id. at 33 ("Ocean effects are logistically difficult to observe because they occur over
such large spatial and temporal scales that they are not easy to observe directly, in contrast
with the more local effects of land use, fishing, and impoundments.").
In late 1994, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, the operator of most of the Columbia
Basin dams, released a study concluding that ocean conditions' may have more of an effect
on the poor condition of salmon runs than the hydroelectric systen. See Lynn Francisco,
Ocean Conditions Called Major Factorin Salmon Declines, CLEARING Up, Jan. 9, 1995, at 6.
Willis McConnaha, a fisheries scientist for the Council, acknowledged that ocean conditions
are an "overwhelming factor" in the number of salmon returning from the ocean. Id. But he
cautioned that the Corps' study should not be used to avoid implementing costly recovery
measures in the Columbia and Snake Rivers. Id.
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spawn considerable intergovernmental disagreement about the path
salmon iestoration ought to take.
Many of the disagreements occasioned by the scientific uncertainty
were encapsulated in the governmental responses to the 1994 court decisions. First, in late 1994, the Council revised its Columbia Basin Fish and
Wildlife Program, calling for keeping juvenile salmon in the river, not barging or trucking them, except in extremely low river flows.9 For the first
time, the Council called for significant drawdowns of mainstem reservoirs
to increase flow velocities to speed salmon migration. 10 Second, less than
three months later, in early 1995, NMFS released a revised BiOp, to comply with the ESA, which did not call for reservoir drawdowns, postponing
a decision on them pending further study." Instead, NMFS prescribed detailed changes to hydroelectric project operation to provide increased
flows without drawdowns.12 Because the new BiOp continued heavy reliance on barging and trucking juvenile salmon, it prompted another lawsuit
from environmentalists.' 3 Finally, in mid-1995, a coalition of Columbia Basin Indian tribes with treaty fishing rights released their own salmon restoration plan.' 4 The tribal plan resembled the Council's, in that its premise
was reliance on inriver transport of juvenile salmon, and it endorsed reservoir drawdowns.' 5 However, the tribal plan was more aggressive than the
Council's program in calling for the use of hatchery supplementation, a
reflection of the tribes' greater faith in the efficacy of artificial production.
This in turn may be a product of the fact that the tribal goal, restoring
salmon to historic levels of abundance, 16 is more ambitious than the Coun17
cil's goal of doublingrun sizes without the loss of biological diversity.
9 NORTHwEST POWER PLANNING COUNCIL, 1994 COLuMBiA BASIN FISH AND WILDLIFE PROGRAM 5-46 to 5-47 (Dec. 1994) [hereinafter 1994 PROGRAM] (discussed infra notes 166-255

and accompanying text).
10 Id. at 5-25 to 5-28, 5-32.
-

11 NATIONAL MARINE, FISHERIES SERV., U.S..DEP'T OF COMMERCE, ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT
SECTION 7 CONSULTATION: BIOLOGICAL OPINION: REINITIATION OF CONSULTATION ON 1994-1998

OPERATION OF THE FEDERAL COLUMBIA RIVER POWER SysTEM AND JUvENLE TRANSPORTATION

PROGRAM IN 1995 AND FuTuRE YEARS 92-94 (Mar. 1995) [hereinafter 1995 BIOP] (discussed

infra notes 256-347 and accompanying text).
12 Id. at 91.
13 See American Rivers v. National Marine FIsheries Serv., No. 96-384MA (D. Or. filed

Mar. 13, 1996); Lynn Francisco, Lawsuit Charges NMFS, Corps with Failureto Implement
BO, CLF ING Up,Mar. 25, 1996, at 7. The plaintiffs in American Rivers sought a preliminary
injunction, but withdrew the motion in return for a settlement agreement with NMFS to
provide spill and water for river flows as called for in the 1995 BiOp. See irfra note 36. As of
this writing, a motion for summary judgment against NMFS is pending before the district
court.
14 WY-KAN-UsH-MI WA-KISH-Wrr (SPIRIT OF ThE SALMON) (1995) [hereinafter TRmBAL PLAN]
(salmon restoration plan released by the tribes of the Nez Perce, Umatilla, Warm Springs,
and Yakama reservations) (discussed infra notes 348-402 and accompanying text).

15 Id. at 5B-41 to 5B-43.
16 Id. at 4, 9.
17 1994 PROGRAM, supra note 9, at 4-4.
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During 1995, hydroelectric operators claimed to implement the NMFS

BiOp,' 8 since only that plan was thought to possess binding authority. 19
Howeveri an examination of actual 1995 hydroelectric operations reveals
that the operations departed substantially from the NMFS BiOp. 20 These
21
departures also became the subject of a court challenge.
1995 also witnessed considerable congressional activity related to
salmon restoration. The most prominent legislative proposal was one that
would have waived federal environmental laws and imposed a "cost cap"
22
on federal expenditures for Columbia Basin fish and wildlife measures.
This was the product of an effort to safeguard the financial viability of the
Bonneville Power Administration (BPA), the region's federal electric
power wholesaler, 23 which has the burden of paying most of the cost of
salmon recovery. 24 Congress eventually decided against waiving environmental laws and imposing a legislative cost cap after federal and regional
negotiators brokered an agreement in which federal agencies agreed to
establish a six-year "budget" that will have many of the same effects as the
proposed cost cap, but which includes a contingency fund to cover unanticipated costs and waives no environmental laws.25 Disagreements over
18

BPA AT THE MIDPOINT
5 (1996) (discussing the effect of the BiOp on river operations); 1 BONNEVILLE

See BONNEVILLE POWER ADMIN., STATE OF THE AGENCY,

DECADE

OF THE
POWER

ADMIN., BUSINESS PLAN, FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT 1-4 (1995) [hereinafter BPA
BUSINESS PLAN] (predicting that the BiOp "will essentially establish river operations for the
next several years"); United States Army Corps of Engineers, North Pacific Division, 1995
River Operations for Fish, SALMON PASSAGE NOTES, Sept. 1995, at 3, 4 (proclaiming that
Columbia and Snake Rivers operations during the juvenile migration season 1) followed the
mandates of the 1995 BiOp, 2)' were "largely successful," and 3) "put fish first").
19 But see infra notes 271-279 and accompanying text, questioning the conventional
assumption that the NMFS BiOp is enforceable, but the Council's program is not.
20 See infra Part V.
21 See Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 32-34,
Ameridan Rivers v. National Marine Fisheries Serv., (D. Or. June 12, 1996) (No. 96-384MA)
[hereinafter American Rivers Motion]; Complaint for Declaratory Judgment and Injunctive
Relief, American Rivers v. National Marine Fisheries Serv., (D. Or. filed Mar. 13, 1996) (No.
96-384MA) (charging that NMFS and federal operating agencies failed to implement measures identified in the NMFS BiOp as necessary to avoid jeopardy to the continued existence
of listed salmon).
22 See Pamela Russell, Hafield Releases Draft Legislation on Bonneville Fish Budget,
CLEARING UP, Sept. 25, 1995, at 1, 14-15 (comparing legislative cost caps).
23 See generally Michael C. Blumm, The Northwest's HydroelectricHeritage:Prologue
to the Northwest Electric Power Planning and Conservation Act, 58 WASH. L. REV. 175
(1983) [hereinafter Blumm, Hydroelectric Heritage] (chronicling the history of hydroelectric
development in the Northwest, including BPA's creation and its role in the region prior to
-the enactment of the Northwest Power Act).
24 16 U.S.C. § 839b(h)(10)(A) (1994) (requiring BPA to use its funding "in a manner consistent with" the Council's program).
25 See, e.g., Statement by Vice President Al Gore, Office of the Vice President (Oct. 23,
1995) (announcing the agreement); Press Release from Sen. Mark 0. Hatfield (R-Or.), Chairman, Senate Committee on Appropriations (Oct. 23, 1995) (same); Letter from Alice M. Rivlin, Director, Office of Management and Budget, to Senator Mark 0. Hatfield (R-Or.),
Chairman, Senate Committee on Appropriations (Oct. 24, 1995) (outlining the agreement's
two major elements: 1) a stable, multi-year fish and wildlife expenditure budget for BPA,
averaging no more than $435 million per year over the next six years; 2) a "fish cost contin-
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the details of the budget prevented the signing of a memorandum of agreement codifying the publicized budget for nearly a year, during which the
budget was transformed into two budgets, one covering BPA's out-ofpocket expenditures on fish and wildlife measures, the other covering
changes in hydroelectric operations to benefit fish migration.2 6 Although it
chosenot to cap fish and wildlife costs, Congress did instruct the Council
to undertake a study of Columbia Basin fish and wildlife "governance" and
make suggestions as to how fish and wildlife decision making in the Co27
lumbia Basin could be improved.
In 1996, Congress again waded into salmon recovery issues, when the
Energy and Water Development Appropriations Act 28 amended the Northwest Power Act to establish a scientific review panel that would make'
29
recommendations on fish and wildlife measures funded by BPA.
Although this provision, known as the Gorton Science Rider, largely duplicated an interagency agreement signed earlier in 1996 between NMFS and
the Council,30 the amendment might be interpreted to change the criteria
by which fish and wildlife measures are judged and perhaps to effectively
overturn1the deference to fishery agencies and tribes required by the Ninth
3
Circuit.

Underlying all of this legislative, administrative, and judicial activity
lay fundamental uncertainties in the science of salmon restoration. In recent years, a number of scientific reports have issued conflicting opinions
as to the efficacy of transporting juvenile salmon by barge and truck versus inriver migration, the level of river flows necessary to optimize inriver
migration, and the appropriateness of reservoir drawdowns.3 2 This sciengency fund" consisting of approximately $325 million to cover additional fish and wildlife

costs above the $435 million average annual level, including costs imposed by court decisions), all reprinted in Northwest Water Law & Policy Project and Northwestern School of
Law of Lewis & Clark College CLE Office, Second Annual Who 'Runs the River Conference:
The Columbia River Hydropower System (Oct. 27, 1995) (conference materials on file with
the Northwest Water Law & Policy Project, Northwestern School of Law of Lewis & Clark
College); Brent Wath & Joan Laatz Jewett, Clinton,Hatfield Announce Salmon Deal, THE
OREGONIAN, Oct. 25, 1995, at Al.
26 See infra notes 604-619 and accompanying text.
27 Energy and Water Development Appropriations Act, Pub. L.No. 104-46, § 508(c), 109
Stat. 402, 420 (1995); NoRTHWEST POWER PLANNING COUNcIL, REPORT TO CONGRESS: FISH AND
WILDIuFE GOVERNANCE AND THE COLUMBIA RIVER HYDROPOWER SYSTEM (May 1996) [hereinafter
CouNciL GOVERNANCE REPORT] (discussed infra notes 621-637 and accompanying text).
28 Pub. L. No. 104-46, 109 Stat. 402 (1995).
29 Northwest Power Planning and Conservation Act, § 512, 110 Stat. 2984, 3005 (1996)
(adding a new § 4(h)(10)(D) to the Northwest Power Act) (discussed infra notes 678698
and accompanying text).
30 Agreement Regarding the Independent Scientific Advisory Board Between the North-

west Power Planning Council and the National Marine Fisheries Service (Jan. 23, 1996)
[hereinafter Council/NMFS Agreement].
,31 But see infra notes 685-686, 691-695 and accompanying text, which argue that the
rider does not overturn the judicially required deference to fish and wildlife agencies and
tribes nor change the statutory criteria program measures must meet.
32 See, e.g., ISG REPORT, supra note 7 (1996 study by the Council's independent scientific group challenging technological fixes, such as barge and truck transportation and
hatcheries, and advocating permanent drawdowns), discussed irtfra notes 38, 49-50, 56, 649-
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tific uncertainty :has allowed proponents and opponents of barge and
truck transport, increased flows, and reservoir drawdowns to argue that
their preferred approach was scientifically supported, while contending
that the disfavored approach was, scientifically suspect. The upshot was
that arguments on all sides assumed a kind of religious holy war in which
the science, like the Bible, was on everyone's side.
And While the arguments raged, the salmon continued to decline. Recent run size estimates for many Columbia Basin stocks are the lowest in
33
recorded history.
This Article examines-the struggles to agree upon and implement an
effective Columbia Basin salmon restoration in the mid-1990s. Part II explains various mainstem passage measures and some of the scientific uncertainty concerning their efficacy. Part III examines the two landmark
court decisions of 1994. Part IV is a detailed examination of the response
to those decisions by the Council and NMFS, as well as an exploration of
the restoration plan proposed by the tribes. Part V looks at how the NMFS
plan was and was not satisfied by hydroelectric operations during 1995.
1995 is' an appropriate year on which to focus because, unlike the
high flow year of 1996,3 4 in 1995 river flows were closer to normal
677 and accompanying text; NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 8 (scientific report on

Pacific Northwest salmon released in late 1995), discussed infra notes 47, 65, 182, 242,339,
736, and 740; MUNDY, supra note 7 (1994 study on merits of juvenile salmon transportation
submitted to NMFS and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service by the Independent Peer Review
Team), discussed infra notes 57-60, 62-63,'65, 67, 240, 735 and accompanying text; GLENN F.
CADA ET AL., REVIEw OF INFORMATION PERTAINING TO THE EFFECT OF WATER VELOCITY ON THE
SURVIVAL OF JUVENILE SALMON AND STEELHEAD IN THE COLUMBIA RIVER BASIN (Feb. 1994) (report prepared for the Council in 1994 by a group of independent scientists), discussed infra
notes 49, 51.
The National Research Council (NRC) report cited above, drew heavy criticism. For
example, Ted Strong, the executive director of the Columbia River Inter-Tribal Fish Commission (CRITFC), labeled the NRC study as "weak" and "flawed," see Lynn Francisco, NRC
Salmon Report Draws Ire; Tribes Call It Flawed, CLEARING Up, Dec. 11, 1995, at 8, although
Sen. Mark 0. Hatfield (R-Or.) called the NRC "the Supreme Court of Science." See Lynn
Francisco, Study Rejects Drawdowns, Supports Barging,EncouragesBiodiversity, CLEARING Up, Nov. 13, 1995, at 8. CRITFC Was not alone in its criticism of the NRC's report. See
Paul Koberstein, Fishy Science: How Scientists Enddnger the Salmon, CASCADIA TIMES, Jan.
1996, at 10, 13 (questioning whether the NRC study was a "fair, independent assessment of
scientific fact").
33, The Idaho Department of Fish and Game estimated that only 1116 wild adult spring/
summer chinook reached Lower Granite Dam in 1995, an all-time low, and only one-seventh
of the number that returned just four years previously. American Rivers Motion, supra note
21, at 2. Even worse, estimates of juvenile Snake River spring/summer salmon in 1996 were
only about 168,000, down from 1.3 million in 1995. See id.; American Rivers Motion, supra
note 21, app. A; Memorandum from Michael H. Schiewe, Division Director, Coastal Zone and
Estuarine Studies Division, National Marine Fisheries Service 1 (Jan. 23, 1996) (on file with
authors).
34 See Pamela Russell, Hydrosystem Balances Precariouslyas Spring Freshet Rages,
CLEARING UP, July 17, 1996, at 6-7 (noting that lower Columbia River flows were expected to
remain above 300,000 cubic feet per second (cfs) into July). In March, 1996, at the outset of
the spring downstream migration season, precipitation above Grand Coulee Dam was 133%
of average; above The Dales, precipitation was 134% of average. See Fish Passage Ctr.,
Weekly Report #96-1, -at 1 (Mar. 15, 1996).
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levels.35 It should be noted, however, that even with the near record runoff in 1996, it took settlement of a lawsuit to assure that the flow and spill
measures called for by the NMFS plan would be satisfied.3 6 Part VI explains the efforts to control BPA's costs that ultimately led to the five-year
fish and wildlife "budget," its potential effects on salmon restoration, the
Council's proposal for a new fish and wildlife governance structure, and
efforts to improve the science of salmon restoration. The Article, concludes, in Part VII, that if the region continues to demand a high level of
scientific certainty before undertaking expensive salmon restoration measures, like reservoir drawdowns and substantially increased flow velocities, endangered Snake River salmon runs will never recover to produce
what the United States promised the treaty tribes over 140 years ago: a
37
sustainable livelihood from fishing.

II. AN OVERVIEW OF MAINSTEM RESTORATION MEASURES
At the outset, we should acknowledge that we are well aware that
effective salmon recovery must account for the entirety of an extremely
complex life cycle. Thus, restoring Columbia Basin salmon will require, at
a minimum, better land management practices to protect and restore
spawning habitat; more sensitive water rights administration to ensure
that sufficient water is left for spawning and rearing; wetlands protection
to supply essential food, especially in the estuary; ocean harvest regulation that ensures adequate adult escapement for spawning; and sensitive
operation of hatcheries that does not compromise the genetic integrity of
wild stocks. These life cycle concerns have been emphasized by a number
of recent scientific studies, with which we have no quarrel. 38 But our fo35

See infra note 439 and accompanying text.

'36 See Stipulation by and Between the Plaintiffs and Federal Defendants Withdrawing

Plaintiffs' Motion for a Preliminary Injunction, American Rivers v. National Marine Fisheries
Serv." (July 23, 1996), discussed in Joan Laatz Jewett, Deal Ensures Increased lows for
Salmon', THE OREOONIAN, July 24, 1996, at B5. Under the agreement, the federal government
agreed to spill water at Columbia and Snake River dams, as called for in the NMFS BiOp,
until August 31, 1996; the government also agreed to release over a million acre-feet of water
from Columbia and Snake reservoirs to boost river flows to facilitate salmon migration. In
return, the 'plaintiffs withdrew their request for a preliminary injunction but promised to
return to court to challenge other aspects of the government's failure to implement the BiOp
as well as the adequacy of the BiOp itself. See Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund, Limited
Agreement Reached to Benefit This Year's Columbia River Salmon Migration;.Administration Holds Concurrent Negotiations; FurtherLitigation Expected (July 23, 1996); see also
supra note 13. See infra note 228 for the definition of acre-foot of water.
37 See, e.g., Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n,
443 U.S. 658, 686 (1979) ("Indian treaty rights to a natural resource that once was thoroughly
and exclusively exploited by the Indians secures so much as, but no more than, is necessary
to provide the Indians with a livelihood-that is to say, a moderate living.").
38 See, e.g., ISG REPORT, supra note 7, at 18 (stressing that salmon restoration measures
must begin with a "conceptual basis" that addresses the entire life cycle of salmon and their
habitat-including ocean conditions and human developments); see also infra notes 651,
658 and accompanying text. See generally NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 8,at 307
(emphasizing that salmon restoration measures must address the fact that salmon traverse
ecosystems and political boundaries throughout their life cycle).
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cus in this study is on the mainstem of the Columbia and Snake Rivers
through which Columbia Basin salmon must migrate and which has historically been dominated by the operation of federal dams largely to generate
electricity. It is in the mainstem where roughly eighty percent of juvenile
salmon perish. 39 Without substantial alteration in the way the dams are
operated, focusing on other life cycle concerns, we believe, amounts to a
futile distraction.
On their journey to the ocean, downstream migrating salmon smolts
must bypass mainstem dams 40 in one of five ways: 1) through the powerhouse and hydroelectric turbines, 2) through ice and trash sluiceways, 3)
by spill over dam spillways, 4) through structural bypass facilities, or 5)
via a barging and trucking program that collects smolts and transports
them downstream for release below Bonneville Dam. In the first four
methods, the juvenile salmon remain in the river, passing through the
dams by various means. The fifth possibility, transporting juvenile salmon,
contemplates temporarily removing the fish from the river.
Thus, two competing approaches for improving juvenile salmon survival rates in the basin have evolved: 1) salmon may be kept in the river,
and inriver conditions improved to hasten their migration, or 2) salmon
can be removed from the river and transported, via barge or truck. Each
method is discussed below.
A. Inriver Migration:Flows, Drawdowns, and Spills
Inriver conditions can be improved by increasing river flow rates, improving dam structures, or changing dam operations (such as increasing
spill) for safer fish passage. Flow improvement measures include flow
augmentation and reservoir drawdowns. Flow augmentation increases
river flows by releasing water from storage dams. Flow augmentation benefits migrating juvenile salmon by speeding their migration to the ocean,,
thus more closely mimicking natural river conditions. Increased flow
reduces exposure to reservoir predation ,and minimizes water quality
problems, such as nitrogen supersaturation and high temperatures. 4 1 Dam
operators do not necessarily lose power as a result of increased flows,
since the water passes through the energy-generating turbines of the
dams.42 But peak juvenile migration periods occur at a time when demand
for power is low and dam operators are attempting to store water for the
39 See Endangered and Threatened Species; Proposed Endangered Status for Snake
River Sockeye Salmon, 56 Fed. Reg. 14,055-02, 14,058 (Apr. 5, 1991); Northwest Resource
Info. Ctr., Inc. v. Northwest Power Planning Council, 35 F.3d 1371, 1376 (9th Cir. 1994).
40 Endangered Snake River salmon must circumnavigate eight dams on their way to the

ocean: Bonneville, The Dalles, John Day, McNary, Ice Harbor, Lower Monumental, Little
Goose, and Lower Granite.
41 1995 BIOP, supra note 11, at 38; see also U.S. FISH AND WILDUFE SERV., REGION 1, FISH
AND WILDLIFE SERVICE DATA SHows 1995 DWORSHAK RESERVOIR DRAwDowN HELPS SNAKE RIVER

SALMON SMOLTS 1 (Aug. 1995) (reporting a "dramatic increase" in smolt survival due to flow

augmentation from Dworshak Reservoir releases).
42 In July 1995, fish flows throughout the Columbia Basin generated surplus power sales
averaging 3,000 megawatts, selling for an average price of 12 mills per kilowatt hour, for
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upcoming winter in anticipation of increased power needs. The conflict
between increased salmon flows and power generation is thus one of
timing.43
Reservoir drawdowns, which may be employed singularly or in combination with flow augmentation, amount to lowering the elevation of reservoirs by releasing stored water downstream. In so doing, drawdowns
reduce the cross-sectional area of reservoirs and benefit migrating salmon
by increasing the rate of flow, thus speeding their migration to the
ocean."' Drawdowns essentially provide the same benefits of flow augmentation, without the provision of upstream water. 45 Like flow augmentation, water is passed through the turbines during a reservoir drawdown.
NMFS found drawdowns effective in increasing smolt survival, 46 but
47
others believe that there is little hard proof that drawdowns will work.
Nevertheless, when either flow augmentation or drawdown is combined
total sales of $27 million. Pamela Russell, Water Year Just Ended Was First Good One in
Four Years, CLEARING Up, Aug. 14, 1995, at 9.
43 The Council described this conflict between the dam operators and migrating juvenile
salmon:
The intent of [improving inriver conditions] is to provide a better migration corridor
for juvenile fish passage. A big part of that objective is met by providing higher river
flows during the migration period. The timing of water releases for flow augmentation, unfortunately, does not coincide with peak needs for electricity. This conflict
creates a tradeoff between power needs and fish needs for the hydro system.
NORTHWESr POWER PLANNING COUNCIL, DRAF-r BRIEFING PAPER: DETAILED FISHERY OPERATING

PLAN 6 (Aug. 1994).
44 1995 BiOp, supra note 11, at 113. Like running water through a smaller pipe, decreased cross-sectional area increases the speed at which the same amount of water flows.
Faster flows benefit smolts by speeding their migration to the ocean, thus more closely
mimicking natural river conditions, reducing exposure to reservoir predation, and minimizing water quality problems such as nitrogen supersaturation and high temperature. Id. at 38;
see also supra note 41 and accompanying text.
.The Ninth Circuit also explained the concept of reservoir drawdown: "Drawdowns are
releases of water that reduce the cross-section of rivers by lowering water levels in mainstem reservoirs. The result is increased velocity of the streamflow with less water than flow
augmentation would require." Northwest Resource Info. Ctr., Inc. v. Northwest Power Planning Council, 35 F.3d 1371, 1381-82 n.23 (9th Cir. 1994); see also Andrew S. Noonan, Just
Water over the Dam? A Look at the EndangeredSpecies Act and the Impact ofHydroelectric
Facilitieson Anadromous FishRuns of t Northwest, 28 IDAHO L. REv. 781, 796-802 (1992)
(an in-depth discussion of the drawdown concept and its origin in the state of Idaho).
45 See 1995 BiOp, supra note 11, at 114 (noting that a Council study found that a
drawdown of John Day from "minimum irrigation pool" to "minimum operating pool" would
provide travel time reductions equivalent to over three million acre-feet (MAF) of flow augmentation). See infra notes 202-203 for definitions of minimum irrigation and operating
pools and irfra note 228 for a definition of acre-foot.
46 1995 BIOP, supra note 11, at 114 (noting travel time benefits of drawdown).
47 See, e.g., Wnmus E. MCCONNAHA & DUANE E. ANDERSON, NORTWEST POWER

PLANNING

COUNCIL, COMPARISON OF METHODS TO INCREASE WATER VELOCITIES IN THE COLUMBIA RIVER 1

(Nov. 1993) (concluding that since a drawdown at John Day has never occurred, the biological effects of a drawdown at that reservoir "cannot be fully assessed"); SNAKE RIVER SALMON
RECOVERY TEAM, FINAL RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE NATIONAL MARINE FISHERIES SERVICE at VII-

66 (May 1994) [hereinafter DRAnm RECOVERY PLAN] (NMFS-appointed scientists concluded
that they did not have the "scientific information needed to endorse drawdown as a firm
recovery action"). The Corps has performed test drawdowns at Lower Granite and Little
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with improvements in dam passage-such as spill, screens, or bypass
channels 48 to keep fish from going through the turbines-juvenle survival
rates should increase. The relationship between increased flows and increased survival has, however, become an issue of widespread dispute.4 9
Goose reservoirs at the Council's behest. See 1 NORTHWEST POWER PLANNING COUNCIL, STRATEGY FOR SALMON 21 (1992) [hereinafter STRATEGY FOR SALMON].
The NRC also weighed in on this issue in its scientific report on Pacific Northwest
salmon, concluding that drawdowns were less effective than transportation in,
improving
juvehile survival. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 8, at 210-11. However, the NRC's
main reason for rejecting reservoir drawdowns as a viable salmon recovery option was the
"economic costs associated with elimination of hydropower production, navigation, and recreation," id. at 211, ani odd conclusion for a scientific study.
Drawdowns may have an adverse effect on other river uses, such as recreation and
navigation. Id. Drawdowns could also eliminate the option of transporting juveniles at certain dams because water levels would be too low to use collection facilities. Id. In addition,
drawdowns could require retrofitting dams to keep adult fish ladders operative. Id.
48 Seven of the eight mainstem dams that Snake River salmon must pass have screens or
bypass systems that divert juveniles around the dam or are used for collection. NORTHWEST
POWER PLANNING COUNCIL, APPENDICES To THE DRAFT ANkDROMOUS FISH AMENDMENTS TO THE
1994 COLUMBIA RIVER BASIN FISH'AND WILDLIFE PROGRAM app. A at 15 (Sept. 1994) [hereinafter
DRAFT AMENDMENTS APPENDIX]. The Corps expects to install bypass facilities at The Dalles

Dam by 1998. Id. But see James D. Crammond, Screening WaterDiversionsfor Fih Protection: A Survey of Policy, Practices and Compliance in the Pacific Northwest, 2 ANIMAL L.
101 (1996) (concluding that compliance with, screening requirements by 1996-under both
the Council's program and the NMFS BiOp-will be problematic); see also ISG REPORT,
supra note 7, at 306, 308 (citing studies at Bonneville Dam that showed that survival of
smolts passing through the bypass was actually lower (due to predation) than those passing
through the power turbines and concluding that, under current bypass technology, the
Council's goal of diverting 90% of the fish away froin the power turbines cannot be
achieved).
49 For example, the NMFS-appointed Recovery Team acknowledged that. juvenile survival decreases when flows are low, but was not convinced that the converse is also true-,
that juvenile survival increases when flows are high. DRAFr RECOVERY PLAN, supra note 47,
at VIII-46 to VIII-47. The NRC also concluded that "[t]he effectiveness of flow-augmentation
alternatives has not been demonstrated." NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, 'supra note 8, at 209.
NMFS has also struggled with the flow-survival issue. In 1993, NMFS claimed that the
effects of flow augmentation on juvenile -sockeye salmon could not be quantified. NATIONAL
MARINE FISHERIES SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, BIOLOGICAL OPINION ON 1993 OPERATION OF
THE FEDERAL COLUMBIA RIVER POWER SYSTEM 19 (May 1993) [hereinafter 1993 BIOP]. However, the agency acknowledged an apparent relationship between higher flows and higher
survival rates for juvenile spring/summer chinook. Id. at 21. For juvenile fall chinook, NMFS
found that "[w]hile it is reasonable to conclude that increased flows are likely to result in
increased survival . . ., quantifying the relationship between flow and survival is difficult
because of the lack of direct observations." Id. at 24. On the other hand, a group of independent scientists prepared a report for the Council and concluded that
"[d]espite ...problems with existing data sets, the general relationship of increasing survival with increasing flow ...still appears to be reasonable." CADA, supra note 32, at 56.
The Council's Independent Scientific Group, while acknowledging that "it is both reasonable and well documented that the amount of time spent by yearling emigrants within
the hydroelectric system is inversely proportional to water velocity," nevertheless found it
impossible "to separate the influence of flow from that of other variables on survival." ISG
REPORT, supra note 7, at 55. The report concluded:
A prominent feature of the debate in the region over fisheries restoration has been the
shape and parameters of the relationships between flow, velocity, fish travel time, and
survival. It seems unlikely that an incremental quantitative relationship between these
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In late 1996, the Independent Scientific Group of the, Northwest Power
Planning Council endorsed permanent drawdowns, not so much to reduce
travel time, but instead to create mainstem spawning habitat.5 0
Flow improvement measures are necessary on the mainstem Columbia and Snake Rivers because Columbia Basin dams, dangerous obstacles
to migrating juveniles in themselves, have significantly decreased natural
flows of the Snake and Columbia Rivers during the spring and summer
migration seasons, creating reservoirs and lakes where rivers previously
flowed. These decreased flows can affect juvenile salmon in many ways:
increasing exposure time to predation, raising water temperatures which
increases susceptibility to disease, creating water quality problems, and
increasing delays -in migration.5 1
Spill of water over a dam is a bypass strategy, not a flow improvement strategy. During spill, smolts are spilled over the top of the dam, thus
avoiding the turbines entirely. That means that dam operators lose potential power generation when spill occurs. 52 Spill can be used in conjunction
-with flow augmentation or reservoir drawdowns, if the drawdown is not
down to natural river level. Smolts spilled over a dam experience zero to
three percent mortality, while those that pass through turbines, the least
desirable passage route, suffer five to fifteen percent mortality.53 But spill
can cause nitrogen supersaturation, which may lead to gas bubble trauma
in smolts and adults under some conditions.5 Nonetheless, frequent past
variables would apply equally to all species and life history types or necessarily be
constant over time and space. Hence, we suggest the abandonment of the search for
the elusive "correct" or "optimum" flow and instead we advise focusing on the restoration of a riverine velocity structure as close as possible to the pre-impoundment
hydrograph.
Id.at 55.
50 ISG REPORT, supra note 7, at 268-69 (discussed infra notes 664-665).
51 1993 BiOp, supra note 49, at 18; see also John Ogan, The Need for a Smolt Travel Time
Objective in the Columbia Basin Fish and Wildlife Program to Protect and Restore the
Northwest's Imperiled Salmon Runs, 24 ENvTL. L. 673, 677 (1994). See generally CADA,
supra note 32 (discussing the impacts of low flows on juveniles in a report done for the
Council by independent scientists).
52 For example, in 1994 an emergency spill allegedly "cost" BPA $12 million in lost electricity sales. See DRAr AMENDMENn APPENDIX, supra note 48, app. A at 15.
63 1995 BiOP, supra note 11, at 47. Mortality from bypass facilities ranges from 1%to 3%.
Id. at 49. These mortality figures represent only one dam. The cumulative effect of eight
.
dams is much higher.
Smolt survival increases with turbine efficiency. Id. at 51. But the precise relationship
between turbine efficiency and smolt survival remains unknown. Id. To lessen turbine mortalities, the 1995 NMFS BiOp called for the operation of turbines within 1%of peak operating
efficiency during the juvenile and adult passage seasons. Id. at 114.
54 1995 BIOP, supra note 11, at 48. Structural improvements to dams, such as the installation of spillway deflectors ("flip lips"), which provide a more horizontal drop, reduce the gas
supersaturation, and thus reduce the possibility of gas bubble trauma. Sonya Bruce, 1995
MigrationExceeds Expectations, SALMON PASSAGE NoTEs, Sept. 1995, at 5. The Corps plans
to begin installing flip. lips at Ice Harbor and John Day in 1997. Id.
Stilling basins may also be modified to reduce gas supersaturation. Stilling basins sit at
the base of spillways and are the areas where water plunging over dams lands. Telephone
Interview with Willis E. McConnaha, Northwest Power Planning Council (Nov. 8, 1996) Ni-
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occurrences of high levels of spill, often due to factors other than salmon
migration-such as turbine outages or high natural flows in excess of turbine capacity-have produced few observable negative effects. 55 Spill re56
mains one of the safest means of dam passage.
B. Out-of-River Migration: Barging and Trucking
The second basic approach to improving juvenile salmon survival is
to remove the smolts from the river and transport them, via barge or
truck, to a safer spot downriver, where they may safely complete their
migration to the Pacific Ocean. Transportation involves capturing the
smolts through a collection facility and placing them on trucks or barges
for shipment downstream. In theory, transportation improves smolt survival by removing smolts from the river, thus reducing the mortalities that
would otherwise be inflicted by the hydropower system. 57 However, despite twenty years of experience, 58 the benefits of transportation remain
uncertain. Also, transportation produces adverse effects of its own. In adtrogen is entrained in the water at the stilling basin, leading to nitrogen supersaturation. Id.
Raising the stilling basin in some fashion, making the plunge pool more shallow, is considered the best way to reduce nitrogen supersaturation problems at the dams. Id.; see infra
notes 549-551 and accompanying text (discussing the Corps' failure to implement modifications to stilling basins as required under the 1995 BiOp).
55 For instance, in 1994 emergency spill conditions produced dissolved nitrogen levels of
11596-12096, 596-1096 above the state water quality standards. 1995 BiOp, supra note 11, at 48.
A corresponding comprehensive biological survey found evidence of gas bubble trauma in
less than .01% of juvenile salmonids, and no signs of gas bubble trauma in adult salmonids or
other aquatic organisms. Id.; see also infra note 548 and accompanying text, discussing
similar results during 1995.
The state fishery agencies of Oregon, Idaho, and Washington, as well as CRITFC, balanced the risks and benefits associated with spill and concluded that spill provides improved juvenile salmon survival, even when nitrogen levels are as high as 125%. Id. at 48-49.
Cf. Idaho Dep't of Fish & Game v. National Marine Fisheries Serv., 850 F. Supp. 886, 900 (D.
Or. 1994) (suggesting that the ESA's directive to use the best available science requires
NMFS to consider the expert opinion of state and tribal fishery agencies).
56 1995 BiOP, supra note 11, at 109. Advocates of spill point to the number of returning
jacks (premature adult salmon) in 1995, six times higher than the preceding year, as evidence of the effectiveness of 1994's spill operations. IDAHO RIVERs UN1TED, A WILD FISH
STORY: THEY SHOULDA MISSED THE BOAT 6 (undated); see also DRAmr AMENDMENTS APPENDIX,

supra note 48, app. A at 16 ("Most available data shows that fish passing through spillways
survive at a higher rate than fish passing through turbines.").
The Council's Independent Scientific Group endorsed spill as effective, stating that
spill has been "shown to offer high survival of fish up to the point where supersaturation of
atmospheric gas becomes a problem." ISG REPORT, supra note 7, at 308. The report cited
surface spill as an especially promising means of fish passage (as opposed to standard spill,
which typically occurred at depths of roughly 50 feet below normal operating pools). Id. at
286-88.
57 MUNDY, supra note 7, at 9.
58 Smolt transportation in the Columbia Basin began in the late 1960s and early 1970s.
MUNDY, supra note 7, at 14. Throughout the 1970s, NMFS research projects transported fish
at Snake River dams. Id. In 1981, the Corps first began transporting all the smolts collected
at Snake River dams. Id.
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dition to the stress associated with handling and crowding, 59 transporta60
tion may allow disease to spread from hatchery smolts to wild smolts.
Both disease and stress may produce mortalities after the smolts are released.6 1 In addition, transportation produces long-term adverse effects
such as disrupting the smolt's ability to find its way back to its natal
stream as an adult, 62 and it likely reduces genetic diversity.63 Although the
precise effects of transportation have yet to be adequately measured, the
collection process alone produces observable direct mortality rates of up
to six percent.64
In 1994, NMFS and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife ,Service submitted the
merits of transportation to an independent scientific peer review. The peer
review found no basis to rely on transportation as a principal recovery
method, concluding that transportation produced positive effects only
when river conditions were most adverse to salmon-that is, low flows
and little or no spill. 65 In 1996, the Council's Independent Scientific Group
concluded that "even if all juvenile salmon could be collected for transportation, there is not enough evidence from previous research to suggest
that even the minimum survival rates necessary for maintenance of population levels could be achieved, let alone those survival rates necessary for
rebuilding salmon populations." 6 6 Transportation's most significant benefit may be non-biological. By removing smolts from the river, it allows the
59 Evidence suggests that transported wild fish suffer more stress than do their hatchery
counterparts, id. at 58, possibly because hatchery fish are accustomed to human handling
and crowded conditions. NMFS has also concluded that mortality may occur during the

handling and collection of juveniles, and that stress, injury, and disease transmission may
occur both during and after transportation. NATIONAL MARINE FISHERIES SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF
COMMERCE, ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT (ESA) SECTION 7 CONSULTATION. REGARDING 1994-1998
OPERATION OF THE FEDERAL COLUMBIA RIVER POWER SYSTEM AND JUVENILE TRANSPORTATION

PROGRAM IN1994-1998, 40 (Mar. 1994) [hereinafter 1994 BIOP]. Also, in the summer of 1994,
an estimated 90,000 juvenile summer and fall chinook salmon died at McNary Dam while
waiting to be transported, due to increased water temperatures. See Northwest Water Law &
Policy Project, In the Halls-News from Government Agencies in the Basin, BIG RIVER
NEWS, Fall 1994, at 11.
60 MUNDY, supra note 7, at 57-58. Studies have demonstrated the possibility of transmis-

sion of bacterial kidney disease from hatchery fish to wild fish during transportation. Id. at
58.
61 See 1995 BiOP, supra note 11, at 111 (noting that state and tribal fishery agencies have
concluded that transportation causes substantial delayed mortality).
62 MUNDY, supra note 7, at 96-102 (finding "overwhelming evidence" that transportation
disrupts homing).
63 Id. at 111-15 (speculating that transportation's negative impact on genetic diversity
could be quite large).
64 1995 BIOP, supra note 11, at 57 (mortality rates of between .3% and 6.3%).
65 Id. at 61 (citing MUNDY, supra note 7, at 116-17). But cf. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL,
supra note 8, at 9 ("Based on limited information, transportation appears to be the most
biologically effective and cost-effective approach for moving smolts downstream. It should
be continued on an adaptive basis (i.e., in such a way that additional information can be
obtained about its effectiveness)."). Why cost-effectiveness should be a consideration in a
scientific study is not clear. See also supra note 47 for another example of the NRC's odd
concern for economic costs in its "scientific" report.
66 ISG REPORT, supra note 7, at 328.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2982177

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

[Vol. 27:21

,continuation of river operations detrimental to salmon, such as maximizing winter flows for hydropower generation. Despite the inconclusive science on the biological benefits of transportation, NMFS, in its 1995 BiOp,
claimed that transportation reduces smolt mortalities and increases the
numbers of returning adults.6 7 .
These two divergent approaches to increasing juvenile salmon survival-improving inriver conditions so that juveniles may migrate safely,
or transporting the salmon out of the river-formed the landscape of,alternatives for the Council, NMFS, and the tribes, in formulating a plan for
increasing salmon survival. Often, the plans adopted a "spread the risk"
approach, employing both inriver and out-of-river approaches to improve
juvenile salmon survival. This mixed strategy often was due to the lack of
agreement about the level of scientific proof indicating which approach
would best restore salmon populations.
IH. JUDICIAL. REJECTION OF SALMON RESTORATION PLANS
A. Establishingthe Parity Promise
Systematic efforts to restore Columbia Basin salmon runs began in
1982, when the Northwest Power Planning Council, an interstate compact
agency authorized by the Northwest Power Act,68 promulgated its first
version of the Columbia Basin Fish and Wildlife Program (the program).
The statute promised "parity" between hydropower operations and fish
and wildlife 69 and called for a program to restore fish and wildlife populations to the extent "affected by the development and operation" of the
Columbia Basin hydroelectric system. 70 Congress set tight time deadlines
for the promulgation of this program, explicitly required that it include
improved river flows and improved fish passage at mainstem dams, and
67 1995 BOP, supra note 11, at 59; see also infra notes 323-337. In calling for transportation, NMFS relied on studies showing that transported fish returned in greater numbers as
adults than non-transported fish. 1995 BiOP, supra note 11, at 59-61. However, state and
tribal fishery agencies disputed the value of these studies, citing major flaws in their experimental design. Id. at 60-61. Perhaps the most egregious of these flaws was the studies' failure to distinguish hatchery fish from wild fish and the use of smolts that were collected,
marked, and transported only to the next dam downstream as control groups. Id. at 61. The
latter meant that the study effectively compared short-haul transportation to long-haul transportation, not instream migration to transportation. Id. The Independent Peer Review also
discounted the importance of these studies. MUNDY, supra note 7, at 79-83, 118.
68 The Northwest Power Act authorized creation of the Council when three of the four
Pacific Northwest states appointed members to the Council. 16 U.S.C. § 839b(a)(2) (1994).
The Ninth Circuit approved this "prospective" method of creating an interstate compact in
Seattle Master Builders Ass'n. v. Pacific Northwest Elec. Power & ConservationPlanning
Council, 786 F.2d 1359, 1363-64 (9th Cir. 1986) (discussed in Symposium, 17 ENvTL. L. 767999 (1987)).
69 The legislative history indicated that henceforth hydropower production and fish and
wildlife protection were to be "co-equal partners" and instructed federal water managers to
treat fish and wildlife "on a par" with other purposes served by Columbia Basin dams. H.R.
REP. No. 96-976, pt. 1, at 49, 56-57 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5989, 6015.
70 16 U.S.C. § 839b(h)(2)(A) (1994). On the evolution of the hydroelectric system, see
Blumm, HydroelectricHeritage, supra note 23, at 180-230.
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directed that it be based on recommendations of the region's fishery agencies and Indian tribes. 7 ' The driving force behind these requirements was
the sense of urgency about the fate of upper basin salmon runs, several of
which were under consideration for listing under the Endangered Species
Act (ESA) when the Northwest Power Act passed in 1980.72

Although the Council met the time deadlines established by Congress,7 3 the program it promulgated in 1982 departed in significant ways
from the fishery agency and tribal recommendations: Despite the fact that
the Northwest Power Act's legislative history instructed the Council not to
act as a "super fish and wildlife entity,"7 4 the Council deviated from the
recommendations by rejecting a proposed schedule of "sliding scale"
flows that would vary depending on the expected runoff but would nonetheless provide fixed flows. 7 5 Instead, the Council's program included a

volume of storage water that would be made available to representatives
of the fishery agencies and tribes who could shape the volume into fish
flows as they deemed fit within a specified time period. 76 This "Water
Budget" was the centerpiece of the Council's 1982 Program and was heralded at the time as an innovative means of balancing the needs of fish and
hydropower.7 7 However, the budget was seriously flawed: it contained too
little water to meet the recommended flows for the Snake River, the
budget period ended before the peak migration of many salmon runs, and
the budget was regularly ignored by,federal water managers. 78 Because
the Northwest Power Act gave the Council ambiguous authority to enforce
the program, 79 and because the Council proved itself to be largely indiffer71 16 U.S.C. § 839b(h)(3), (9) (time deadlines), 839b(h)(6)(E)(ii) (improved flows and
fish passage), 839b(h)(2) (fish and wildlife agency and tribal recommendations).
72 See Lorraine Bodi, The History and Legislative Background of the Northwest Power
Act, 25 ENVTL. L.365, 366 (1995) [hereinafter Bodi, Northwest Power Act History]; F. Lorraine Bodi, Protecting Columbia River Salmon Under the Endangered Species Act, 10
EwNvr. L. 349 (1980).
73 The Columbia Basin Fish and Wildlife Program was promulgated in November 1982.
See Michael C. Blumm, Implementing the Parity Promise:An Evaluationof the Columbia
Basin Fish and Wildlife Program, 14 ENVrL. L.277, 279 (1984) [hereinafter Blumm, Implementing Parity].
74 126 CONG. REc. H29, 810 (daily ed. Nov. 17, 1980) (statement of Rep. Dingell).
75 See Michael C. Blumm & Andy Simrin, The Unravelingof the ParityPromise:Hydropower, Salmon, and EndangeredSpecies in the Columbia Basin, 21 Esvri. L.657, 675-76
(1991) [hereinafter Blumm & Simrin, Unraveling Parity] (describing the fishery agency and
tribal recommendations).

.

76 NORTHwEsr POWER PLANNING COUNCIL, COLUMBIA RIVER BASIN FISH AND WILDLIFE PRO§§ 302-04 (1982) [hereinafter 1982 PROGRAM].
77 See JODY LAWRENCE ET AL., UNIvERsrrY OF WASH. DEP'T OF CIVIL ENG'G, THE WATER

GRAM

BUDGET A STEP ToWARDs BALANCING FisH AND POWER IN THE COLUMBIA RIVER BASIN

(Water

Resources Series Tech. Report No. 81, 1983).
78 See 6 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTs 101-02 (Robert E. Beck ed., 1994); Blumm & Simrin,

Unraveling Parity, supra note 75, at 677, 689.
79 The Northwest Power Act directs BPA to use its funds and authorities "in a manner
consistent with the... program." 16 U.S.C. § 839b(h)(10)(A) (1994). The Act requires other
federal water managers-the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, the Bureau of Reclamation, and
the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission-to take the program "into account at each rele"vant stage of decisionmaking processes to the fullest extent practicable." Id.
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ent to implementation issues,80 the flows the program promised often
were not delivered. 8' Instead of transporting fish downstream with in-

creased river flows, federal water managers developed a system of truck
and barge transportation.8 2 Both the Council and the fish and wildlife
agencies acquiesced to transportation, despite the fact that the Northwest
Power Act explicitly called for improved river flows. 8 3
B. Listing Salmon Under the Endangered Species Act

The failure to restructure river flows produced several reactions.
First, in March 1990, the Columbia Basin Fish and Wildlife Authority, a
coalition of federal and state fish and wildlife agencies and Indian tribes,

proposed a comprehensive mainstem flow regime that reiterated the 1981
fishery agency and tribal recommendation calling for specified flows on
the lower Columbia and summer flows through August of each year.8 4 Second, also in March, the Shoshone-Bannock tribe filed a petition to list the
Snake River sockeye under the ESA.8 5 Two months later, in May 1990, a
coalition of environmental groups submitted a petition to list several runs
of Snake River chinook.8 6 The ESA petitions initiated a new era of efforts
to restore Columbia Basin salmon.
In response to the ESA petitions, Oregon Senator Mark 0. Hatfield (ROr.) convened a series of meetings with major river users in an effort to
seek a means to avert listing determinations. Dubbed the "Salmon Summit," these meetings failed to produce a plan to avert the listings, but they

succeeded in producing a noteworthy contribution to salmon restoration
efforts: a proposal, championed by Idaho Governor Cecil Andrus, to draw
down lower Snake River reservoirs during the spring migration by twentyfive feet or more. 87 By reducing the cross-sectional area of a reservoir, a
§ 839b(h)(11)(A)(ii); see Blumm & Simrin, Unraveling Parity,supra note 75, at 669-70, 712;
see also Colloquium, Who Runs the River?, Panel Discussion, 25 ENVTL. L. 417, 422 (1995)
[hereinafter Who Runs the River?] (BPA General Counsel Harvey Spigal's explanation of the
meaning of the consistency provision in the Northwest Power Act).
80 See Blumn & Simrin, UnravelingParity, supra note 75, at 676-77, 684-85, 710-13.
81 See id. at 688-89 (discussing reasons why BPA and the Corps failed to implement the
water budget).
82 See 6 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 78, at 104-05.
83 16 U.S.C. § 839b(h)(6)(E)(ii) (1994) (requiring the Council's program to "provide flows
of sufficient quality and quantity to improve production, migration, and survival of [anadromous] fish as necessary to meet sound biological objectives"); see Adam Berger, An Insider's Perspective on Northwest Resource Information Center v. Northwest Power
Planning Council, 25 ENvTL. L. 369, 371-73 (1995).
84 See Blumm & Simrin, Unraveling Parity,supra note 75, at 707-08.
85 See id. at 714. In the case of Columbia Basin salmon, the ESA requires the Secretary'
of Commerce to consider ESA listing petitions from interested persons and determine if a
listing is warranted. See 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(3)(A)-(C) (1994).
86 See Blumm & Simrin, UnravelingParity,supra note 75, at 714. Some environmental
groups, notably Oregon Trout, sought ESA listings mo.re out of an aversion to proposals for
hatcheries than-out of concern over the failure to restructure river flows.
87 See id. at 725-26; Michael C. Blumm, Saving Idaho's Salmon: A History of Failure
and a Dubious Future,28 IDAHO L. REV. 667, 688 (1991) [hereinafter Blumm, Saving Idaho's
Salmon].
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drawdown would produce increased flow velocities with less water released from storage.8 8 After the Salmon Summit, reservoir drawdown became a prominent issue in salmon restoration planning.
As an additional response to the ESA petitions, Senator Hatfield requested a status report on the petitioned salmon runs from NMFS and the
Oregon Department of Fish and Wildlife.8 9 The alarming figures in the ensuing report-for example, spring chinook were at only six percent of the
1961 count in the Salmon River, the Snake River's principal tributary-left
little doubt that ESA listings were imminent. 90
In November 1991, NMFS listed the Snake River sockeye as an endangered species. 9' Five months later, in April 1992, the agency listed Snake
River chinook runs as threatened, 92 a classification that was subsequently
downgraded to endangered in 1994. 9 3 The listings prompted the Council to

amend its program in late 1991 to improve mainstem flows for migrating
salmon.94 For the first time, the Council set a spring Snake River flow
"target" of a minimum of 85,000 cubic feet per second (cfs) and included a
number of measures designed to achieve the target.95 Prior to the 1991
amendments, most of the Water Budget was supplied by runoff, not stor88

See supra notes 44-47 and accompanying text.

89 NATIONAL MARINE FISHERIES SERV. & OR. DEP'T OF FISH AND WILDLIFE, PAST AND PRESENT
ABUNDANCES OF SNAKE RIVER SOCKEYE, SNAKE RIVER CHINOOK AND LOWER COLUMBIA RIVER

COHO SALMON (1990).
90 Id. at 11; see Blumm & Simrin, UnravelingParity, supra note 75, at 716. A subse-

quent coast-wide survey, conducted under the auspices of the American Fisheries Society,
signaled that the salmon crisis was not limited to the Columbia Basin but was regional in
scope. Willa Nehlsen et a., Pacific Salmon at the Crossroads:Stocks at Risk from California, Oregon, and Washington, 16 FISHERIES 4 (Mar-Apr. 1991), excerpted and analyzed in
Joseph Cone, The Alarm That Was Heard: The Crossroads Report, in Tan NORTHWEST
SALMON CRISIS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 290, 290-300 (Joseph Cone & Sandy Ridlington eds.,

1996) [hereinafter NORTHWEST SALMON CRISIS].
91 Endangered and Threatened Species; Endangered Status for Snake River Sockeye
Salmon, 56 Fed. Reg. 58,619 (Nov. 20, 1991).
92 Endangered and Threatened Species; Threatened Status for Snake River Spring/Summer Chinook Salmon, Threatened Status for Snake River Fall Chinook Salmon, 57 Fed. Reg.
14,653 (Apr. 22, 1992).
93 Endangered and Threatened Species; Status of Snake River Sping/Summer Chinook
Salmon and Snake River Fall Chinook Salmon, 59 Fed. Reg. 42,529 (Aug. 18, 1994) (emergency interim rule); Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Emergency Reclassification of the Snake River Spring/Summer Chinook Salmon and the Snake River Fall Chinook
Salmon from Threatened to Endangered Status, 59 Fed. Reg. 54,840 (Nov. 2, 1994) (emergency rule).
94 NORTHWEST POWER PLANNING COUNCIL, AMENDMENTS TO THE COLUMBIA RIVER BASIN FIH

AND WILDLIFE PROGRAM (PHASE 2) 30-54 (1991) [hereinafter 1991 AMENDMENTS]. The Council
amended its program in four phases during 1991-92. Phase 1 involved habitat projects; Phase
2 concentrated on improving mainstem flows; Phase 3 addressed production issues and rebuilding schedules; and Phase 4 concerned resident fish and wildlife. See Blumm, Saving
Idaho's Salmon, supra note 87, dt 689 n.126 (discussing the 1991 amendments).
95 1991 AMENDMENTS, supra note 94, at 34-38. Actually, the target was expressed in terms
of a "minimum monthly average flow equivalent." Id. at 34. A "flow equivalent" is "the.flow
level required to achieve the same water particle travel time as 85,000 cfs at average normal
pool elevations at all projects. For example, 81,000 cfs at minimum operating pool elevations
is the flow equivalent of 85,000 cfs at average normal pool levels." Id. at 34 n.9.
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age.96 The amendments ended this practice, and in the process tripled the
amount of water released from storage. 97 However, the total amount of
water promised to increase flows in the lower Snake River flows was not
materially different than that promised in the original Water Budget nearly
ten years earlier. 98 Moreover, under most flow conditions the Council's
program continued to rely on barge and truck transport of juvenile
salmon, despite acknowledging that the benefits of artificial transportation were uncertain.9 9 The Council itself recognized the inadequacy of the
measures in its 1991 amendments to rebuild the salmon runs. 100 As a result, the amendments called for reservoir drawdowns within four years
unless studies demonstrated them to be "structurally or economically infeasible, biologically imprudent or inconsistent' with the . . Northwest
Power Act."' 0 1
Almost contemporaneously with the promulgation ofthe 1991 amendments, NMFS began to implement the ESA by initiating consultation procedures. In April 1992, NMFS issued a BiOp that determined that 1992
Columbia Basin hydroelectric operations would not jeopardize the continued existence of Snake River salmon. 10 2 This "no jeopardy" conclusion
The measures to achieve the target included: 1) lowering the four mainstem lower
Snake reservoirs to "near minimum operating pool levels"; 2) releasing 900,000 acre-feet of
water from the Corps' Dworshak Dam toproduce fish flows in low-water years; 3) shifting
flood control storage from Snake Basin reservoirs to Columbia Basin reservoirs in below
average water years (adding up to 200,000 acre-feet in the Snake Basin); 4) tapping uncontracted storage at Bureau of Reclamation projects for90,000 acre-feet and storage at Idaho
Power's Brownlee Dam for 110,000 acre-feet; and 5) calling for innovative water uses, such
as efficiency improvements, conservation, marketing, option-leasing, and storage buy-backs
(producing 100,000 acre-feet). Id. at 36-38, 50-53. In combination, these measures were intended to result in spring flows above the 85,000 cfs target in average or better-than-average
water years. Letter from John Shurts, Attorney, Northwest Power Planning Council, to
Michael C. Blumm 4 (Aug. 16, 1996) (on file with authors).
96 Letter from John Volkman, General Counsel, Northwest Power Planning Council, to
Michael C. Blumm (Aug. 13, 1996) (on file with authors).
97 Id.
98 See

Blumm, Saving Idaho's Salmon, supra note 87, at 692. The 1991 amendments
promised summer flows for the first time and nearly doubled the amount of water available
for fish flows on the Columbia River. Id. at 691-92.
99 Id. at 693; i991 AMENDMENTS, supra note 94, at 28-30. In fairness to the Council, the
federal and state fish and wildlife agencies (but not the tribes) acquiesced in the Corps'
transportation program. Moreover, the Council's program called for the fishery agencies to
decide when and how to transport fish. STRATEGY FOR SALMON, supra note 47, vol. U at 39.
100 NORTHWEST POWER PLANNING COUNCIL, AMENDMENTS TO THE COLUMBIA RIVER BASIN FISH

1992) [hereinafter RESPONSE TO
COMMENTS] ("However, the Council does not believe that these measures are enough.").
101 1991 AMENDMENTS, supra note 94, at 44.
102 Section 7(a)(2) of the ESA requires an agency proposing a federal action (the "action
agency")' to "insure" that the federal action "is not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of" any threatened or endangered species, or adversely modify its critical habitat, 16
U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (1994). To determine whether a proposed action would jeopardize -the
listed species, the action agency must consult with an "expert agency." In the case of
threatened and endangered Snake River salmon, the expert agency was NMFS, and the consultation resulted in NMFS's BiOps. See 50 C.F.R. §§ 222.23(a), 227.4 (1994). For a detailed
examination of the consultation process, see James Kilbourne, The EndangeredSpecies Act
AND WILDLIFE PROGRAM, RESPONSE TO COMMENTS 33 (Jan.
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was a consequence of NMFS's adoption of a controversial standard under
which hydroelectric operations were approved if they merely improved
river conditions from the previous year, 10 3 a standard that failed even to
level the decline of the listed species.'0 4 As part of the 1992 "no jeopardy"
opinion, NMFS issued an incidental take stitement that allowed takings of
listed salmon but required measures to minimize the takes, such as modifying dam structures and operations. 10 5
The next year, NMFS issued another "no jeopardy" opinion concerning the effect of Columbia Basin hydroelectric operations, but refined the
standard it used the previous year into a two-step process: first, the
agency evaluated whether the proposed operations would reduce salmon
\mortalities bielow those incurred during a selected 1986-90 "base period";
second, it considered whether the operations, in combination with all
other human effects on salmon, were reasonably likely to reduce mortalities over the long run so that salmon populations would stabilize.t °6 The
goal was to stabilize salmon populations at recent levels within four
salmon life cycles, about fifteen years. 10 7 NMFS approved the proposed
1993 hydroelectric operations because, influenced by the Council's 1991
amendments to its program, operations would increase Snake River spring
flows from an expected average of 48,000 cfs in 1992 to 85,000 cfs in

Under the Microscope:A Closeup Look from a Litigator'sPerspective, 22 ENvm. L. 499, 52571(1991).
A BiOp estimates the effects of a proposed agency action on a threatened or endangered species and determines whether the proposed action will likely jeopardize the continued existence of that species. 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(h) (1994). In essence, the expert agency
attempts to predict the future state of the listed species after implementation of the proposed action. If the expert agency can ensure that the post-action state is not likely to jeopardize the species, the agency issues a "no jeopardy biological opinion." 16 U.S.C..
§ i536(a)(2) (1994); 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(h)(3) (1994). Conversely, if the expert agency cannot
make this determination, it must issue a "jeopardy biological opinion." 50 C.F.R.
§ 402.14(h)(3) (1994). Jeopardy BiOps must contain "reasonable and prudent alternatives" to
the proposed action that will avoid jeopardy. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(3)(A) (1994); 50 C.F.R.
§ 402.14(g)(5) (1994).
103 NATIONAL MARINE FISHERIES SERV., ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT SECTION 7 CONSULTATION/
CONFERENCE BIOLOGICAL OPINION: 1992 OPERATION OF THE FEDERAL COLUMBIA RIVER POWER

SYSTEM 15, 21 (Apr.'1992) [hereinafter 1992 BIOP] (NMFS estimated that Snake River flows
under the 1992 BiOp would increase from an average of 60,000 cfs during 1984-90 to 64,000
cfs).
104 See Steven Daugherty, Threatened Owls and EndangeredSalmon: Implementing the
ConsultationRequirements of the EndangeredSpecies Act, 14 PuB. LAND L. REV. 203, 242-43
(1993). All NMFS required was that the operation "improve survival and make progress toward reversing the decline of listed and proposed species." Id. at 241 (quoting Letter from
Rolland A. Schmitten, Regional Director, National Marine Fisheries Service, to Ernest J. Harreil, Corps of Engineers, North Pacific Division 1-2 (Dec. 5, 1991)); see also Mark A. Eames,
The EndangeredSpecies Act, the FederalColumbia River Power System, and the National
Marine FisheriesService, 25 ENvTL. L. 389, 393 (1995).
105 1992 BIOP, supra note 103,'at 63-72.
106 1993 BIOP, supra note 49, at 10-11, 15; see Eames, supra note 104, at 395-96.
107 Eames, supra note 104, at 396.
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1993.108 The states of Idaho and Oregon promptly challenged this "no jeopardy" BiOp.

C. Idaho Department of Fish & Game v. National Marine Fisheries
Service: Rejecting the Status Quo

The Idaho Department of Fish & Game challenged the 1993 BiOp's
conclusion that Columbia Basin hydroelectric operations would produce
no jeopardy to listed salmon.' 09 Idaho claimed that the two-step methodology NMFS employed in arriving at its no-jeopardy conclusion was flawed,
and the result was arbitrary decision making.1 0 On March 28, 1994, District Judge Malcolm Marsh agreed with Idaho and struck down the 1993
NMFS BiOp.

Judge Marsh faulted the NMFS framework for making the jeopardy
decision on two grounds. First, he concluded that NMFS's justification for
choosing the 1986-90 "baseline period"-against which proposed hydroelectric operations would be measured-on grounds of "consistent management practices" was neither factually accurate nor biologically
sound. 1 ' NMFS had in fact employed longer baselines in 1992,112 and
Judge Marsh concluded the litmus of consistent practices "necessarily fo-

cuses more upon system capability than the needs of the species.""13 The
short four-year baseline skewed the jeopardy determination because the

years 1986-90 were years of drought and extremely low salmon runs, making it relatively easy to conclude that proposed operations would produce
a "significant reduction" in salmon mortality, and thus "no jeopardy" to the
species." 4 This focus on "system capabilities tending to the status quo

rather than the stabilization of the species" was, according to Judge
Marsh, arbitrary and capricious." 5
The second flaw in NMFS's framework for making the jeopardy determination concerned the agency's use of life cycle models to predict the
108 1993 BiOp, supra note 49, at tbl. 2; see Eames, supra note 104, at 396. The amendments to the Council's program, as well as the Idaho Department ofFish & Game and NRIC
decisions, were examined briefly in Michael C. Blumm, Columbia Basin Salmon and the
Courts: Reviving the Parity Promise, 25 ENvrL. L. 351, 360-62 (1995) [hereinafter Blumm,
Reviving Parity].See generally Who Runs the River, supra note 79, at 349-424 (discussing
conflicts between entities responsible for managing flows).
109 Oregon intervened on Idaho's side, and the State of Alaska and the four Columbia
Basin tribes with Stevens treaty fishing rights-the Confederated Tribes of the Umatilla,
Warm Springs, and Yakama reservations and the Nez Perce Tribe-participated as amici
supporting Idaho. The Pacific Northwest Generating Cooperative, the DSIs, and the Public
Power Council intervened in support of NMFS. See Idaho Dep't of Fish & Game v. National
Marine Fisheries Serv., 850 F. Supp. 886, 890-91 (D. Or. 1994).
110 Id. at 891. See Will Whelan, Idaho's Strategy in Idaho Department of Fish & Game v.
National Marine Fisheries Service, 25,ENvTL. L. 399 (1995).,
111 Idaho Dep't of Fish & Game, 850 F. Supp. at 892-96.
112 In 1992, NMFS employed a 1984-90 baseline for juvenile salmon, and a 1975-90 baseline for adult salmon. Id. at 893.
113 Id.
114 Id. Nor did NMFS consider alternative baseline periods. Id.
115 Id.
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effect of proposed operations on salmon populations, and whether the result would lead to stabilization at 1990 population levels within four
salmon generations, or by 2008.116 Although all three of the models NMFS
employed were fraught with uncertainty-Judge Marsh referred to them
as "educated guesses premised on 'crude assumptions"' 7 -NMFS, discounted pessimistic assumptions in each of the models.118 Disregarding
worst case assumptions "without well-reasoned analysis and without considering the full range of risk assumptions" was arbitrary and capricious,
Judge Marsh determined." 9 For one thing, the result inflated the confidence level that proposed operations would allow salmon populations to
rebound to 1990 levels by 2008 from fifty percent to between sixty and
seventy percent. 120 For another, the models failed to consider the risks
associated with small populations, such as inbreeding and what is called
the "extinction vortex," where environmental catastrophes could extirpate
12
the species. '
Having concluded that the methodologies underlying both NMFS's selection of a baseline and its predictive plans were arbitrary, 22 Judge
Marsh made some suggestions as to how NMFS could produce a BiOp
satisfying the directives of the ESA. He suggested that NMFS consider alternative baselines 23 and "significant information and data from wellqualified scientists such as the fisheries biologists from the states and
tribes" in carrying out the ESA's mandate of making decisions on the basis
of the best available scientific knowledge. 124 This admonition to consult
the biological views of the states and tribes may be one of the most enduring aspects of the decision, and is remarkably similar to the sentiments the
Ninth Circuit would articulate in its interpretation of the Northwest Power
Act six months later. 25 Finally, in perhaps the most remarkable part of his
opinion, Judge Marsh counseled that small, incremental steps would not
satisfy the ESA:
[T]he process is seriously, "significantly" flawed because it is too heavily
geared towards a status quo that has allowed all forms of river activity to proceed in a deficit situation-that is, relatively small steps, minor improvements
and adjustments-when the situation literally cries out for a major overhaul.
Instead of looking for what can be done to protect the species from jeopardy,
116

Id. at 896.

117 Id. at 897. The three juvenile passage models NMFS employed were BPA's Columbia
River Salmon Passage model (CRISP), the Council's Passage Analysis Model (PAM), and the

state and tribal fishery agencies' Fish Leaving Under Several Hypotheses model (FLUSH).
Id. at 896 n.25.
118 Id. at 897.

119 Id. at 898-99. NMFS rejected the pessimistic assumptions because the agency claimed
they failed to account for improved land management and hatchery practices. Id. at 897.
120 Id. at 897-99.
121 Id. at 898-99.
122 Id. at 893. Judge Marsh refused to draw a line between dam construction-related
salmon losses and operational losses. Id. at 895.
123 Id. at 893.
124 Id. at 900 (interpreting 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (1994)).
125 See infra notes 143-146, 153-156 and accompanying text.
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NMFS and the other action agencies have narrowly focused their attention on

what the establishment is capable of handling with minimal disrupion. 126.

This judicial impatience with administrative incrementalism was echoed
by the Ninth Circuit in the opinion analyzed in the next subpart.

D. Northwest Resource Information Center v. Northwest Power
Planning CounciL Reviving the ParityPromise

After adopting the amendments to the Columbia Basin Fish and Wildlife Program in December 1991, the Council consolidated those amendments and others it adopted in 1992 into what it called the "Strategy for
Salmon."1 27 Although the strategy offered the first improvement in mainstem flows since the program was initially promulgated in 1982,128 even
the Council's chairman conceded that the amendments were "not enough
for the fish."' 29 The Council's failure to set biological objectives drew the
following criticism:
It is a strange program that calls for incremental improvements in hydropower/
salmon tradeoffs before establishing the goals those improvements are to
achieve. The basic flow is one of approach: the Council starts from the premise
that not much can be done because of economic costs that entrenched river
users claim they will suffer. The contrast between the proposals of the 1991
amendments and the biologically-based results of the Columbia Basin Fish and
Wildlife Authority's on flows and Idaho's on reservoir drawdowns is
30
striking.'

-

This incremental approach, the result of a twelve-year history of deference
to power interests, 13 ' was challenged by a coalition of environmental
groups and the Yakama Indian Nation for being too weak, and by industrial customers of BPA for being too strong.
Six months after Judge Marsh's decision striking down the NMFS
BiOp, the Ninth Circuit invalidated the Council's 1991 amendments, agreeing with the environmentalists and the tribe.'3 2 The court, in an opinion by
Judge Thomas Tang, described the case as a "classic struggle" between

salmon and hydropower, "the two great natural resources of the Columbia
126 Idaho Dep't of Fish & Game, 850 F. Supp. at 900.
127 See STRATEGY FOR SALMON, supra note 47; see also infra note 166.
128 See Blumm, Saving Idaho's Salmon, supra note 87, at 692.
129 See id. at 694 (referring to RESPONSE TO COMMENTS, supra note 100, at 33) ("However,
the Council does not believe that these measures are enough."); THE TROUT & SALMON
LEADER 6 (Jan/Feb. 1992) (Council Chairman Ted Hallock said, "the plan doesn't do enough,
but considering all the interest groups involved, it was the best that could be expected.").
130 Blumm, Saving Idaho's Salmon, supra note 87, at 694.
131 See Berger; supra note 83, at 371, 373.
132 Northwest Resource Info. Ctr., Inc. v. Northwest Power Planning Council (NRIC), 35
F.3d 1371 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 116 S.Ct. 50 (1995). The discussion of this case is
adapted from 6 WATERS AND' WATER RIrHTS 105-09 (Robert E. Beck ed., 1994); and Blumm,
Reviving Parity,supra note 108, at 356-59. Challenges to plans under the Northwest Power
Act must be brought in the Ninth Circuit. 16 U.S.C. § 839f(e)(5) (1994); see Northwest Resource Info. Ctr., Inc. v. National Marine Fisheries Serv., 25 F.3d 872, 874-75 (9th Cir. 1994).
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River Basin... [a]t odds for most of this century." 133 Noting that Columbia
Basin salmon had declined from 10 to 16 million fish annually to only
about 2.5 million fish,' 3 4 and that hydropower was responsible for about
eighty percent of the decline, 13 5 the court determined that the 1980 Northwest Power Act "marked an important shift in federal policy," aimed at

"making fish and wildlife a 'co-equal partner' with the hdropower indus-

try.'u3 6 The court characterized the statute as "mark[ed by] ... its legisla-

tive craftsmanship," noting several innovations such as requiring "textual
consistency" (that is, interpreting its provisions consistent with other statutory provisions, especially environmental laws), adopting a systemwide
approach, redefining fish and wildlife mitigation, lowering the burden of

proof for taking action, and tapping hydroelectric revenues to finance restoration efforts.'3 7 But despite these legislative innovations, and despite

the fact that the .Council's program had been acclaimed as the world's largest biological restoration program, 13 8 the court concluded that the program had failed to satisfy the Act's directives. 3 9
The program's failures were essentially two: 1) it contained no biological objectives, and 2) it failed to explain the statutory basis for the restoration measures it adopted and. those it rejected, particularly
recommendations of the region's fishery agencies and Indian tribes that
the Council rejected.' 40 The Council argued that its reasoning for rejecting
agency and tribal recommendations was scattered throughout the administrative record, although contained largely in an appendix entitled "Re133 NRIC, 35 F.3d at 1375.
134 Id. at 1376 (citing Robert C. Lothrop, The Misplaced Role of Cost-Benefit Analysis in
Columbia Basin Fishery Mitigation, 16 ENvr L. 517, 522 (1986)).
135 Endangered and Threatened Species; Proposed Endangered Status for Snake River
Sockeye Salmon, 56 Fed. Reg. 14,055-02, 14,058 (Apr. 5, 1991).
136 NRJC, 35 F.3d at 1377-78.
137 Id. at 1378 (adopting the arguments made in Blumm, Fulfilling Parity,supra note 1,
at 118-121; and Blumm & Simrin, Unraveling Parity, supra note 74, at 667-68); see also
NRJC, 35 F.3d at 1377 (noting that the Northwest Power Act "marked the shift of the burden
of uncertainty-of proving specific harm to salmon from particular activities-from the
salmon to the power system").
138 NRIC, 35 F.3d at 1375 (citing Kai N. Lee & Jody Lawrence, Adaptive Management:
Learningfrom the Columbia River Basin Fish and Wildlife Program, 16 ENVTL. L. 431, 441
(1986)); see also NORTHWEST POWER PLANNING COUNCIL, 1987 COLUMBIA RIVER BASIN FISH AND
WLDum PROGRAM 5 (1987) ("[The program is] possibly, the most ambitious effort in the
world to save a biological resource.").
139 NRIC, 35 F.3d at 1395. The General Counsel of the Northwest Power Planning Council has suggested that the court may have responded to the optimism of the Act's drafters,
which is plain in the legislative history, but which seemed to dissipat as the difficulty of
salmon recovery became apparent in later years. John M. Volkman, Steering by Dicta, 25
ENVTL. L. 385, 386 (1995); see also Bodi, Northwest PowerAct History, supra note 72, at 367
("Fourteen years ago, we were optimistic-incredibly, and in hindsight, naively optinisticabout these legal prescriptions to save the salmon. We thought that the Northwest Power
Act answered all of our needs.").
140 NRIC, 35 F.3d at 1391-92 (interpreting 16 U.S.C. § 839b(h), (6)(C), (E) (1994)), 138486 (interpreting 16 U.S.C. § 839b(h)(7) (1994)).
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sponse to Comments."' 41 But the court rejected the Council's invitation to
search the record because it interpreted section 4(h)(7) of the Act, directing the Council to explain "in writing, as part of the program," to require explanation of the relationship between program recommendations
and the statutory criteria in the program document itself, not in an
42

appendix. 1

In perhaps its most notable ruling, the Ninth Circuit concluded that
the Northwest Power Act's provision requiring the Council to give "due
weight" to the recommendations of the fishery agencies and tribes' 43 demanded "a high degree of deference," not only to their recommendations
but also to the agencies' and tribes' interpretations of the statute.'4 This
conclusion was largely the product of the court's structural interpretation
of the Northwest Power Act. Comparing the Act's power provisions to the
statute's fish and wildlife provisions, Judge Tang determined that the former were open-ended provisions, giving the Council flexibility to make
quasi-legislative decisions; however, because the latter provisions contain
more detailed criteria and procedures, they narrowed the Council's discrerely" on the recomtion considerably, requiring the Council to "heavily
145
mendations of the fishery agencies and tribes.
We conclude that [section 4(h) of the Northwest Power Act] binds, more than

unleashes, the Council's discretion with respect to fish and wildlife issues. Indeed, we are convinced that the fish and wildlife provisions of the [Act] and
their legislative history require that a high degree of deference be given to fish-

of such provisions and their recommendations
ery managers' interpretations
146
for program measures.

141 See Berger, supra note 83, at 372-73. The "Response to Comments" was part.of the
1991 amendments to the Council's program. See RESPONSE To COMMENTS, supra note 100.
142 NRIC, 35 F.3d at 1385-86 (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 839b(h)(7) (1994)). The court concluded that it was important that the Council explain the relationship between its program
measures and the statutory criteria to promote both effective public participation, one of the
Act's purp 6 ses, and effective judicial review. Id. at 1385.
143 16 U.S.C. § 839b(h)(7) (1994).
144 NRIC, 35 F.3d at 1389.
145 Id. at 1388; see id. at 1387 ("The difference between the power plan and the fish and
wildlife provisions..., then, is a contrast of generous discretion and bound discretion; the
difference highlights the limited discretion of the Council [in rejecting the fish and wildlife
recommendations of the fishery agencies and tribes]."). Also influencing the court's deference ruling was the Act's legislative history and the fact that the fishery agencies and tribes
were involved in drafting the statute. Id. at 1388-89.
146 Id. at 1388; see also id. at 1388-89:
Congress realized that furtherance of the purpose of the Act, that fish and wildlife be
on a par with energy, required that the Council defer to the recommendations of agencies and tribes. Of course, the reason for this deference to fishery managers is their
unique experience and expertise in fish and wildlife. Congress intended that the
Council not simply tap this resource of information and advice, but that it "heavily
rely" upon it.
...We-find it inherently reasonable to give agencies and tribes, those charged
with the responsibility for managing our fish and wildlife, a high degree of deference
in the creation of a program and the interpretation of the Act's fish and wildlife
provisions.
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While ruling that the fishery agencies and tribes were entitled to a
high degree of deference, the court rejected the argument of BPA's industrial customers that the Act required each program measure to satisfy a
cost-benefit test. The court ruled that "a fish and wildlife measure cannot
be rejected solely because it will result in power losses and economic
costs," concluding that the statute "prevents cost considerations from precluding biologically sound restoration of anadromous fish in the Columbia
River Basin... so long as an adequate, efficient, economical, and reliable
power supply is assured." 147 Thus, the Council must assure only that overall its program does not produce an uneconomical power supply, 148 quite
unlikely given that even reservoir drawdowns probably will produce retail
rate increases of just five to ten percent.149
Although the court remand6d the case to the Council to repair its
administrative record, to aid the Council on remand it also construed the
15 0
five statutory criteria that the program recommendations must satisfy.
The court described these criteria as "significantly circumscrib[ing] the
Council's discretion," and no less a substantive obligation than the "equitable treatment" requirement previously interpreted by the Ninth Circuit as
a substantive directive.15 ' These criteria require 1) program measures to
complement fishery agency and tribal actions; 2) the use of the best available scientific information; 3) the setting of sound biological objectives,
and the adoption of the cheapest alternative only where equally effective
ecological alternatives exist; 4) consistency with Indian treaty rights; and
5) improved salmon survival at dams and improved river flows.
The first criterion requires program measures to "complement the existing and future activities" of the fishery agencies and tribes.' 52 Although
the court did not decide whether the Council's program satisfied this standard, it noted that the recent decision of Judge Marsh striking down the
NMFS BiOp under the ESA 153 urged "policy and operations in a direction
away from the status quo towards affirmative action" and observed that
"the Council's rejection of the agencies' and tribes' consensus as to increased flows and biological objectives does not appear to square well
with these efforts."154
The court construed the second criterion, using "best available scientific knowledge,"1 55 as requiring deference to the fishery agency and tribal
147 Id. at 1394 (adopting the arguments made in Lothrop, supra note 134, at 534-35, 549-

51).
NRIC, 35 F.3d at 1394. The court emphasized that the Northwest Power Act "assures
a 'power supply,' not a 'hydropower supply.'" Id. at 1378 n.13.
149 See Bodi, Northwest Power Act History, supra note 72, at 368.
150 16 U.S.C. § 839b(h)(6)(A)-(E) (1994).
151 NR!C, 35 F.3d at 1389 (citing Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian
Nation v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 746 F.2d 466,473 (9th Cir. 1984); and National
Wildlife Fed'n v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 801 F.2d 1505, 1514-15 (9th Cir. 1985)).
152 16 U.S.C. § 839b(h)(6)(A) (1994).
153 See supra notes 109-126 and accompanying text.
154 NRIC, 35 F.3d at 1391.
155 16 U.S.C. § 839b(h)(6)(B) (1994).
148
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interpretations and allowing for "reasonable inferences and predictions,"
but the court concluded that the Council's failure to explain its rejection
of the fish agency and tribal recommendations prevented a judicial determination as to whether the Council satisfied this requirement. 156 However,
the conclusion that the Council owes, deference to the scientific interpretations and inferences of the fishery agencies and tribes is clearly among.
the most important results of the case.
The Ninth Circuit also concluded that the Council violated the third
criterion, requiring the setting of "sound biological objectives" and adopting the "minimum economic cost" alternative only where equally effective
biological alternatives exist. 157 Essentially, the court faulted the Council

for not being specific enough, discounting the Council's goal of doubling
populations, for example, as being a m~re policy statement without time
deadlines; instead, the court suggested the statute required the kind of
specificity contained in fishery agency recommendations concerning
water particle travel times, recruits per spawner, smolts per adult.return,
and adult passage rates.' 5 8
The last criterion' 59 the court discussed, improved salmon survival at
dams and improved river flows necessary to meet sound biological objectives, 160 requires, according to the court, a "high degree of deference" to
the fishery agencies and tribes.' 61 Although the court concluded that the
Council's failure to explain its rejections of the recommendations from the'
fishery agencies and tribes precluded a judicial determination of whether
the Council satisfied the standard, it noted that "[t]he record evokes in us,.
however, a strong sense of skepticism; without explanation, the Council
rejected the consensus of most fishery managers on the issues of flows
in favor of the recommendations of power interand biological objectives
162
ests and DSIs."
It is not an exaggeration to suggest that by interpreting the Northwest
Power Act to require "a high degree of deference" both to the program
recommendations of the fishery agency and tribes and to their interpretations of the statute, the Ninth Circuit may have revolutionized Columbia
Basin hydroelectric operations. The court seems to have been fully aware
of this possibility. Judge Tang concluded:
Unfortunately, the record reveals few profound successes resulting from the[ ]
innovations in thinking [contained in the Northwest Power Act]. The Council's
approach seems largely to have been from the premise that only small steps
156
157
158

NRIC, 35 F.3d at 1391.
16 U.S.C. § 839b(h)(6)(C) (1994).
NRIC, 35 F.3d at 1392.

The court did not construe the fourth statutory criterion, which requires consistency
with Indian treaty rights, 16 U.S.C. § 839b(h)(6)(D) (1994), other than to suggest that "mea159

sures which would allow the extinction of Snake River fall chinook, for instance, upon
which the Yakima people largely depend for their livelihood, may very well be inconsistent
with the Yakima Nation's treaty reserved fishing rights." NRIC, 35 F.3d'at 1392.
160 16 U.S.C. § 839b(h)(6)(E) (1994).
161 NRIC, 35 F.3d at 1392.
162 Id. at 1392-93.
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are possible, in light of entrenched river user claims of economic hardship.
Rather than asserting its role as a regional leader, the Council has assumed the
role of a consensus builder, sometimes sacrificing the Act's fish and wildlife
goals for what is, in essence, the lowest common denominator acceptable to
163
power interests and DSIs.

The "lowest common denominator" is, apparently, no longer acceptable. Coupled with Judge Marsh's rejection of the status quo and his call
for a "major overhaul" of system operations, 16 the Ninth Circuit decision
signaled that the federal courts would not allow Columbia Basin salmon
restoration plans to proceed on an incremental course while salmon populations nosedive.

165

IV. RESPONDING TO THE COURTS: THE COMPETING SALMON
RESTORATION PLANS
The aforementioned legal battles and the continuing decline of
salmon runs and habitat resulted in the promulgation of several new plans

to address salmon recovery in the basin. Three competing plans for increasing salmon survival, all released within a one-year period between
late 1994 and mid-1995, are discussed below. The chief differences be-

tween the plans concerned the emphasis each plan gave to increased
flows and/or reservoir drawdowns to improve inriver migration as opposed to out-of-river transport by barge and truck.
A. The 1994 Amendments to the Columbia River Basin Fish and
Wildlife Program

The Council reinitiated the amendment process for its Columbia
River Basin Fish and Wildlife Program (the program) 16 6 in May 1994, receiving recommendations and releasing them for notice and comment on
163 Id. at 1395.

164 See supra text accompanying note 126.
165 Whereas there were 2.5 million adult salmon returning to the Columbia River when
the Northwest Power Act passed in 1980, fewer than one million returned in 1994. See Bodi,
Northwest Power Act History, supra note 72, at 365-66. In 1995, only 1,116 wild spring/
summer adult salmon passed Lower Granite Dam, just one-seventh of the number four years
before' American Rivers Motion, supra note 21, at 2; see also supra note 33.
166 The Council's program was created in November 1982 pursuant to the Northwest
Power Act. 16 U.S.C. § 839b(h)(1)(A) (1994); see supra note 73. Major amendments to the
program were made in 1984, 1987, 1990, and 1991-94. See DRAFr AMENDMENTS APPENDIX,

supra note 48, app. A at 1.In 1992, the Council promulgated the Strategy for Salmon, which
consisted of amendments to the program that focused particularly on salmon. See STRATEGY
FOR SALMON, supra note 47. The Strategy for Salmon was integrated into the Council's existing program. See generally NORTHwEsT POWER PLANNING COUNCIL, 1994 COLUMBIA RIVER
BASIN FISH AND WILDLIFE PROGRAM (Jan. 1994) [hereinafter INTEGRATED PROGRAM] (the latest

integrated program prior to the 1994 amendments). Thus, the Council's 1994 amendments
included amendments to the Strategy for Salmon, which is merely a label for the portion of
the Council's program concerning salmon, as well as to other sections of the program. See
id. (other sections of the program include, for example, measures to protect resident fish
and wildlife).
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August 16, 1994.167 Three weeks later, the Ninth Circuit handed down the
NRIC decision. 168 As a result, the Council decided to publish the same
recommendations for notice and comment, still attempting to meet its
self-imposed deadline of December 1994 for amending the program. 169
The Council was able to adhere to this tight time frame because at the
time of the NRIC decision, it had all but concluded a "mainstem hypothesis" rulemaking. This was based on a scientific workshop that attempted
to identify areas of agreement and disagreement concerning increased
river flows versus barging in terms of salmon survival. 170 The rulemaking
gave the Council an important conceptual grounding for proceeding with
the 1994 amendments. In particular, it helped commit the Council to apply
"adaptive management" principles to the flow versus barging issue; in
other words, to "learn by doing." 171 The program measures adopted later
in 1994 were designed to test the hypotheses underlying the flow/barging
debate. The Council was also able to authorize reservoir drawdowns employing adaptive management principles. 172,

167 See NORTHWEST POWER PLANNING COUNCIL, RECOMMENDATIONS TO AMEND THE ANADRO-

1, at 1
(Aug. 1994).
168 Northwest Resource Info. Ctr., Inc. v. Northwest Power Planning Council, 35 F.3d
1371 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 116 S.Ct. 50 (1995).
169 The Council noted that the tribes and state and federal fishery agencies had "counseled strongly against delaying the amendment process." See DRAFT AMENDMENTS APPENDIX,
supra note 48, app. A at 3. The Council also wished to act promptly and have its recommendations in place for the 1995 spring migration season:
In this process, the Council has taken into consideration the [Ninth Circuit's] admonition that "the emphasis of the entire [Northwest Power Act] is on prompt action."
Given continuing declines in the salmon runs, having adequate protections in
the.., program is essential. If the Council were to request a new set of amendment
recommendations to the ... program, the Council probably would be unable to make
decisions before the spring 1995 salmon migration.
Id. (quoting NRIC, 35 F.3d at 1379 (citing Northwest Resource Info. Ctr. v. National Marine
Fisheries Serv., 818 F. Supp. 1399, 1401 (W.D. Wash. 1993), affd, 25 F.3d 872 (9th Cir.
1994))). And it should be noted that the membership of the Council underwent a significant
change following the November 1994 gubernatorial elections in Oregon and Idaho. See infra
note 179.
For the complete recommendations that the Council received and viewed in promulgating the 1994 amendments, see NORTHWEST POWER PLANNING COUNCIL, DRAFr ANADROMOUS
MOUS FISH SECTIONS OF THE COLUMBIA RIVER BASIN FISH AND WILDLIFE PROGRAM, PART

FISH AMENDMENTS TO THE 1994 COLUMBIA RIVER BASIN FISH AND WILDLIFE PROGRAM (Sept.
1994) [hereinafter DRAFT AMENDMENTS] and DRAFr AMENDMENTS APPENDIX, supra note 48.
170 See NORTHWEST POWER PLANNING .OUNCIL, FLOW/VELOCITY-SURVIVAL WORKSHOP: MEET-

ING SUMMARY (Feb. 22-23, 1994); and NORTHWEST POWER PLANNING COUNCIL, FLow/VELocrrYSURVIVAL WORKSHOP 'II: MEETING SUMMARY (June 17, 1994) (reproduced in the administrative
record of the Council's 1994 Fish and Wildlife Program amendment process as documents

95-1/1040 and 95-1/1041).
171 See Lee & Lawrence, supra note 138, at 441-60; John M. Volkman & Willis E. McConnaha, Through a Glass Darkly: Columbia River Salmon, the Endangered Species Act, and
Adaptive Management, 23 ENVTL. L. 1249, 1251-63 (1993).
172 See infra notes 198-218 and accompanying text.
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Three other Council studies, all initiated pursuant to directives in the
Council's 1991 amendments, 173 laid important groundwork for the 1994
amendments. First, a drawdown committee-comprised of representatives of the Council, the fish and wildlife agencies and tribes, and othersmonitored the Corps' evaluation of drawdown options. 174 Second, the
Snake River water committee-comprised of representatives from the
Council, the fish and wildlife agencies and tribes, conservation organizations, and user groups-examined alternatives for securing an additional
one million acre-feet of water for Snake River salmon flows from water
purchases, efficiency gains, and other nonstructural methods. 1 75 Third, the
Environmental Defense Fund performed a cost-effectiveness evaluation of
reservoir drawdowns, nonstructural water alternatives, and new storage
projects in terms of increasing flow velocities in the Snake, concluding
that water purchases were the most cost-effective option, but that reservoir drawdowns could be expected to provide the biggest benefits in reduced water travel time. 176
These studies informed the Council's judicially imposed duty to reexamine the record and make new findings incorporating the directives of
the NRIC court. 7 7 The Council proceeded to formulate the program recommendations it received into five options 78 and still meet its deadline
for amending the program.
On December 14, 1994, the Council, by a 6-2 vote,'7 9 approved amend173 See Blumm, Saving Idaho's Salmon, supra note 87, at 694-95 (discussing the study
directives).
174 HARZA & Assocs., REVIEW OF RESERVOIR DRAWDOWN, FINAL REPORT TO THE NORTHWEST

POWER PLANNING COUNCIL COLUMBIA/SNAKE DRAwDowN COMMITTEE (Apr. 1994).
175 BOOKMAN-EDMONSTON ENG'G, INC., REPORT OF THE SNAKE RIVER BASIN WATER COMMITTEE, WATER MANAGEMENT OPPORTUNITIES WITHIN THE SNAKE RIVER BASIN, OREGON AND IDAHO

(July
176 1994).
See ADAM DiAmANr & ZAcH WILLEY, WATER FOR SALMON: AN ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF
SALMON RECOVERY ALTERNATIVES IN THE LOWER SNAKE AND COLUMBIA RIVERS at IV

(Apr. 1995)

(an economic analysis prepared for the Council). Although this study concluded that dryyear water leasing and other water acquisitions were the most cost-effective alternatives,
reservoir drawdown alternatives could be expected to provide the biggest benefits in reduced water travel time. Id. at V.
177 See DRAr AMENDMENTS APPENDIX, sipra note 48, app. A at 3.
178 The Council declared that any of the five options could be "adopted, modified, or,
rejected in whole or in part." DRAFr AMENDMENTS APPENDIX, supra note 48, app. A at 15; for
the five options, see DRAr AMENDMENTS, supra note 169, § 5.
179 The six Council members voting for the 1994 amendments were Chairman Angus
Duncan and Ted Hallock of Oregon, Ken Casavant and Ted Bottiger of Washington, and
Robert Saxvik and Andy Brunelle of Idaho. The two dissenting Council members, Stan Grace
and John N. Etchart, were both from Montana. Shortly after the 1994 amendments, the membership of the Council underwent major changes due to the election of new governors in the
states of Oregon and Idaho. Joyce Cohen replaced Ted Hallock and, in September 1995, John
Brogoitti assumed Angus Duncan's seat on the Council after Duncan resigned. John Etchart
replaced Duncan as Chairman of the Council until an election of new officers could be held.
In Idaho, Mike Field and Todd Maddock were appointed to represent Idaho, replacing Robert Saxvik and Andy Brunelle. Brunelle had been a controversial appointee of then-Governor
Cecil Andrus, replacing Jay Webb, who resigned in November 1994-immediately prior to
the release of the 1994 amendments. Also, in December 1995, Ted Bottiger resigned and was
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ments to its program.180 These amendments called for several significant
changes in the Council's approach to restoring salmon runs, increasing
juvenile survival rates, and achieving the program's goal of doubling
salmon and steelhead runs without the loss of biodiversity.' 8
1. Rive Rows
The most important of the 1994 amendments concerned the Council's
adoption of higher flow velocity targets for both the Snake and Columbia
Rivers to improve juvenile salmon survival. The Council called182for "sliding
scale flow/velocity objectives or targets" in the Snake River.
Under the Council's program, spring flows would range from a mini. mum monthly flow average of 85,000.cubic feet per second (cfs) to 140,000
cfs at Lower Granite Dam.1s8 Previously, the program called for only184a
minimum monthly average spring flow of 85,000 cfs at Lower Granite.
goal for Lower
Under the 1994 amendments, the minimum monthly flow
86
Granite' 85 in the summer months would be 50,000 cfs.'

On the lower Columbia, the amendments called for sliding scale
monthly flow targets at The Dalles Dam for a three-year period. 8 7 Over
replaced by Mike Kreidler. See NORTHWEST POWER PLANNING COUNCIL, 1995 ANNUAL REPORT 4
(Oct. 1995) [hereinafter 1995 ANNUAL REPORT]. The last-minute approval of the amendments,
just before the Council's membership was about to turn over, received some criticism. See
Cyrus NoL, Funding the Fish Plans; Securing the Sixth Vote, CLEARING UP, Jan. 16, 1995, at
3.
180 The final result was ihe Council's 1994 Columbia Basin Fish and Wildlife Program. See
1994 PROGRAM, supra note 9.
181 1994 PROGRAM, supra note 9, at 4-4. The Council hoped that the 1994 amendments
would lead to an improvement in salmon survival over the next 20 years. DRAFT AMENDMENTS APPENDIX, supra note 48, app. B at 3. The Council also established a systemwide goal
of "a healthy Columbia River Basin" that includes, among other things, the "long-term sustainability of native fish." 1994 PROGRAM, supra note 9, at 2-1. Another goal of the program is
the protection and enhancement of the basin's ecosystem. Id.
. 182 1994 PROGRAM, supra note 9, at 15-67. The NRC study criticized the concept of setting
flow "targets," suggesting that mere targets gave too much discretion to project managers
and that, in order to be effective, flow measures had to be imposed as "operating constraints"-meaning thatflow measure would take precedence over power production. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 8, at 210.
183 1994 PROGRAM, supra note 9, at 5-20.
184, See, e.g., INTEGRATED PROGRAM, supra note 166, at 5-8.
185 Lower Granite is one of four lower Snake River federal dams that juveniles must pass
through during their migration. Lower Granite is the uppermost dam on the Snake, followed
by Little Goose, Lower Monumental, and Ice Harbor.
186 1994 PROGRAM, supra note 9, at 5-20. This flow target would be increased in years of
high runoff. Id. Previously, the Council had set aside up to 137,000 acre-feet of water, to be
drafted from Brownlee Reservoir, to aid in the migration of juvenile fall chinook. INTEGRATED PROGRAM, supra note 166, at 5-10.
187 1994 PROGRAM, supra note 9, at 5-29. Prior to the 1994 amendments, the program
rarely set hard flow targets, but, had instead provided water for flow augmentation. This
water was measured in terms of million acre-feet (MAF). See, e.g., INTEGRATED PROGRAM,
supra note 166, at 5-12 to 5-14; see infra note 228 for a definition of an "acre-foot" of water.
The Council created the Water Budget in 1982, reserving 4.64 MAF of water to be used to
facilitate juvenile migration. 1982 PROGRAM, supra note 76, at 3-4 (1.19 MAF of this amount
to be used to aid Snake River migration). The amount of water to be held in storage was
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this three-year "critical period," spring flow targets would range from
300,000 cfs to 260,000 cfs to'220,000 cfs.' 8 8 The peak flow goals of 140,000
cfs in the Snake River and 300,000 cfs in the Columbia River were the
same as the state fishery agencies' 1991 flow proposal, except that those
1991 recommendations were expressed in instantaneous flows and daily
averages, instead of the program's monthly flow averages. 8 9
The Council also adopted specific "integrated rule curves" at Hungry
Horse and Libby Dams, 19° employing the rule curves to balance the need
for salmon flows with the protection of resident fish and wildlife, as it is
required to do under the Northwest Power Act.191 NMFS was also concerned about the impact of improved flows on resident fish, although that
concern may not have been an appropriate factor to consider when
192
promulgating the BiOp.
The key to the ambitious flow goals contained in the 1994 amendments was the Council's endorsement of a mainstem passage experiment
-under which the program authorized both inriver passage and artificial
transportation for an interim period, while carefully monitoring and evaluating the results in order to determine which method of passage is superior. 193 For purposes of this experiment, the Council assumed that both
increased flow velocities and transportation would increase salmon survival.' 94 But in order to conduct the experiment with roughly the same
number of fish passing inriver as being transported, the Council anticipated that fewer fish would be transported. 95 Moreover, the Council also
assumed that inriver fish passage would benefit from higher flows, endorsing as a working hypothesis the notion that increased flows would proincreased over the years in the Council's program. See 1995 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 179,
at 7. According to the Council, the 1994 amendments would provide 11.87 MAF of stored
water to be used for increased river flows-compared to 4.64 MAF reserved in the original
1982 Water Budget. Id. For a description and history of the Water Budget, see Blumm &
Simrin, Unraveling Parity, supra note 75, at 674-79, 688, 690; and supra notes 76-78.
188 1994 PROGRAM, supra note 9, at 5-29. The Council referred to the three-year period as a
"critical period," id., adopting terminology employed by hydroelectric system planners.
189 See Blumm & Simrin, Unraveling Parity, supra note 75, 707-08 (listing the recommended flows).
190 1994 PROGRAM, supra note 9, at 5-5, 10-5, 10-8.
191 Under its program, the Council must restore fish and wildlife populations "to the extent affected by the development and operation" of the Columbia Basin hydroelectric system. 16 U.S.C. § 839b(h)(10)(A) (1994); see also supra note 70 and accompanying text;
NoRTHwEsT POWER PLANNING COUNCIL, 1996 ANNUAL REPORT 9 (Oct. 1996) [hereinafter 1996
ANNUAL REPORT].

192See infra notes 285, 481 and accompanying text.
193 1994 PROGRAM, supra 9, at 5-6. The Council's mainstem experiment had five elements:
1) a statement of hypotheses concerning the efficacy of both inriver passage and transportation; 2) development of technical aspects of the experiment with the assistance of the Council's independent group of scientists; 3) improvements in inriver passage; 4) an accelerated
research effort to clarify issues such as the flow/survival relationship; and 5) a partnership
between the Council, NMFS, fishery managers, and river operators to carry out and evaluate
the experiment. Id.
194 Id. at 5-7.
195 Id. Actually, the Council thought that while fewer fish would be transported under
low flow conditions, more would be transported under high flows. Id.
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duce increased salmon survival.' 96 The Council cautioned that increased
flows alone would not be enough to increase salmon survival, but that
reduced water temperature, control of predation, improved transportation
methods, and completion of screen installation at the dams would be nec197
essary as well.

2., Reservoir Drawdowns
The chief means to achieve the flow targets adopted by the Council in
1994 was a phased approach to reservoir drawdowns, championed by outgoing Idaho Governor Cecil Andrus.19 8 The amendments called for a twomonth, twenty-five foot drawdown of Lower Granite reservoir, to an elevation of 710 feet in 1995.199 In 199, Lower Granite would be drawn down
196 Id. at 5-9 to 5-12. The Council stated that the failure of the region to develop better
information on the increased flow/increased survival relationship was partly due to unavailability of new techniques and technologies. Id. at 5-5. But the Council also stressed that
it has also been the result of unnecessarily prolonged debates about the need for the
research, the best methods for conducting it and the desirability of taking additional
action pending the development of additional information. The Council hopes that its
call for immediate action and immediate improvement in the knowledge base will
help resolve this longstanding impasse.
Id. Although the Council noted that there remained uncertainty in the flow/survival relationship, particularly concerning the amount of change in survival for a given change in flow, id.
at 5-10, it concluded that "[tihe preponderance of information indicates that during the
downstream migration, the lowest survival occurs at the lowest flow. At higher water velocities, survival continues to increase but at a decreasing rate." Id. at 5-11. In 1996, the report of
the Independent Scientific Group concluded that a clear flow/survival relationship had yet to
be demonstrated, but also concluded that "[f]low is clearly essential for anadromous fish to
complete their life cycles." ISG REPORT, supra note 7, at 239, 247.
197 1994 PROGRAM, supra note 9, at 5-1. The Council had previously adopted a 9096 fish
guidance efficiency (FGE) as the design criterion for bypass systems, which are devices that
deflect fish away from turbine intakes. Id. at 5-36; see also INTEGRATED PROGRAM, supra note
166, at 5-25. FGE is the percentage of the total number of fish approaching a turbine intake
that are deflected from the turbine by a guidance device such as a turbine intake screen. See
1994. PROGRAM, supra note 9, at G-5. The Council had also previously required a 98% or
greater salmon survival rate in all bypass or collection facilities, meaning that 98%of the 90%
of salmon deflected into the bypass system survive from the system entrance to its outfall.
Id. at 5-37; see also INTEGRATED PROGRAM, supra note 166, at 5-25.
198 See Blumm & Simrin, Unraveling Parity, supra note 75, at 725; Blumm, Saving
1
Idaho's Salmon, supra note 87, at 688.
199 1994 PROGRAM, supra note 9, at 5-25. The drawdown would occur from April 16 to
June 15-the migration period for many juveniles. Id. The minimum operating level at
Lower Granite is 733 feet, although the average elevation is 735 feet. Telephone Interview
with Willis E. McConnaha, Northwest Power Planning Council (Jan. 31, 1997). The spillway
level is approximately 697 feet at the reservoir; 690 feet is the lowest elevation level at
Lower Granite at which adult fish ladders will still operate. Id. The tribes also recommended
drawdown of Lower Granite to 710 feet. See infra note 367 and accompanying text.
The drawdown was also contingent on the manufacture of dipping baskets capable of
handling the juveniles that enter the gatewells. 1994 PROGRAM, supra note 9, at 5-25. A
gatewell is a rectangular, vertical slot that runs down the forebay of a dam, in which a
concrete slab (or several concrete slabs) can be inserted to cover a turbine and make it
inoperative during times of turbine repair or modification. Telephone Interview with John M.
Volkman & Willis E. McConnaha, Northwest Power Planning Council (Apr. 18, 1996). Migrating fish often end up in the gatewells as they attempt to get past a dam. Id. Dipping baskets
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another twenty feet-to near spillway level (an elevation of 690 feet)-for
the two-month period; these deeper drawdowns would continue at Lower
Granite until 2002200
The spillway is the channel or passageway around or over a dam
through which excess water is released or "spilled" without passing
through the turbines. 20 1 Thus, a drawdown to near spillway level is a
drawdown to a level near this structure. There are an array of possible
levels to which a reservoir may. be drawn down: the minimum irrigation
pool (MIP), 20 2 the minimum operating pool (MOP), 20 3 near spillway level,
spillway level, 20 4 ard natural river level.
The 1994 amendments called for Little Goose reservoir to be drawn
down to near spillway level in 1999 for the two-month spring migration
period as well.20 5 Like the Lower Granite drawdowns, the Little Goose
drawdowns would continue until 2002.206 In 2002, the Council would de-'
termine whether to draw down the two remaining lower Snake River
projects, Lower Monumental and Ice Harbor Dams, to spillway or natural
20 7
river levels.
To achieve the flow target of 220,000 cfs to 300,000 cfs on the lower
Columbia,' the amendments called for the John Day reservoir to be operated at near MOP by 1996, and to remain at that level year-round thereafter.208 Until 1996, John Day would be operated at MIP from May 1 to
August 31 of each year.2°9 The drawdowns to near MOP beginning in 1996
would be contingent, according to the Council, on "full, prior mitigation of
would be, in theory, devices that safely extracted the smolts from the gatewells during a
drawdown. Id.
200 1994 PROGRAM, supra note 9, at 5-26 to 5-27.
201 Id. at G-12. A spillway operates as a safety valve for a dam and must be able to
discharge major floods without damaging the dam, while also maintaining the reservoir level
below some predetermined maximum level. Id.
202 MIP is the lowest level at which irrigation pumps at a reservoir will operate effectively. Id. at 5-29. In other words, a reservoir drawdown to MIP would be to the depth of the
irrigation pipes. Bruce, supra note 54, at 3. The only reservoir where a drawdown to MIP is
an issue is John Day, which is the longest reservoir on the lower Columbia.
203 MOP is "[t]he lowest water level of an impoundment at which navigation locks can
still operate." 1994 PROGRAM, supra note 9, at G-9. MOP is higher than a spillway crest
drawdown.
204 Spillway level is often used synonymously with "spillway crest," the elevation at which
the reservoir behind the dam is level with the top of the dam's spillway. Id. at G-12.
205 Id. at 5-26. Little Goose would be drawn down to an elevation of 590 feet. Id.
206 Id.
207 Id. at 5-27. The Council's program is unclear on what actions are to occur in 2002. The
Council will "determine" in 2002 if Ice Harbor and Lower Monumental drawdowns will occur. Id. However, the Council called on the Corps to prepare for Lower Granite and Little
Goose drawdowns to near spillway or natural river levels as well. Id. at 5-26 to 5-27. Apparently, deeper drawdowns at Lower Granite and Little Goose could be implemented along
with the drawdowns at Ice Harbor and Lower Monumental-sometime after 2002. Telephone Interview with Willis E. McConnaha, supra note 199.
208 1994 PROGRAM, supra note 9, at 5-32.
209 Id. at 5-29.
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impacts to irrigators and other reservoir users." 210 These mitigation measures could include dredging at the upper end of the John Day reservoir to
allow lowering the reservoir below the current MIP. 211 The Council expected that these measures would lead to a lowering of the MIP by
1994.212 In 2002, John Day would then be lowered to near spillway crest,
2 13
either 1) from May 1 to August 31 annually or 2) year-round.
The effectiveness of reservoir drawdowns as a tool to enhance juvenile survival has long been a matter of contention. 214 In adopting the
drawdown proposal, the Council made clear its belief that the best way to
analyze the effectiveness of drawdowns was to actually conduct them:
[M]any of the positive and negative aspects of drawdown are unsubstantiated.
Drawdown is outside the range of conditions of almost all scientific studies
relating to mainstem passage. This is because almost all of the studies have
been conducted after the hydroelectric system was in place. . . . This allows
endless opportunity for speculation on the potential positive and negative ,aspects, none of which will be know[n] with certainty until drawdown is, tried.
For example, PNUCC 2 15 and other utility interests frequently assert that
drawdown will have a negative impact by concentrating predators; in other
words, the number of predators will stay the same, but the volume of water
will decrease under drawdown. With more predators in a smaller volume of
water, they contend that predation rates will go up. There is absolutely no em-•
pirical evidence to support such a claim. In fact, an at least equally plausible
hypothesis is that the drawdown will increase velocities and so decrease the
suitable habitat for predators, and thus decrease Uuvenile] mortality beyond
216
what would be expected on the basis of water velocity improvements alone.

210 Id. at 5-32. However, the Corps subsequently notified NMFS that it did not believe it
could put the necessary mitigation measures in place in time for a 1996 drawdown. See 1995
ANNUAL REPoRT, supra note 179, at 9. The Corps declared that it "lacks legislative authority
to mitigate for potential impacts to private facilities and that specific Congressional approval is necessary." Id.
211 1994 PROGRAM, supra note 9, at 5-32. Presumably, irrigation pumps could also be extended to help lower the MIP at John Day, although the Council did not mention this
possibility.
212 Id. at 5-29.
213 Id. at 5-32.
214 See supra notes 44-50 and accompanying text.
215 PNUCC, the Pacific Northwest Utilities Conference Committee, represents the basin's
electric customers, including utilities and the DSIs. During the amendment process, PNUCC
recommended the deletion of all language that mentioned drawdowns or any positive benefits from them in the program. See DRAFr AMENDMENTS, supra note 169, § 5 Drawdown,
Option 1 at 5-15 to 5-19.
• :
216 1994 PROGRAM, supra note 9, at 15-65. The Council also stated that drawdowns may be
"less effective than barge transportation, equally effective, or, as the fish managers suggest,
more effective. Without comparative data, we cannot know." Id. at 15-80.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2982177

COLUMBIA BASIN SALMON

1997]

This sentiment reflects adaptive management principles, which the Council has long employed 217 inother aspects of its program, but which it had

not applied to the mainstem passage issue until

1994.218

3. Spills
In addition to increased flow velocity and reservoir drawdowns, the
1994 amendments called for spill to achieve eighty percent fish passage
efficiency (FPE) at the mainstem dams. 219 FPE is "the percentage of the
total number of fish that pass a dam without passing through the turbine[s]." 220 This eighty percent rate reflects a marked increase in spill efficiency. Previously, the program had recommended only seventy percent
migrants and just fifty percent FPE for summer
FPE for 22spring
1
migrants.
A spill program at mainstem dams has been in place since December
31, 1988, when, to settle a lawsuit, BPA, fishery agencies, tribes, and utility
representatives negotiated a ten-yeir spill agreement covering Lower Monumental, Ice ,Harbor, John Day, and The Dalles Dams. 222 The Council
adopted the spill agreement in 1989.223 The Council's 1994 amendments
increased the protection provided by the 1988 spill agreement by setting a
higher FPE standard for the spills and calling for spill at all Snake River
(Lower Monumental
projects, instead of just at the two Snake River dams
224
agreement.
1988
the
in
specified
and Ice Harbor)
Under the 1994 program, any spill must be consistent with state water
225
quality standards, based on the maximum allowable dissolved gas level.
Heavy spill may lead to gas bubble disease in juveniles, although there is
considerable disagreement over the effects of dissolved gas on juveniles
217 Id. at 5-6; see'also id. § 3 (detailing the Council's plan for coordinated implementation, research, monitoring, and evaluation); Lee & Lawrence, supra note 138, at 432-33;
Volkman & McConnaha, supra note 171, at 1258-63.
218 1994 PROGRAM, supra note 9, at 5-6; see Blunmm & Simrin, Unraveling Parity, supra
note 75, at 740-77 (complaining that adaptive management was not applied to mainstem
passage).
219 1994 PROGRAM, supra note 9, at 5-36, 5-40. Snake River projects were to meet this goal
from April 15 to July 31; Columbia River projects from May 1 to August 31. Id.
220 Id. at G-5. FPE should be distinguished from fish guidance efficiency (FGE), which is
the proportion of smolts that pass the dams via juvenile passage facilities. 1995 BiOP, supra
note 11, at 45. FPE includes the percentages of fish that pass by both spill and juvenile
passage facilities. Id. Because the presence and effectiveness of juvenile passage facilities
varies at different dams, the amount of spill necessary to achieve a given FPE also varies.
See id. at 46 (tbl. 12) (showing FGE and the corresponding FPE for spring migrants at four
dams).
221 INTEGRATED PROGRAM, supra note 166, at 5-26.
222 See 1994 PROGRAM, supra note 9, at 5-36; see also Blumm & Simrin, UnravelingParity, supra note 75, at 699-700 (discussing the lawsuit and negotiations).
223 See Blumm & Simrin, Unraveling Parity, supra note 75, at 699-700 (noting that the
spill agreement-at the time considered a large step in improving juvenile survival rateswas "not reached as a result of the Council's leadership").

224 1994 PROGRAM, supra note 9, at 5-36.

225 Id. at 5-36, 5-40.
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and the levels at which spill begins to adversely affect them. 226 Thus, the
Council's eighty percent FPE standard must be met only within the limits
22 7
of the applicable state water quality standards for dissolved gases.
4. Water Purchases
In addition to improvements in flow velocities and spill levels, the
Council authorized the purchase of one million acre-feet (MAF) of water
from willing sellers in the Snake River Basin to aid in achieving boosted
river flows. 228 This water would be in addition to the Council's 1992 au-

229
thorization to purchase 427,000 acre-feet tO-aid in flow improvements,
230
providing a total of 1.427 MAF available to aid migrating juveniles. New
purchases would be in increments, with 500,000 acre-feet purchased by
1996, and another 500,000 acre-feet by 1998.231

5. Transportation
An important change in the 1994 amendments concerned an alteration in the Council's stance toward barging and trucking juvenile salmon
around the dams. The Council's mainstem experiment sought roughly the
same number of fish passing inriver as being transported, which required a
decrease in the number of transported fish.23 2 Except for fish transported
for study purposes, the amendments called for restricting barging and
trucking to "extremely adverse" river conditions. 23 3 Significantly, fishery
agencies and tribes and the Corps would determine if such conditions existed.234 The amendments anticipated barging fewer than half the juveniles
226 See supra notes 54-56 and accompanying text; infra notes 316, 546-548 and accompa-

nying text; see also

BONNEVILLE POWER ADMIN. ET AL., COLUMBIA RIVER SYSTEM OPERATION

437 (July 1994) (discussing certain planning methods and conclusions concerning gas bubble
disease and anticipated juvenile survival rates at various dissolved gas levels); BONNEVILLE
REVIEW: DRAFr ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT APPENDIX C-I: ANADROMOUS FISH 4-35 to

POWER ADMIN. ET AL., COLUMBIA RIVER SYSTEM OPERATION REVIEW: FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT APPENDIX C: ANADROMOUS FISH AND JUVENILE FISH TRANSPORTATION 3-15

(Nov. 1995) (discussing anticipated juvenile survival rates at different levels of dissolved
gas, though in less depth than the DEIS).
227 1994 PROGRAM, supra note 9, at 5-36, 5-40. See infra note 316, for a discussion of the
relationship between FPE standards set under the ESA (through the NMFS BiOp) and state
water quality standards established under the Clean Water Act.
228 1994 PROGRAM, supra note 9, at 5-21. One acre-foot of water covers one acre to a
depth of one foot, the equivalent of 325,850 gallons. Id. at G-L
229 See id. at 5-21. The Council authorized the earlier 427,000 acre-feet in its 1992 Strategy for Salmon. STRATEGY FOR SALMON, supra note 47, at vol. I, 27-28.
230 The Council stated that all of this water should be used to benefit both Snake and
Columbia River migrants, and that no corresponding reduction in Columbia River flows
should occur unless flow objectives in the Columbia were being met. 1994 PROGRAM, supra
note 9, at 5-21.
231 Id.
232 See supra notes 193-195 and accompanying'text.
233 1994 PROGRAM, supra note 9, at 5-46.

234 Id. at 5-47. The Council's rationale was to limit the number of salmon transported to
the "minimum necessary for design study purposes." Id. at 5-46.
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in any given year, unless extremely adverse conditions existed. 235 No
transportation would occur at drawdown reservoirs. 236 The amendments
also called upon the Corps to improve transportation by upgrading facili23 7
ties and improving operations.
The 1994 amendments represented -a significant change in the Council's approach to transportation as a survival device for juvenile salmon.
Although the Council concluded that transportation would help improve
238
juvenile survival for the "near term, especially in low water conditions,"
it warned that barging "should not be regarded as a substitute for changes
in the river ecosystem" or "as a device to delay substantial improvements
in inriver survival conditions." 23 9 However, the Council did call for further
240
study. on the efficacy of transportation for improving salmon survival.
6. Hatchery Production
For several years, the Council's program has adopted recommendations for hatchery measures, but sought to put them in a context that recognized that the Council's goal is both to increase numbers of fish for
harvest and to protect the genetic integrity of the salmon runs. 241 Ensuring
biodiversity and conserving genetic diversity of fish species continued as
235 Id. at 5-47.'
236 The Council believed that "significant modification to the present operation of transportation" would result from the 1994 amendments. Id. at 5-46. This would include a change
in "the present policy of transporting all fish collected at Lower Granite, except fish collected for research purposes." Id. The Council also stated that its mainstem passage experiment-which is, in effect, an interim spread-the-risk approach-would "likely require a
reduction in the number of smolt collection points, perhaps to a single upriver site." Id. at 56. See supra notes 193-197 for a discussion of the mainstem passage experiment.
237 1994 PROGRAM, supra note 9, at 5-48.
238 Id. at 5-46.
239 Id.
240 Id. at 5-7. Transportation effectiveness was one of the hypotheses in the Council's
mainstem passage experiment. See id. at 5-5 to 5-15; see also supra notes 193-195 and accompanying text. The Council noted a U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service (USFWS) review of transportation, which concluded that the available evidence was insufficient "to identify
transportation as either a primary or supporting method of choice for salmon recovery in
the Snake River Basin." MUNDY, supranote 7, at viii; see also 1994 PROGRAM, supra note 9, at
5-12 to 5-13. The USFWS report also stated that transportation operations are "unlikely to
halt or prevent the continued decline and extirpation of listed species of salmon in the
Snake River Basin," and that there were insufficient data to determine if transporting listed
fall chinook and sockeye salmon would improve survival rates. MUNDY, supra note 7, at 11617. The Council noted that its skepticism of the efficacy of transportation contradicted the
NMFS Recovery Team's Draft Recovery Plan, which concluded that the data show relatively
clear benefits from transportation. 1994 PROGRAM, supra note 9, at 5-12. Compare DAFr
RECOVERY PLAN, supra note 47, ch. VII; see also NORTHWEST POWER PLANNING COUNCIL,
SMOLT TRANSPORTATION AND ITS ROLE IN REBUILDING FISH POPULATIONS (June 1994) (background paper on transportation in the Basin that reprinted excerpts of Mundy's study that

the Council felt would be helpful during the 1994 amendment process and, perhaps, signalling the Council's eventual position on transportation).
241 See 1994 PROGRAM, supra note 9, § 7.
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goals of the Council's program in the 1994 amendments. 242 The Council
defined biodiversity as "the
variety of and variability in living organisms,
2
with respect to genetics." 4
The dilemma in hatchery production, according to the Council, is that
"artificial production can have negative effects on wild and naturally
spawning salmon populations." 244 As a result, the Council adopted a fundamentally different policy toward hatcheries than that which drove fish
and wildlife management during most of the twentieth century. 2 45 As the
Council explained,
Because of concerns over the basin's salmon carrying capacity, the effects of
hatchery-produced fish on those that spawn in streams, and the cost of hatcheries, new salmon production facilities generally should not be constructed unless it is clear that the need for fish cannot be met with existing facilities,
or a
246
new facility would be a better way to achieve the program's goals.

With this policy in place, the Council approved measures to ensure
that
hatchery programs are consistent with the basin's carrying capacity,2 47 conserve genetic diversity, 24 and are consistent with the needs of
wild and naturally spawning populations. 249 The Council also sought to
ensure that the systemwide and cumulative effects of hatcheries are better
understood, 250 and that proposed new supplementation projects be carefully screened. 25 1 After this screening process, the Council called for supplementation projects proposed by the tribes to be implemented with
242 Id. at 7-5, 7-7. The NRC also felt that preserving genetic diversity is a key component
in hatchery operations intended to help restore salmon populations. NATIONAL RESEARCH
COUcIL, supra note 8, at 10,.318-19.
243 1994 PROGRAM, supra note 9, at 7-5.
244 Id. at 7-11.
245 See J. icHAowcH ET AL., A HISTORY OF FRAMEWORKS USED IN' THE MANAGEMENT OF
COLUMBiA RIVER CHINOOK SALMON 68 (1996).
246 1994 PROGRAM, supra note 9, at 4-6.
'247 Id. at 7-6.
248 Id. at 7-7.
249 Id. at 7-8, 7-16.
250 Id. at 7-9.
251 Id. at 7-17. Many biologists argue that supplementation should be used to assist depleted populations because numerous small populations are declining, and thus basinwide
population diversity is declining as well. Id. at 7-12. Thus, supplementation proponents "recommend rapidly increasing the sizes of these small populations to prevent their extinction
and loss of genetic diversity by properly using some form of artificial propagation." Id. Other
biologists fear that supplementation could change the identity of these depleted populations
or reduce their ability to survive over the long term in their natural environment. Id.; see
also Jack K Sterne, Jr., Supplementation of Wild Salmon Stocks: A Curefor the Hatchery
Problem or More Problem Hatcheries?, 23 COASTAL MGMT. 123, 140 (1995) (discussing the
supplementation debate and concluding that supplementation should only occur "under
carefully controlled conditions" in an "experimental, adaptive management framework");
ISG REPORT, supra note 7, at 400 (advising the Council "to resist attempts to implement
supplementation on a large scale without adequate planning and review and without adequate monitoring and evaluation in place").
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careful assessment of biological risk and follow-up monitoring and
252
evaluation.
7. Summary
The 1994 amendments to the Council's program represented a bold
step forward in the attempt to tangibly change the basin's river operations
and halt the rapid decline in salmon populations. However, the enforceability of the program remains unclear. 253 As a result, the most notable
252 1994 PROGRAM,

supra note 9, at 7-18.

Under the Northwest Power Act, the federal agencies that operate the hydroelectric
system must, at "each relevant stage of decisionmaking," take the Council's program into
account "to the fullest extent practicable." 16 U.S.C. § 839b(h)(1l)(A)(i) (1994); see also
Northwest Resource Info. Ctr., Inc. v. Northwest Power Planning Council, 35 F.3d 1371, 1379
n.15 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 50 (1995) (discussing the legislative history behind this provision of the Northwest Power Act). The Act also requires BPA to act "in a
manner consistent with" the Council's program. 16 U.S.C. § 839b(h)(10) (1994). BPA's General Counsel has suggested that this "consistency" provision does not require BPA to implement the Council's program. See Who Runs the River?, supra note 79, at 422 (remarks of
Harvey Spigal). The Ninth Circuit seems to agree. Northwest Resource Info. Ctr., Inc. v.
National Marine Fisheries Serv., 25 F.3d 872, 874 (9th Cir. 1994) (stating that BPA "must act
consistently with the Council's program but in the end has final authority to determine its
own decisions").
Nevertheless, these statutory provisions would seem to give the Council some degree
of authority:
[T]he Council possesses a good deal more authority than it thinks it has (or perhaps
wants). The Act requires BPA to act consistently with the Council's program and obligates other federal water managers to take the program into account at every relevant
stage of decision making to the "fullest extent practicable." If these are not iron-clad
directives, they are nevertheless strong indications that Congress expected the program to be implemented.
The truth is we do not know how much enforcement authority the Council possesses because the Council has chosen not to test its authority, ignoring program'.
violations like the Corps' failure to implement the Water Budget or to satisfy its spill
provisions.... [T]he Council's lack of enforcement authority is the product of its own
self-fulfilling prophecy.
Blumm & Simrin, Unraveling Parity, supra note 75, at 737-38 (citations omitted). But the
General Counsel for the Council countered:
The Council's authority in the fish and wildlife area is constrained; it can guide, but
not command, federal river management. The investment of federal hydropower revenues to help fish and wildlife must be "consistent" with the Council's program,
but... [BPA] actually writes the checks. The Council has no authority over fish and
wildlife agencies, land managers, or irrigators. The Council is not toothless, but it
cannot command and control.
Volkman & McConnaha, .supra note 171, at 1254 (citation omitted) see also Stephen
Stuebner, NW Power.PlannersReach Crossroads,ThE OREGONIAN, Aug. 21, 1995, at BI (discussing the Council's lack of authority). Former Idaho Governor Cecil Andrus said that the
Council "turned out to be a toothless tiger.... It's a public body that's been neutered. Either
the agencies should listen to them or Congress ought to do away with them." Id. at B6; see
also Michael V. McGinnis, On the Verge of Collapse: The Columbia River System, Wild
Salmon and the Northwest Power Planning Council, 35 NAT. RESOURCES J. 63 (1995) (discussing, via a survey, the ambiguous authority of the Council). But see ivifra notes 271-279
and accompanying text, comparing enforcement authority under the Northwest Power Act
with the ESA.
253
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provisions of the 1994 amendments, those calling for reservoir drawdowns
and increased water purchases to boost Snake River flows, were not implemented by system operators. Soon after the 1994 amendments, NMFS
released its 1995 BiOp, a restoration program thought to be enforceable. 254 It was therefore the NMFS BiOp that took center stage in 1995 and

alleged that this program also went
thereafter, although salmon advocates
255
unenforced in important respects.

B. The 1994-98 NMFS Biological Opinion
In Idaho Department of Fish and Game v. NMFS, the court called for
a "major overhaul" in river operations. 256 In response, NMFS reinitiated an
ESA section 7 consultation on 1994-98 operations of the Federal Columbia
River Power System (FCRPS), releasing a new BiOp on March 2, 1995.257
258
In a noticeable departure from the 1993 BiOp rejected by the court,
NMFS concluded that the proposed action, the planned 1994-98 operation
of the federal hydropower system, would likely jeopardize the continued
existence of the listed salmon stocks 259 unless the federal water managers
254 See Al Wright, Should the Courts Run the River?, 25 ENVTL. L. 403, 405 (1995) ("In the
short term, obviously, the river is going to be run by a section 7 Endangered Species Act
biological opinion which results from the consultation process."); Harvey Spigal, The Implications of Salmon Recovery for the Bonneville Power Administration and the Region, 25

ENVTL. L. 407, 407 (1995).
255 See infra Part V.

256 850 F. Supp. 886, 900 (D. Or. 1994), vacated as moot, 56 F.3d 1071 (9th Cir. 1995)
(discussed supra text accompanying note 126).
257 Dates used in connection with the BiOps refer to issuance dates. The 1993 BiOp remanded in Idaho Department of Fish and Game involved consultation on 1993 operations.
See 1993 BiOp, supra note 49 (issued May 26, 1993). Prior to the decision in Idaho Department of Fish and Game, NMFS had issued the 1994 BiOp covering 1994-98 FCRPS operations and the juvenile transportation program. See 1994 BiOp, supra note 59 (issued Mar. 16,
1994). Following Idaho Department of Fish and Game, NMFS reinitiated consultation on
the federal actions covered in the 1994 BiOp, producing the 1995 biological opinion, which
also covered 1994-98 FCRPS operations. 1995 BIOP, supra note 11, at 7-10 (issued Mar. 2,
1995).
258 See 1993 BiOp, supra note 49, at 63-65 (concluding that FCRPS operations would not
jeopardize the existence of the listed species). In 1992, NMFS reached a similar conclusion
in its first BiOp for listed salmon species. See 1992 BiOp, supra note 103, at 50 (concluding
that operation of the FCRPS would not jeopardize the existence of the listed species). NMFS
released the 1994 BiOp, the first BiOp produced for 1994-1998 river operations, before the
Idaho Department of FishandGame decision but and discarded it in favor the 1995 BiOp
following the court's decision; the 1994 BiOp also concluded that the listed salmon stocks
would not be jeopardized. See 1994 BiOP, supra note 59, at 63-66 (concluding that operation
of the FCRPS would not jeopardize the existence of the listed species).
259 1995 BiOp, supra note 11, at 88-91. NMFS concluded that "without major modifications to the Snake and Columbia River dams, it is unlikely survivals can be sufficiently improved to ensure that the operation of the FCRPS does not impede survival and recovery of
listed Snake River salmon.", Id. at 81. This BiOp marked the first time, that NMFS found
operation of the FCRPS likely to jeopardize the continued existence of the listed salmon. In
previous BiOps, NMFS declared that operation of the FCRPS was not likely to jeopardize the
listed salmon, and then proposed "reasonable and prudent measures" for dam operators to
minimize the incidental taking of the listed salmon. 50 C.F.R. § 402.14() (1995); see 1994
BiOp, supra note 59, at 92-105; 1993 BIOP, supra note 49, at 90-100; 1992 BiOP, supra note
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adopted the recommended "reasonable and prudent alternative," which included immediate, intermediate, and long-term actions to improve mainstem salmon survival. 260 These immediate actions included improved
bypass, increased spill and flows, and improved operation of the transportation program for juvenile salmon. 26 1 NMFS also recommended intermediate and long-term actions that would i"prove the operation and
262
configuration of the FCRPS, such as reservoir drawdowns.
In accordance with a federal "spread the risk" policy,263 however, the

1995 NMFS BiOp relied primarily on a combination of spill and transportation to reduce smolt mortalities. 264 To gather data needed to design future
juvenile passage measures, NMFS proposed to use the 1995 migration season as a grand experiment to compare the relative merits of transportation
103, at 63-72; see also supra note 258; infra note 435. Although legally distinct, these earlier
"reasonable and prudent measures" were actually quite similar in nature to the actions that
NMFS now called for in the reasonable and prudent alternative in the new 1995 BiOp. See
1995 BiOP, supra note 11, at 91-93. Compare 1994 BiOP, supra note 59, at 92-105; 1993 BiOP,
supra note 49, at 90-100; 1992 BiOP,supra note 103, at 63-72.
260 1995 BiOP, supra note 11, at 91. NMFS listed six reasons why the proposed operation
of the FCRPS in 1994-98 would likely jeopardize the continued existence of the listed salmon
species and adversely modify their critical habitat: 1) the near expiration of sockeye populations, 2) the significant difference between the proposed action and NMFS's proposed recovery plan, 3) the -major role FCRPS operations play in salmon mortalities, 4) the difficulty in
making predictions that the species' biological requirements will be met over its life cycle; 5)
the minor survival improvements promised in the proposed dam operations, and 6) the necessity of long-term system reconfigurations for achieving significant improvements in survival rates. Id.
In the 1995 BiOp, NMFS also outlined the analytical process it followed during the § 7
consultation. First, NMFS defined the "biological requirements" of the listed species. Id. at
11. These requirements are merely what is required for the species' continued existence or,
more specifically, the species' survival and recovery. Id. Second, NMFS evaluated the relevance of the "environmental baseline" to the species' current status. Id. at 12. This baseline
was at the heart of the dispute in Idaho Department of Fish and Game. See Idaho Dep't of.
Fish & Game v. National Marine Fisheries Serv., 850 F. Supp. 886, 892-94 (D.Or. 1994) (holding NMFS's selection of a baseline period that included drought conditions and low run
numbers to be arbitrary and capricious), vacated as moot 56 F.3d 1071 (9th Cir. 1995). According to NMFS, the baseline for the 1995 BiOp included."[t]he direct and indirect effects of
the FCRPS' construction and the past.manner of its operation." 1995 BiOP, supra note 11, at
33. Third, NMFS evaluated the effects of the proposed action on the listed species. Id. at 13.
Fourth, NMFS determined whether the species could be expected to survive with an adequate potential for recovery under the effects of the proposed action, the environmental
baseline, and any cumulative effects. Id. Finally, NMFS identified reasonable and prudent
alternatives to proposed actions that it found likely to jeopardize the continued existence of
the listed species. Id. at 14.
261 1995 BiOP, supra note 11, at 91.
262 'Id. at 91-93.
263 Id. at 112, 131. Because NMFS was unsure of the relative merits of transportation and
spill, it purported to rely on both, thus "spreading the risks" between two principal methods
of juvenile passage. Id. The Council also relied on this approach, but to a lesser degree than
the BiOp. See supra notes 193-195, 232 and infra notes 337, 543.
264 Without spill or transportation, the vast majority of smolts would pass through the
turbines. Few dams have bypass facilities. Even at those dams with juvenile bypass facilities, a large majority of smolts still pass through the turbines. 1995 BiOP, supra note 11, at
46-47.
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and spill.265 To allow for in-season adjustments in response to changing

river dynamics in implementation of the BiOp, NMFS created a Technical
Management Team (TMT) composed of representatives from NMFS, the
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, the Corps, BPA, and the Bureau of Reclamation (the Bureau). 266 There was no state or tribal representation until May
1996,267 when NMFS expanded the TMT to include state and tribal repre-

sentatives. 26 8 The TMT's duty is to "advise the operating agencies [the
Corps and the Bureau] on dam and reservoir operations to optimize passage conditions for juvenile and adult anadromous salmonids."26 9 Its recommendations are made by consensus; ,if no consensus is reached,
NMFS
270
makes the final recommendation to the Corps or the Bureau.
The NMFS BiOp, unlike the Council's program, 27 ' was thought to establish a legally binding blueprint for action. 272 Why such a distinction has
been drawn is not at all clear. Action agencies like BPA, and the Corps, not
NMFS, have the ultimate responsibility for satisfying the ESA. 273 These
same agencies, not the Council, implement the Northwest Power Act. If
the Corps or BPA completely ignored the NMFS BiOp, that would likely
constitute an ESA violation, but the Ninth Circuit has ruled that action
agencies are not bound by all the details of a BiOp if they take alternative,
reasonably adequate measures to ensure the continued existence of listed
species. 274 Both the ESA and the Northwest Power Act in effect shift the
burden of proof to action agencies to show that they have a convincing
reason for not following plans prescribed by NMFS and the Council. However, neither NMFS nor the Council has attempted to enforce either plan
in court.
265 Id. at 111. The NMFS BiOp was also briefly examined in Blunin, Reviving Parity,
supra note 108, at 362-63.
266 1995 BiOp, supra note 11, at 101-03.
267 NMFS did direct the TMT to coordinate its decisions with the state fishery agencies,
tribes, Idaho, Power Company, and other regional interests. Id. at 102. The states and tribes
commented to NMFS that the states and tribes should "have' a seat at the table" in maldng
FCRPS operations decisions. See id. at 102. But NMFS stated that "[olperation of the FCRPS
is a federal responsibility, however, and cannot be .delegated to nonfederal entities." Id. at
103.
268 See Letter from William Stelle, Jr., Regional Director, National Marine Fisheries Service., to John A. Kitzhaber, Governor, Oregon (May 15, 1996) (enclosing a May 7, 1996 NMFS
memorandum altering the TMT structure).
269 1995 BiOp, supra note 11, at 101. The federal agencies participating in the TMT had an
April 1, 1995 deadline to agree to "operating guidelines" for the TMT. Id.
270 Id. at 101. Recommendations may also be made to BPA, which has the authority to
make storage agreements with Canada. Id. at 101-02.
271 See supra note 253 for a discussion of the enforceability of the Council's program.
272 See Wright, supra note 254; Spigal, supra note 254.
273 Pyramid Lake Tribe of Indians v. United States Dep't of the Navy, 898 F.2d 1410, 1415
(9th Cir. 1990) (action agencies may not rely solely on BiOps to establish conclusively they
have satisfied their ESA obligations; a decision to rely on a BiOp must be shown to not be
arbitrary and capricious).
274 Tribal Village of Akutan v. Hodel, 869 F.2d 1185, 1193-94 (9th Cir. 1988) (upholding the
Secretary of the Interior's deviation from one reasonable and prudent alternative in a NMFS
BiOp, where the Secretary gave a "well reasoned" explanation and adopted "alternative reasonably adequate steps" in an offshore oil and gas lease sale).
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Perhaps the real difference in the two statutes is that environmental
groups, encouraged by the ESA's citizen suit provision, 275 have been willing to test the adequacy of BiOps in court.276 Although the Northwest
Power Act has no citizen suit provision, it does authorize judicial review
under the Administrative Procedure Act0 77 The Ninth Circuit recognized a
citizen suit in the NRIC case. 278 Consequently, enforcing the provisions of
the Council's program would seem to be little different from enforcing the
measures in a BiOp: a citizen would have to show that an action agency
lacked a convincing reason for failing to implement the program.2 7 9 However, citizens have yet to attempt to enforce the Council's program in this
manner, and questions about its enforceability allowed the NMFS BiOp to
supplant the 1994 amendments to the Council's program as the focus of
Columbia Basin salmon restoration efforts.
1. River Flows
The new BiOp contained several immediate actions to improve
salmon survival. NMFS.caUed for improved flows in the Snake and Columbia Rivers, setting spring flow targets of 85,000 to 100,000 cfs in the Snake
River at Lower Granite Dam and 220,000 to 260,000 cfs in the lower Columbia at McNary Dam. 280 Summer flow targets were set at 50,000 to
55,000 cfs in the Snake and 200,000 cfs in the Columbia.28 ' These flow
targets were lower, in terms of peak flows, than those contained in the
Council's program, which called for spring flow targets of 85,000 282
to
140,000 cfs in the Snake and 220,000 to 300,000 cfs in the Columbia.
However, the flow targets were .somewhat higher than targets in previous
NMFS BiOps, which had called for spring flows of 85,000 cfs in the Snake
and 200,000 cfs in the Columbia, and summer flows of 50,000 cfs in the
283
Snake and 160,000 cfs in the Columbia.
275 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g) (1994).
276 \See, e.g., Idaho Dep't of Fish & Game v. National Marine Fisheries Serv., 850 F. Supp.
886 (D. Or. 1994) vacated as moot 56 F.3d 1071 (9th Cir. 1995) (discussed supra notes 109-

126 and accompanying text).
277 16 U.S.C. § 839f(e) (1994); see also 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (1994).
278 See supra notes 127-165 and accompanying text.
279 See 1982 PROGRAM, supra note 76, at 13-2 (Nov. 1982) (interpreting the Northwest
Power Act to require federal agencies to implement the Council's program or explain why
implementation would not be "physically, legally, or otherwise practicable... , including a
description of all possible allowances available to permit implementation"); see also Blumm,
Implementing Parity, supra note 73, at 336-37 (discussing § 1304(a)(5) of the Council's
1982 program). However, the Council without explanation softened this language in its 1994
amendments to the program. See 1994 .PROGRAM, supra note 9, at 1-14 ("Ultimately, the
Council expects federal project operators and regulators to implement program measures or
explain in detail why they cannot do so.").
280 1995 BiOP, supra note 11, at 104.
281 Id.

282 See 1994 PROGRAM, supra note 9, at 15-29; supra notes 183-189 and accompanying
text.
28 See 1994 BiOp, supra note 59, at 5; 1993 BiOp, supra note 49, at 4.
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Unlike the Council's program, the new BiOp set "interim limits" for
the elevation of certain reservoirs in the FCRPS.284 These limits were created in response to NMFS's concern over the effect of flow improvement
measures on resident fish-a concern arguably beyond the scope
of a BiOp. 28 5 Nonetheless, NMFS contended that the flow targets
would increase both 1) the priority for fish flows relative to power
production, 28 6 and 2) the chance that flow targets would actually be
287
met.
2. Reservoir Drawdoums
The NMFS BiOp differed most from the Council's program by refusing to commit to Snake River reservoir drawdowns. Instead, NMFS directed the Corps to conduct a drawdown feasibility study, postponing a
decision as to whether to proceed with drawdowns until 1999.288 In the
Snake River, the BiOp did call for the lower Snake River projects immediately to be operated within one foot of MOP, from April 10 until adult fall
chinook begin entering the Snake in late August. 289 NMFS expected this
partial drawdown to result in faster migration for juveniles. 290
The only commitment to drawdowns in the BiOp similar to the Council's recommendations concerned drawing down the John Day reservoir to
near MOP by 1996.291 However, under the NMFS BiOp any other reservoir
284 1995 BOP, supra note 11, at 95. These interim limits were to be in place until August
31 of each year. Id. NMFS set interim limits for four reservoirs in the FCRPS: Grand Coulee

(1,280 feet), Libby (2,439 feet), Hungry Horse (3,540 feet), and Dworshak (1,520 feet). Id.
285 1995 BOP, supra note 11, at 97-99. NMFS explained that it placed draft limits on reservoirs so that "operations for anadromous fish do not place at risk other portions of the
Columbia Basin ecosystem and the resident fish and wildlife that rely on the reservoirs." Id.
at 97-98. A BiOp must avoid jeopardizing the listed species; no other considerations apply. 16
U.S.C § 1536(a) (1994); 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(g)(4) (1995). The draft limits not only responded
to nonsalnon considerations, but conflicted with measures that NMFS found necessary to
avoid jeopardizing listed salmon-achieving target fish flows. Dam operators can, as a legal
matter, respond to the needs of nonllsted species but, arguably, a BiOp should deal only
with the needs of the listed species under consultation. The plaintiffs in American Rivers v.
NMFS charged that the draft limits were imposed without any biological rationale and in
violation of the ESA. American Rivers Motion, supra note 21, at 6, 32-34; see also infra notes
481-483.
286 1995 BOP,supra note 11, at 96. According to BPA, 10 to 11 MAF of water was used to
increase flows during the drought years of 1992-94. Id. NMFS claimed that if the 1995 BiOp
measures had been in effect for those years, 13 to 16 MAF would have been released for
salmon. Id.
287 Id. at 96. NMFS stated that the measures in the new BiOp increased the likelihood of
achieving flow targets in the Columbia River for both the spring and summer a 25% increase
for the spring, and a 90% increase for the summer. Id.
288 Id. at 92-94.
289 Id. at 112. NMFS required filling pools after the fall chinook began entering the Snake
to provide sufficient water depth at adult fishways. Id. at 112-13. NMFS also allowed operations at elevations higher than one foot above MOP for approved research purposes. Id. at
112.
290 Id.at 113.
291 Id. at 113-14. NMFS called for John Day to be operated within a one to one-half foot
range of MIP from April 20 to September 30 in 1995. Id. at 113. At John Day, MIP is higher
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drawdowns would first require a process of detailed evaluations and sub2 92
sequent decisions.
The BiOp directed the Corps to develop an "interim evaluation report" by mid-1996 on NMFS's three alternatives for the lower Snake River
projects: 1) a natural river level drawdown, 2) a spillway crest drawdown,
or 3) the improvement or construction of surface collectors. 2 93 NMFS anticipated the completion of engineering and design work for the chosen
than MOP by 5.5 feet. Telephone Interview with Carl Christianson, Study Manager, U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers (Mar. 5, 1996). Then, beginning in March of 1996, NMFS directed
the reservoir to be continuously operated at near MOP. 1995 BIOP, supra note 11, at 113.
This was similar to the Council's recommendations for John Day. See supra notes 208-213
and accompanying text. NMFS also required an investigation of the feasibility of.a future
spillway crest drawdown. 1995 BiOP, supra note 11, at 113.
NMFS noted that the John Day drawdown has been "particularly controversial" and
was not recommended by the NMFS Recovery Team. Id. at 113-14. State and tribal fishery
agencies supported the drawdown, however. Id. at 114. NMFS included the John'Day
drawdown in the BiOp because it would provide travel time benefits through John Day's
large slack water pool, which produces one of the highest smolt predation rates anywhere in
the Columbia Basin. Id.
The reasoning concerning the John Day drawdown is instructive. BPA, an agency that
found implied authority, to fund a nuclear power program that has now saddled the region
with a $7 billion debt, see Blumm, Hydroelectric Heritage, supra note 23, at 222-24, could
find no authority to spend money on "economic mitigation;" that is, the costs of extending
irrigation pipes and reconstructing boat ramps to ensure other river users would suffer no
harm as a 'result of drawdowns. Memorandum from Harvard Spigal, General Counsel,
Bonneville Power Administration, to Randall Hardy, Administrator, Bonneville Power Administration (Aug. 12, 1995); Memorandum from James Luce, Assistant General Counsel,
and Phillip Key, Attorney, Bonneville Power Administration, to Randy Hardy, Administrator,
Bonneville Power Administration (Mar. 9, 1995). Since the John Day drawdown to MOP was
conditioned on such economic mitigation, 1995 BiOP,supra note 11, at 113, BPA's position
left the measure in the hands of the congressional appropriations process, and the Corps
(operator of John Day) failed to request sufficient appropriations. Although Congress did
include $1 million for John Day drawdown during fiscal year 1996, the conference report
directed the Administration to provide scientific justification for the project in any further
requests for funding. See American Rivers Motion, supra note 21, at 16. In April 1996, the
Corps wrote NMFS that it had deferred all planning regarding lowering John Day to MOP,
and the agency's fiscal year 1997 budget request asked for no money for John Day
drawdown work. See id.; see also notes 562-563. In December 1997, Will Stelle sent a letter
to the Corps affirming NMFS' call for immediate drawdown to MOP and consideration of
drawdown to spillway crest. NMFS Seeks Funding;IrrigatorsDetail Impacts, NORTHWEST
SALMON REcOVERY REPORT, Feb. 14, 1997, at 2. In the same month, the Corps made a request
to Congress to reprogram $1.4 million for further study, Les Blumenthal, Proposal Leaves
Salmon High and Dry, SErATTE POST-INMLLIGENCER, Feb. 7, 1997, at A8,but did not request
the funds necessary to implement drawdown.
Thus, by narrowly interpreting their authority and manipulating the congressional appropriations process, BPA and the Corps have apparently succeeded in bringing to a halt
implementation of a measure the Council's program estimated would decrease juvenile
salmon travel time by 14% to 17%, the equivalent of releasing over 3 MAF of water in storage,
without harming other river users. See 1995 BiOP, supra note 11, at 114. Such recalcitrance
to changing the status quo, repeated persistently (and well out of public view), is a major
reason why it is so difficult to implement an effective salmon restoration program.
292 1995 BiOp, supra note 11, at 92-94.
293 Id. at 92-93.
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alternatives would be completed by December 1998.294 NMFS believed

that the NEPA process and a "quest for congressional authorization" for
any drawdown proposal could not be completed until 2000.295 The NMFS
BiOp also assumed that not until late 1999 would there be sufficient information to pick from the "two primary choices" for Snake River projects:
surface collectors or drawdowns. 29 6 The chosen alternative would then be
implemented in 2000.297

NMFS's willingness to delay recommending action in the BiOp ignored a concern expressed by the Council 2 8 and others that salmon may
be "studied to death" 299 before undertaking effective action to improve
survival. The Council, relying on the -"best available scientific information," determined that the imperiled status of the salmon required immediate action.3 00 NMFS, which must also rely on the best available scientific
294 Id. at 92.
295 Id. at 92,116. NMFS stated no reason why it concluded that the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370d (1994), should apply. NEPA requires
federal agencies to prepare an environmental impact statement for all "major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment." Id. § 4332(C). Presumably, NMFS also felt it would need congressional authorization for any drawdown below
MOP level, because below-MOP drawdowns may foreclose the operation of other federally
authorized dam uses, such as navigation locks.
296 1995 BiOp, supra note 11, at 93. NMFS did state that both surface collectors and
drawdown could be implemented if the drawdown was to spillway crest level. Id. The surface collectors could be used for either transportation or to improve inriver conditions. Id.
at 92.
297 Id. at 92-94.
298 In the program, the Council declared:
The urgency of action has only been heightened by exceedingly poor returns of the
past two years and the even worse projections for the coming several years. These,
constitute historical low numbers in the population and raise the specter of extinction.... These mortalities must be reduced....
... The Council believes, on the basis of the best available scientific information, that these actions [recommended in the program] are likely to improve the survival of anadromous fish and that immediate survival improvements are needed or
important components of the salmon runs will likely be lost to extinction.
1994 PROGRAM, supra note 9, at 5-2 to 5-3 (emphasis added).
299

See, e.g.,

SAVE OUR WILD SALMON COALITON, GivE WILD SALMON A. FIGHTING CHANCE

(Oct. 1994) (action alert flyer distributed during the Council's 1994 amendment process); see
also Blumm, FulfillingParity,supra note 1, at 124-31 (concluding that Congress's intent in
enacting the "best available scientific knowledge" standard was not to hold fishery agencies
and tribes to a high standard of scientific proof that might delay implementation of effective
salmon recovery measures); Save Salmon First,THE OREGONIAN, Sept. 18, 1994, at D2 ("This
is no longer just a complex problem requiring greater study. This is a crisis. It requires
strong measures, imposed now, not two years from now."); Ted Hallock, Delay on Salmon
Plan Would Increase the Risk, THE OREGONIAN, Dec. 28, 1994, at D7 (editorial by recently
retired Council member urging that science not be used as a delay in implementing salmon
recovery measures).
8o0 See supra note 298 and accompanying text. The Northwest Power Act requires the
Council to rely on the "best available scientific knowledge." 16 U.S.C. § 839b(h)(6)(B)
(1994). The NRIC decision also stated that the Northwest Power Act "placed a premium on
prompt action, allowing decisions to be made on the best available scientific knowledge."
Northwest Resource Info. Ctr., Inc. v. Northwest Power Planning Council, 35 F.3d 1371, 1395
(9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 50 (1995).
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information,3 0 1 did not seem to share the Council's sense of urgency, despite its conclusion that drawdowns were one of the most significant aspects of its BiOp.60 2 NMFS assumed that the information gathered during
the four-year delay would "help answer the question of the level of mortality imposed on listed Snake River salmon by the FCRPS."3 03 The BiOp
listed drawdown measures under the title of "Immediate Research, Evaluation and Engineering Studies to Improve Survivals in the Intermediate
and Long Term."s

4

This epitomizes the distinction between NMFS's will-

ingness to delay action on reservoir drawdowns and the Council's call for
"immediate action"3 0 5-not merely immediate research-to lower the
reservoirs.
3. Spills
NMFS also called for more spill to increase juvenile salmon sur30 7
vival,30 6 concluding that spill was the safest passage route at dams.
NMFS directed water managers to spill at all projects during the.spring,
including projects used to collect juveniles for transportation.30 8 However,
301 The ESA requires NMFS to "use the best scientific and commercial data available." 16
U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (1994); see also Idaho Dep't of Fish & Game v. National Marine Fisheries
Serv., 850 F. Supp. 886, 900 (D. Or. 1994), vacated as moot 56 F.3d 1071 (9th Cir. 1995).
302 See 1995 BiOp, supra note 11, at 81 ("NMFS has concluded that without major modifications to the Snake and Columbia River Dams, it is unlikely survivals can be sufficiently
improved to ensure that the operation of the FCRPS does not impede the survival and recovery of listed Snake River salmon."); see also supra note 259. In the 1995 BiOp, NMFS listed
the three alternative dam modifications identified in its proposed recovery plan for Snake
River salmon: spillway crest drawdowns, natural river drawdowns, and surface collectors.
1995 BiOP, supra note 11, at 81.
Also, unlike flow augmentation, spill, and transportation, drawdowns were completely
absent from FCRPS operations proposed.by the federal water managers, meaning that
NMFS recommended drawdown of its own accord. See id. at 38-81 (describing the effects of
the proposed action).
303 See 1995 BiOp, supra note 11, at 94. NMFS stated that this information would also
help to determine whether sufficient survival improvements could be achieved in FCRPS
operations to contribute to the recovery of the listed species. Id. If not, NMFS concluded
that survival improvements would have to be achieved in "other sectors," such as habitat
improvements, hatchery actions, and harvest actions. Id. These "other sectors"-habitat,
hatchery, and harvest actions-were recommended in NMFS's proposed recovery plan. Id.
NMFS released a proposed recovery plan in March of 1995, shortly after the 1995 NMFS
BiOp. See NATIONAL MARINE FISHERIES SERV., PROPOSED RECOVERY PLAN FOR SNAKE RIVER
SALMON (1995) [hereinafter PROPOSED RECOVERY PLAN]; see also id. at ch. V, § 2-4 (recommendations concerning these "other sectors").
Whether improvements in the FCRPS would lead to recovery of'the listed species is a
different question from whether the FCRPS, as operated, is jeopardizing the continued existence of those species. While the information gathered during the delay before implementing
drawdowns may help to promulgate and implement a recovery plan under the ESA, NMFS
completely failed to assess the effects of delaying action on the continued existence of the
listed species.
304 1995 BIOp, supra note 11, at 116.
305 See 1994 PROGRAM, supra note 9, at 5-5.
306 1995 BIOP, supra note 11, at 104-05.
307 Id.at 109.
308 Id. at 105.
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NMFS limited spill to benefit spring and summer chinook in the Snake

River to high flow conditions, and called for maximum transportation during low flow conditions.30 9 NMFS hoped to accomplish this purpose by
establishing "spill triggers" in the BiOp-minimum flows at Snake River
dams below which no spill can occur without TMT authorization. 310 In the
summer, during the juvenile fall chinook migration, NMFS required spill
only at noncollector projects.3 11 Like the Council's program, 312 the NMFS
3 13
BiOp required spill to meet eighty percent FPE.
NMFS determined that increased transportation, not spill, was the

best solution for improved survival during low flow conditions. 3 14 As in
the Council's program,3 15 the eighty percent FPE level could be limited by
high gas levels. 3 16 The BiOp did reduce the somewhat arbitrary nature of
309 Id.
310 Id. If during any week the "unregulated weekly average flows" at Lower Granite are
projected to be less than 100,000 cfs, the BiOp directed the water managers not to spill at
that project. Id. If flows at Lower Granite are projected to be less than 85,000 cfs, under the
BiOp no spillwould occur at Lower Granite, Little Goose, and Lower Monumental-unless
the TMT recommended otherwise. Id.
311 Id.
312 See supra note 219; 1994 PROGRAM, supra note 9, at 5-36, 540.
313 1995 BIOP, supra note 11, at 105.
314 Id. During low flow conditions, spill at collector projects would be reduced (or eliminated) to increase the proportion of juveniles that could be transported. Id.
315 See supra notes 224-227 and accompanying text; 1994 PROGRAM, supra note 9, at 5-36,
540.
316 1995 BiOP, supra note 11, at 106. At Snake River and lower Columbia dams, the BiOp
set maximum levels of dissolved nitrogen, or "gas caps," at 12-hour averages of 115% of
saturation (or an instantaneous level of 120%) at dam forebays, and 120% of saturation (or an
instantaneous level of 125%) at dam tailraces. Id. NMFS intended to limit long-term exposure to 115%, id. at 106-07, despite requests for higher levels by state and tribal fishery
agencies. MIclE DEHART, FISH PASSAGE CTR., SUMMARY OF THE 1995 SPRING AND SUMMER
JUVENIu PASSAGE SEASON 7 (Oct. 1995).
The BiOp allowed the gas caps to be adjusted downward to comply with state water
quality standards. 1995 BiOP,supra note 11, at 106. The states of Idaho, Oregon, and Washington had established water quality standards for dissolved nitrogen of 110% of saturation
under the Clean Water Act at the suggestion of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).
DEHART, supra, at 7. NMFS requested-and the states subsequently granted-waivers of
their 110% standard. Id. NMFS argued that the 110% standard was unnecessary because 1)
the fish could cormpensate hydrostatically for the effects of higher dissolved gas levels, 2)
the daily fluctuation in levels of dissolved gas limited possible detrimental effects on fish,
and 3) NMFS believed that migration of salmon at low depths reduces the effects of dissolved gas 1995 BiOP, supra note 11, at 107. NMFS rejected a higher dissolved gas level
recommended by the state fishery agencies and tribes "because of concerns about the poten
tial sublethal effects of gas bubble disease" for migrating juveniles. Id. at 107-08. The tribal
restoration plan recommended a higher ceiling for dissolved gas. See infra notes 381, 422
and accompanying text. The results of tests in 1994 and 1995 seemed to justify this call for a
higher ceiling. See supra note 55 and accompanying text; infra note 548 and accompanying
text.
If the states had not granted the waivers, the BiOp probably would have had to give
way to the state standards, since state water quality standards are also federal standards
under the Clean Water Act. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c)(3) (1994). Under such a circumstance, the
BiOp would have had to suggest other measures that would avoid jeopardy or declare that
the continued existence of the species was jeopardized.
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the Snake River spill triggers by allowing the TMT discretion to
order spill
317
when flows at Lower Granite did not reach the spill triggers.
4. Water Purchases
The NMFS BiOp, like the Council's program,31 8 called for the
purchase of additional water to aid in achieving flow targets on the Snake
River. NMFS directed the Bureau to continue to provide the 427,000 acrefeet of water called for in the Council's program.3 19 But whereas the Coun3 20
cil called for the purchase of an, additional million acre-feet of water,
NMFS merely called for the Bureau to "secure an additional amount of
water... as may be necessary to further reduce human-caused mortality
of endangered salmon in the Snake River."32 1 The Bureau and the state of
Idaho apparently convinced NMFS that it would be unrealistic to expect
that additional water could be purchased without condemnation
3 22
authority.
5. Transportation
Although it endorsed both spill and transportation, the NMFS BiOp
relied on transportation under most river flows, relegating spill only to
unusually high flow conditions in, the Snake River. During the spring and
summer juvenile passage seasons,?33 the BiOp called for spill necessary to
achieve eighty percent FPE. 324 However, as previously mentioned, at

Snake River dams NMFS limited the eighty percent requirement to high
flow conditions, such as 100,000 cfs at Lower Granite Dam. 325 When flows
317 1995 BiOP, supra note 11, at 105.
318 See supra notes 228-231 and accompanying text; 1994 PROGRAM, supra note 9, at 5-21.
319 1995 BiOp, supra note 11, at 99; see also supra note 229 and accompanying text; 1994

PROGRAM, supra note 9, at 5-21. The NMFS BiOp stated that the Bureau "shall" continue to
provide the water, but then allowed the Bureau to take "such actions as are necessary to
ensure a high probability of providing provision of that volume by 1998." 1995 BiOP, supra
note 11, at 99. The latter language makes the water purchase measure look less like an
"immediate action to improve survival," and more like a hortatory suggestion that may or
may not ever be achieved. See infra Part V for a discussion of actual river operations in
1995
320 See supra note 228 and accompanying text; 1994 PROGRAM, supra note 9, at 5-21.
321 1995 BOP, supra note 11, at 99.
322 Id. at 100.
323 In the Snake River, the spring/summer chinook juvenile passage season is April 10

through June 20; in the Columbia, the spring passage season is April 20 through June 30. Id.
at 105. The BiOp also called for spill during the juvenile fall chinook migration season (June
21 to August 31 in the Snake River and July 1 to August 31 in the Columbia River). Id.
Specifically, it directed the federal water managers to spill at'all noncollector projects to
achieve 80% FPE. Id. No spill triggers applied. Dams with collection and transport facilities
are Lower Granite, Little Goose, Lower Monumental, and McNary. Bruce, supra note 54, at 2
(graph). On the lower Snake and Columbia Rivers, Ice Harbor, John Day, The Dalles, and
Bonneville have no collection facilities. See id.
324 1995 BiOP, supra note 11, at 105.
325 Id.;.see supra notes 309-310 and accompanying text.
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fell short of such "spill triggers,"3 26 the BiOp called for maximum possible
transportation, thus increasing the proportion of fish that were transported in low Snake River flow conditions. Unlike the Council, NMFS assumed that the continued transportation of juvenile salmon would prove
beneficial,3 27 concluding that "it is appropriate to continue to rely on
transportation as a major means to mitigate the adverse impacts of the
FCRPS."3 28 In fact, NMFS itself admitted that the BiOp "relies primarily on
transportation of smolts."

329

The BiOp called for all fish collected at the lower Snake River collec-,
33
tor projectsso to be transported, unless otherwise directed by the TMT. 1
This is in stark contrast to the Council's recommendation that transportation occur only during "extremely adverse" conditions.3 32 NMFS predicted
that about seventy-four percent of spring and summer chinook juveniles
arriving at Lower Granite would be transported if flows exceeded 85,000
cfs. 3 33 Even when flows exceed 100,000 cfs, NMFS anticipated that fiftysix percent of the juveniles would be transported. 33 4 These figures reflected NMFS's significantly greater faith in the efficacy of transportation
than that expressed in the Council's program, under which fewer than
one-half of juvenile salmon would be transported in any year.33 5 .
The NMFS BiOp adopted somewhat of a "two rivers approach," calling for transportation primarily on the Snake.River and employing inriver
migration (with increased flows and spill) on the Columbia. This approach
assumes that it makes little sense to increase any flows in the Snake River
326 1995 BiOp, supra note 11, at 105. The spill triggers (the amount of flow at Lower
Granite necessary to trigger the 80% FPE spill requirement) are as follows: for spill at Lower
Granite Dam, 100,000 cfs; for spill at Little Goose and Lower Monumental, 85,000 cfs. Id.
Seasonal average flows at Lower Granite exceeded 100,000 cfs only twice and 85,000 cfs just
four times during the decade between 1985 and 1994. Id. at 40. The BiOp directed 8096 FPE
at all lower Columbia River projects from April 20 to June 30, 1995. Id at 105. However, the
BiOp did authorize the TMT to recommend spill when flow levels are below the spill triggers. Id. at 105.
327 Id. at 111. NMFS stated that the available empirical data indicated that transportation
"has demonstrated benefits for Snake River spring/summer chinook and is likely to benefit
Snake River fall chinook and sockeye salmon." Id.
328 Id. at 111.
329 Id. at 80. NMFS made this statement when comparing the BiOp to the proposed recovery plan. NMFS suggested that the proposed recovery plan contained more inriver improvements, such as significant increases in flow augmentation and increased spill at
Columbia River dams. Id.; see also PROPOSED RECOVERY PLAN, supra note 303, ch. 5, § 2
(containing the inriver improvements).
330 See supra note 323 for a list of the Snake River collector projects.
331 1995 BiOP, supra note 11, at 110.
332 See supra text accompanying note 233; 1994 PROGRAM, supra note 9, at 5-46 to 5-47.
Also, under the Council's program the state fishery agencies and tribes determine when
"extremely adverse" conditions exist. See supra text accompanying note 234.
333.1995 BiOp, supra note 11, at 112.
334 Id at 112. At Lower Granite, at flows over 100,000 cfs, NMFS estimated that 56% of
spring/summer chinook, 35% of fall chinook, and 48% of sockeye would be transported. Id.
at 58.
335 See 1994 PROGRAM, supra note 9, at 547; supra text accompanying note 235.
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if most smolts will be collected and removed from the river.336 In essence,
the NMFS BiOp endorsed a long-term "spread the risk" approach, a change
from the Council's 1994 Program, which endorsed a "spread the risk" ap37
proach "only as an interim strategy."3
6. NMFS's Recovery Plan and BPA's System OperationReview
In the future, the NMFS Recovery Plan and BPA's System Operation Review (SOR) could also influence the operation of the FCRPS.
The recovery plan, required by the ESA to help remove listed
salmon species from their endangered status,33 8 has yet to be finalized.33 9 The SOR is, in effect, BPA's attempt to comply with NEPA
336 See Ken Casavant, Salmon Recovery Plans:Some FundamentalChoices, 26 ENVTL. L.
663, 665 (1996). The author, a member of the Council, explained the rationale behind
NMFS's approach:
From my perspective as a transportation economist, let us call that inriver movement
a railroad, and let us say if we barge most of our commodity from point A to point B,
does it make sense and how costly is it to start the engine and run the train full bore,
even though the train is essentially empty? This is similar to the inherent conflict
between transporting the majority of salmon, yet calling for flow augmentation, spill,
and some other measures, when most of the fish have been removed from the river. I
do not think any transportation economist would suggest that we conduct both programs simultaneously, unless we have an excess demand problem. Unfortunately, this
is not the case with current salmon volumes.
Id.
337 1994 PROGRAM, supra note 9, at 5-6; see also supra notes 193-195, 263 and accompanying text. Compare supra notes 263-264 and accompanying text. However, in early 1996,
Idaho Governor Phil Batt, with the help of Idaho Council members Mike Field and Todd
Maddock, endorsed new measures and recommendations to aid in juvenile migration. MEASURFS TO ENHANCE SALMON AND STEELHEAD MIGRATION SUCCESS DURING 1996: STATE OF IDAHO
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR A BALANCED RESOURCE APPROACH (Feb. 20, 1996) [hereinafter IDAHO
RECOMMENDATIONS]. These recommendations employed -an interim "spread the risk" ap-

proach, id. at 2-3, under which flow augmentation would be separated from spill, so that the
two techniques could be evaluated independently. See IDAHO RECOMMENDATIONS, sypra at 56; Northwest Power Planning Council, Idaho Officials New Policy to Aid Snake River
Salmon, UPDATE, Mar. 25, 1996, at 2 [hereinafter Council Update]. The policy also called for
an "equitable balance" between inriver and out-of-river migration under high flow conditions
(defined as flows over 100,000 cfs)-in contrast to 1995 river operations, when as many as
80% of juveniles were barged. Council Update, supra, at 2. The Idaho recommendations also
endorsed the use of daily or weekly averages for flow targets, instead of the seasonal averages used by NMFS. IDAHO RECOMMENDATIONS, supra, at i. This recommendation is even
more ambitious than the Council's program, which used only monthly average flows in setting its flow targets. See supra notes 183-189 and accompanying text. The Idaho recommendations also declared that the NMFS BiOp's 100,000 cfs "spill trigger" at Lower Granite was
too high. IDAHO RECOMMENDATIONS, supra, at ii,
6; see also supra note 326 and accompanying
text. Council Chairman John Etchart said that the Council would "look very, very carefully"
at Idaho's proposal. Council Update, supra, at 2.
338 16 U.S.C. § 1533(0(1) (1994).'A recovery plan must provide for the "conservation and
survival of endangered species and threatened species" listed under the ESA. Id.
339 As of this writing, the proposed recovery plan, released in March 1995 by NMFS,
shortly after the 1995 NMFS BiOp, was the most current version of the recovery plan. See
PROPOSED RECOVERY PLAN, supra note 303. An earlier draft recovery plan was also released.
See DRAFT RECOVERY PLAN, supra note 47. The draft recovery plan was written by the Snake
River Salmon Recovery Team, which consisted of seven NMFS-appointed scientists, see id.
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by writing an environmental impact statement on system opera340
tions.
The SOR process began in 1990, with a final EIS released in November 1995.34 1 Unsurprisingly, the SOR closely mirrored the 1995 NMFS
BiOp.3 42 During the draft stages of the SOR process, BPA noted that the
NMFS Recovery Plan would "guide all aspects of salmon restoration and
recovery, including the role transportation will play."834 The role of the
Council's program seems less certain, especially since federal dam opera44
tors apparently believe they are not bound to follow it3
Thus, by 1995 the NMFS BiOp appeared to be the guiding salmon recovery plan and the chief regulator of the operation of the basin's federal
hydropower system. These facts are troubling since, when compared to
the Council's 1994 amendments, the NMFS BiOp both 1) called for less
ambitious measures to improve inriver conditions for migrating juveniles,

and 2) delayed implementation of some of those measures, such as reservoir drawdowns, for several years.3 45 In addition, according to NMFS, the

at xvi, created pursuant to the ESA. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(0(2) (1994). Members of the recovery
team were not pleased with NMFS's decision to exclude some of the recovery team's recommendations from the proposed recovery plan. On May 31, Don Bevan, the head of the recovery team, sent a letter to NMFS outlining certain disagreements between the recovery team's
recommendations and some of NMFS's changes to those recommendations which appeared
in the proposed recovery plan. See Snake River Recovery Team Comments on Revised Plan,
CLEARING Up, June 5, 1995, at 6 (reprinting portions of Bevan's letter). The team felt that no
drawdown should occur until problems of downstream and upstream passage for both
'juveniles and adults were addressed. Id. Bevan also stated that the team did "not accept the
Plan's wording that implies that there is a known flow-survival relationship." Id. Bevan also
stated that he was "quite pleased" with the NRC study, supra notes 32, 47, because it was
"another group of independent people coming up with the same conclusions and the same
recommendations [as the Recovery Team]." Lynn Francisco, Study Rejects Drawdowns,
Supports
Barging,Encourages Biodiversity, CLEARING Up, Nov. 13, 1995, at 8, 9.
340 42 U.S.C.
§ 4332(C) (1994). The SOR was conducted jointly by BPA, the Corps, and the
Bureau. See BONNEVILLE POWER ADMIN. Err AL., COLUMBIA RIVER SYSTEM OPERATION REVIEW:
FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT SUMMARY 2 (Nov. 1995) [hereinafter SOR SUMMARY].
341 See SOR SUMMARY, supra note 340, at 1-5 (discussing the long history of the SOR
process).
342 The "preferred alternative" in the SOR contained the same measures called for in the
1995 BiOp. See id. at 5-11, 34-37. While calling for John Day Dam (year-round) and the four
lower Snake River projects (in the spring and summer) to be operated at MOP, the SOR did
not commit to "deep drawdowns." Id. at 8. Like the NMFS BiOp, 1995 BIOP, supra note 11,
at 92, 116, the SOR concluded that congressional authorization and funding would be a "necessary first step" for these deep drawdowns. SOR SUMMARY, supra note 340, at 8. Also like
the BiOp, the SOR gave no reason for its conclusion that congressional approval of reservoir
drawdowns is necessary. Some in the region feel that the SOR, with its lengthy and costly
process, was "worthless." Bob Baum, Costly 5-Year Study of Columbia: "Worthless," BEND
BULLETIN, Jan. 10, 1996, at B4. Others also felt that the SOR "virtually ignored" the advice of
the tribes. See id.
343 BONNEVILLE POWER ADMIN. ET AL., COLUMBIA RIVER SYSTEM OPERATION REVIEW: DRAF-

(1994).
344 See supra note 253 and accompanying text. But cf. text accompanying supra notes
273-279 (arguing that the Council's program is no less enforceable than the NMFS BiOp).
345 See Who Runs The River?, supra note 79, at 349-424; see also supra notes 280-283,
288, 292-299 and accompanying text.
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT, SUMMARY 10
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chances of the listed salmon species reaching recovery levels was, at best,
less than eighty percent and could take anywhere between twenty-four to
one hundred years to achieve.1 6 Worse, many measures in the NMFS
BiOp were not implemented in 1995.347
C. The Tribal Anadromous Fish RestorationPlan
On June 15, 1995, the tribes of the Nez Perce, Umatilla, Warm Springs,
and Yakama reservations released their Columbia River Anadromous Fish
Restoration Plan (the tribal plan).34 8 The overriding approach to the tribal
plan for restoring salmon populations was simple: put the fish back in the
river and keep them there.3 49 The tribal plan's objective was to restore all
populations of anadromous fish, including the salmon, the pacific lamprey,
and the white sturgeon.3 50 Thus, the scope of the tribal plan, like the
Council's program,35 1 was broader than the NMFS BiOp.3 52 Also, like the
Council's program,353 the tribal plan included particular hatchery plans for
subbasins in the Columbia River Basin. 35
The tribal plan listed four specific goals: 1) restore anadromous fish
to the rivers and streams of the Columbia River Basin, 2) emphasize restoration strategies that rely on natural production and healthy river systems,
3) protect tribal sovereignty and treaty rights, and 4) reclaim the anadro346 1995 BiOp, supra note 11, at 130-35. NMFS used time periods of 24, 48, and 100 years
and employed differing plans to determine the likelihood of achieving recovery levels for
each time period. Id. NMFS had no plan for sockeye because of their "critically low population levels." Id. at 135. NMFS stated that spring/summer chinook had a 70% chance of reaching the threshold recovery level within 24 to 100 years. Id. at 131-32. This optimism is
misleading, however, because there was only a greater than 50% chance of recovery in 48
years, id. at 132 (the chance for recovery within 100 years was 70% or higher), and chances
for recovery within 24 years (by the year 2018) could not be predicted at a 70% probability
under any of the NMFS plans, id. at 133. Chances of fall chinook reaching recovery levels
were more optimistic: a 50-70% chance of being above the recovery level within 48 years (by
2042). Id. at 134.
Delayed federal action and uncertain results have led some to question the role of the
ESA in helping to restore salmon populations. One commentator envisioned four future scenarios concerning the requirements of the ESA: 1) federal preemption of the Council's program, 2) public backlash from this preemption that could jeopardize the effectiveness of the
ESA, 3) a collapse of the listed salmon species because of a failure to develop and implement a recovery plan, or 4) amendment of the ESA to protect entire ecosystems and multiple species. McGinnis, supra note 253, at 91.
347 See infra Part V.
348 TRIBAL PLAN, supra note 14.

349 Id. at 1-1.
350 Id. at 3-1 to 3-3.
351 See 1994 PROGRAM, supra note 9, at 4-4 (the goal of the Council's program is to double
salmon and steelhead runs without the loss of biodiversity); see also supra text accompanying note 17.
352 The BiOp, of course, is aimed merely at ensuring that the existence of the three listed
salmon species is not jeopardized or, if the existence is jeopardized by the operation of the
hydrosystem, that a reasonable and prudent alternative is in place to ensure their continued
existence. See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2), (b)(3)(a) (1994).
353 See 1994 PROGRAM, supra note 9, at 7-1.
354 See TRIBAL PLAN, supra note 14, at vol. II (containing the 23 subbasin plans).
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mous fish resource for future generations.3 5, The tribal plan adopted two
objectives to achieve the above goals concerning salmon: 1) halt the decline in salmon populations within seven years, and 2) increase adult
salmon returns above Bonneville Dam to four million within twenty-five
years.356 The tribal plan recommended a series of short-term and longterm measures for improving juvenile passage and survival, such as impos35 7
ing river flow targets and drawing down reservoirs.
1. River Flows
The tribal plan recommended short-term ncreased flows in both the
Snake and Columbia Rivers. On the Snake River, unlike the Council's program or the NMFS BiOp, the tribal plan did not set flow targets based on
cubic feet per second. Apparently, the tribes felt it was unrealistic to set
flow targets on the Snake River because of restrictions on Dworshak Reservoir and the lack of water in the basin. 358 Instead, the tribal plan recommended that a particular quantity of water, measured in acre-feet, be set
aside for flow augmentationto aid salmon migration in the Snake River.
One to three MAF of water would be made available on the upper Snake
River, 450,000 acre-feet from Brownlee Reservoir, 1.5 MAF from Dworshak Reservoir in the, spring, and one MAF from Dworshak in the summer.3 5 9 The tribal plan recommended that these volumes of water be
managed- by the state and federal fishery agencies and the tribes.360 The
tribes felt it important to balance river flows more evenly between spring
and summer migrants, which helps to explain the differences between the
tribal plan, the Council's program, and the NMFS BiOp in their approach
to managing the Snake River.36 1 On the Columbia River, the tribal plan did
call for flow targets. The plan's short-term recommendation consisted of
the same flow targets at The Dalles Dam as those in the Council's program. Spring flow targets would range from 300,000 to 260,000 to 220,000
cfs.

362

.

35 Id. at 1-4, 513-2 to 5B-3.

356 Id. The tribal plan also planned to restore all anadromous fish populations to their
"historic abundance" within 200 years. Id. at 1-4, 5B-3.
357 Id. at 5B-37 to 5B-43.
368 Telephone Interview with Bob Heinith, Hydropower Coordinator, Columbia River Inter-Tribal Fish Commission (Mar. 5, 1996).

39 TmBAL PLAN, supm note 14, at 5B-40. The tribes' endorsement of a volumetric approach, instead of fixed flows, seemed ironically inconsistent with the Ninth Circuit's deci-

sion in the NRIC case'(in which the Yakama Indian Nation was a plaintiff), where the court
questioned the efficacy of the volumetric "water budget" as a substitute for fixed flows. See
Northwest Resource Info. Ctr., Inc. v. Northwest Power Planning Council, 35 F.3d 1371,

1380, 1389, 1392-93 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 50 (1995).
360 TRmAL PLAN, supra note 14, at 5B-40.
361 Telephone Interview with Bob Heinith, supra note 358.
362 TRiBAL PLAN, supra note 14, at 5B-40. The tribal plan's spring flow targets would be

implemented from April 15 to June 15. Id. This is a bit shorter than the period defined by the
Council, which spanned from April 10 to June 20. 1994 PRoGRAM, supra note 9, at 5-20.
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The tribal plan also adopted a long-term goal of achieving "mean historical flows" during the juvenile migration period. 363 The plan defined
"historical flows" as "those flows that would have existed prior to water
resources development, including flows that would have occurred in the
absence of irrigation depletions."36 Daily and hourly fluctuations in flows
due to power peaking would also be reduced in the long term under the
36 5
tribal plan.
2. Reservoir Drawdowns
To aid in achieving these flow targets, the tribal plan called for both
short-term and long-term reservoir drawdowns. The plan eschewed the
seasonal drawdowns recommended by the Council's program and contemplatedunder the NMFS BiOp, stating that reservoir drawdowns should be
implemented on a permanent basis for ecosystem considerations.3 66 In the
short term, the tribal plan recommended that Lower Granite be drawn
down to 710 feet in 1996.367 The Council's program made the same recommendation, albeit for 1995 instead of 1996, and for only two months instead of year-round.3 6 8 Under the tribal plan, the three remaining Snake
River projects-Little Goose, Lower Monumental, and Ice Harbor damswould be operated at MOP from April 15 to October 31.369 On the Columbia River, John Day Reservoir would be drawn down to MOP in 1996.370
This recommendation was similar to measures contained in both the
3 72
Council's program 371 and the NMFS BiOp.
The tribal plan also recommended a long-term drawdown measure,
consisting of one of three alternatives: 1) John Day and Ice Harbor drawn
down to natural river level, 2) John Day drawn down to spillway crest
level and Ice Harbor and Lower Monumental drawn down to natural river
level, or 3) John Day and all four Snake River projects drawn down to
natural river level. 373 The tribal plan expected survival rates for juvenile
salmon originating above Lower Granite to increase by up to four times
the recent survival rates if one of the long-term drawdown measures were
3 74
implemented.
3W3TRwAL PLAN,
364 Id.

supra note 14, at 5B-42.

365 Id. at 5-38. See also id. at 5B-38 fig. 5-4, for a comparison of the tribal plan's recommended short-term and long-term flows with the regulated monthly flows of 1991-94.
366 Id. at 5B-41.
367 Id.; see supra note 199 and accompanying text.
368 1994 PROGRAM, supra note 9, at 5-25.
369 TRnsAL PLAN, supra note 14, at 5B-41.
370 Id.
371 See supra notes 208-213 and accompanying text.
372 See supra note 291 and accompanying text.
373 TRmAL PLAN, supra note 14, at 5B-42.
374 Id. at 5B-43. The tribal plan estimated that, under the first long-term drawdown option, survival rates would increase 3 times; survival rates would increase 3.4 times under the
second option; and 4 times under the third option. Id.
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3. Spills
Like the Council's program3 75 and the NMFS BiOp,3 76 the tribal plan

3 77
recommended spill to achieve eighty percent FPE in the short-term.
However, for the long-term, spill would be increased to achieve ninety percent FPE, 3 78 the most ambitious FPE recommendation of the three plans.
As under the Council's program3 79 and the NMFS BiOp,38 0 the FPE level
could be limited by high gas levels, but the tribes would set a higher ceiling for dissolved gas than under the NMFS BiOp. 38 1

4. Transportation
Like the Council's program, 38 2 the tribal plan recommended that
transportation of juvenile salmon no longer be recognized as part of "a
long-term salmon recovery program."3 83 The tribes concluded that halting
transportation of juveniles would allow for testing of alternative passage
measures which are foreclosed when transportation occurs. 384 The tribal
plan recommended the discontinuation of transportation altogether, 385 the
most drastic change in current transportation operations called for by any
of the three plans. This recommendation is consistent with the tribal
plan's goal of putting fish back in the river.38 6 The similarity between the,
Council's program and the tribal plan on the transportation issue is not
surprising, since the Council relied heavily on tribal and state fishery
agency recommendations when it called for restricting transportation in
38 7
its program.
375
376
377
378

See supra note 219 and accompanying text.
See supra note 313 and accompanying text.
TRIBAL PLAN, supra note 14, at 5B-40.
Id. at 5B-42.

379 1994 PROGRAM, supra note 9, at 5-36.
380 1995 BiOp, supra note 11, at 106.
381 TR AL PLAN, supra note 14, at 5B-40 to 5B-41. The tribal plan recommended a ceiling
of 1206-125% dissolved gas levels. Id. This was a higher ceiling than the 115% in the NMFS
BiOp. See 1995 BiOp, supra.note 11, at 106-08. In fact, NMFS specifically rejected the tribal
plan's trigger because of concerns over "gas bubble trauma" in juvenile salmon. Id. at 107-08;
see also supra note 316 and accompanying text. However, studies in 1994 and 1995 on the
effects of high gas levels on fish seem to indicate that the tribes were justified in seeking a
higher gas cap. See supra note 55 and accompanying text; infra note 548 and accompanying
text.
382 See supra notes 232-239 and accompanying text.
383 TRIBAL PLAN, supra note 14, at 5B-39.
384 Id.
385 Id. at 5B-41.
386 Id,. at 1-1.
387 See 1994 PROGRAM, supra note 9, at 15-116 to 15-120 (outlining tribal and state fishery
agency transportation recommendations, listing which measures the Council adopted, and
explaining why the Council did or did not accept certain recommendations).
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5. Hatchery Production
The tribal plan recommended the use of hatcheries to "supplement"
declining fish populations, 8 8 concluding that supplementation is "an appropriate tool for use with [fish] populations that are fragmented and declining, and where other remedial actions cannot be implemented quickly
enough or on a scale that is large enough to halt further population
losses."38 9 The tribal plan stated that hatcheries should simulate natural
conditions to ensure that natural and hatchery fish groups would be managed as one gene pool,390 with a goal of reestablishing naturally spawning
salmon runs, instead of continuing current hatchery operations which employ "rearing and release methods."3'9
The tribal plan outlined hatchery goals and recommended hatchery
actions for each subbasin above Bonneville Dam.3 92 Hatcheries would also

be used in achieving another goal of the tribal plan: to reintroduce salmon
to many areas from which they have been extirpated. 393 The tribal plan
took a different view of supplementation than the Council's program,
which recognized the "legitimate biological concerns" of using artificial
propagation. 394 In contrast, the tribal plan concluded that' supplementation is "an indispensable part of any restoration plan," 395 asserting that
genetic concerns could be accounted for and declaring that "the increasing likelihood of species extirpation is in fact the far greater genetic
6

risk."39

6. Summary
The, tribal plan does not legally bind federal dam operators in any
way. But this did not stop the tribes from lambasting the past actions of
NMFS and recommending a new course for the agency to follow. The plan
attacked NMFS's failure "to articulate a clear jeopardy standard" and its
failure "to give due weight" to the tribes' and state fishery agencies' recommendations and survival planning. 397 The tribal plan also compared the
expected results from its recommendations and those from NMFS's pro388 TRiBAL PLAN,

supra note

14, at 5B-24.

389 Id.
390 Id.
391 Id. at iv-v.

392 See id. Vol. I.
393 Id. at 5B-35.
394 See 1994 PROGRAM, supra note 9, at 7-12.
395 TRmIAL PLAN, supra note 14, at v.
396 Id.
397 See TRmAL PLAN, supra note 14, at 4-15. However, unlike the Council, NMFS is not
required by federal law to give "due weight" to these recommendations. See 16 U.S.C.
§ 839b(h)(7)(1994) (Northwest Power Act's due weight provision). The tribal plan also recommended that NMFS reconsider its controversial use of the "evolutionarily significant unit"
(ESU) in making ESA listing determinations. Id. at 5A-5. See generally Daniel J. Rohlf,
There's Something Fishy Going On Here: A Critiqueof the NationalMarine FisheriesService's Definition of Species Under the Endangered Species Act, 24 ENVrL. L. 617 (1994)
(discussing ESUs and the controversy surrounding NMFS's use of them).
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posed recovery plan.30 8 This comparison revealed that NMFS's proposed
scenarios failed to meet survival and recovery standards for listed Snake
River spring and fall chinook,3 99 while the tribal plan's measures would
achieve survival and recovery for both species. 400 The tribal plan even
questioned -whether NMFS should have an active role in Columbia Basin
salmon restoration efforts. The tribes doubted whether historically NMFS
has played a "constructive role" in the recovery of upriver salmon
stocks,4 0 ' charging that NMFS had compromised its integrity on hatchery
40 2
and hydrosystem operations issues.
D. Comparing the Three Salmon Restoration Plans
The three proposed plans' different approaches to improving juvenile
survival rates, and the ambitiousness of those approaches, were reflected
in their goals. Both the Council's program and the tribal plan were more
ambitious than the NMFS BiOp, particularly in their willingness to call for
immediate reservoir drawdowns. In. terms of restoring salmon populations, the tribal plan was the most aggressive, since only that plan had a
goal of restoring fish populations to historic levels. 403 The goal of the
Council's program was to double salmon runs without the loss of biological diversity,4°4 while the goal of the NMFS BiOp was merely to ensure
that employment of a "reasonable and prudent alternative" to the current
operation of the hydrosystem would not jeopardize the continued exist40 5
ence of the three endangered salmon species in the Snake River Basin.
In addition to differences in overall goals, the plans took significantly different approaches to the details of improving survival rates, such as river
flows, drawdowns, spillS, and transportation.
398 See TRmiAL PLAN, supra note 14, at 5C-1 to 5C-12.
399 Id. at 5C-3 to 5C-4.
400 Id. However, short-term measures for spring chinook may not be as successful because of the limited options for increasing very small populations quickly.
401 Id. at 4-27 n.135.
402 Id. The tribal plan, in a scathing footnote, criticized NMFS and its past practices:
Given the proposed role of NMFS in recovery, it is appropriate to ask whether the
agency and its predecessor, the Bureau of Commercial Fisheries, has played a con-.
structive role, historically, in the. recovery of naturally-spawning upriver stocks. In
reviewing its role as regulator of ocean salmon fisheries, its authorship of the Lower
Snake River Compensation Plan, and its administration of the Mitchell Act, NMFS has
frequently exacerbated stock status. In addition, the work of the NMFS Seattle-based
research program, with its focus on captive broodstock technology and its massive
research contracts with the Corps of Engineers, has compromised itself as an honest
broker onf production and hydro operations issues.
Id.
403 Id. at 1-4.
404 See 1994 PROGRAM, supra note 9, at 4-4 to 4-9; see also supra note 181 and accompanying text. Note that the Northwest Power Act calls for the Council to provide for both
"improved survival" at the dams and "flows of sufficient. .. quantity... to improve production, migration, and survival" of the salmon. 16 U.S.C. § 839b(h)(6)(E)(i)-(ii) (1994).
405 See 1995 BiOp, supra note 11, at 91. NMFS stated that another goal of the BiOp was
"to fulfill the United States' commitment to uphold tribal treaty fishing rights." Id. The limited scope of the BiOp also explains why NMFS did not address hatchery issues.
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1. River Flows
All three plans called for river flow improvements, but differed on the
methods and quantities. The Council's program and the NMFS BiOp called
for similar river flow improvements in the Snake River for spring migrants,
but the Council recommended a higher monthly average peak flow at
Lower Granite (140,000 cfs) 406 than NMFS (100,000 cfs). 40 7 The tribal plan
eschewed setting flow targets and instead earmarked amounts of storage
water to be set aside for flow improvements. 40 8 The Council and tribes
called for the same increased 'flows in the Columbia River, which were
slightly higher than those in the BiOp. 40 9 In addition, the tribal plan410 and
the Council's programn4 ' strongly endorsed the "watershed," or subbasin,
approach to managing flows, while the BiOp did not.
The three plans also differed on the question of how to obtain water
for flow improvements, and how much to obtain. The Council called for
the purchase of 1.427 MAF of water to aid in boosting flows in the Snake
River. 412 NMFS called for just 427,000 acre-feet of water and gave a hazy
directive to the Bureau to secure additional amounts.4 13 The tribes did not
call for "water purchases," but instead recommended that federal water
managers set aside roughly four to six MAF of water that the tribes would
help shape to produce river flows for migrating juveniles in the Snake
4 14
Basin.
2. Reservoir Drawdowns and Spills
The Council's program and the tribal plan both took more agressive
approaches to the issue of reservoir drawdowns than NMFS's BiOp. Both
the Council and the tribes called for drawdowns on the Snake River by
1994 PROGRAM, supra note 9, at 5-20; see also supra text accompanying note 183.
407 1995 BiOp, supra note 11, at 104; see also supra text accompanying note 280.
408 TRBAL PLAN, supra note 14. Under the tribal plan, this water would be managed by
state and federal fishery agencies and the tribes. Id. at 5B-40; see also supra text accompanying note 360. The tribal plan did not explain how this method of flow improvement differed from the Council's prior practice under the Water Budget. See supra notes 76-82 and
accompanying text.
409 Both the Council's program and the- tribal plan called for a three-year scheme of
monthly flow targets at The Dalles Dam, beginning at 300,000 cfs, decreasing to 260,000 cfs
in the second year, and ending at 220,000 cfs. 1994 PROGRAM, supra note 9, at 5-29; TRIBAL
PLAN, supra note 14, at 5B-40;'see also supra notes 187-188, 362. NMFS called for flow
targets of 220,000 to 260,000 on the Columbia, but this target was set for McNary Dam instead of The Dalles. 1995 BiOp, supra note 11, at 104. See supra note 280 and accompanying
text.
410 See TuaBAL PLAN, supra note 14, at v; see also id. at vol. II (containing the entire
subbasin plan).
411 See 1994 PROGRAM, supra note 9, at 4-5, 7-4 to 7-5.
412 1994 PROGRAM, supra note 9, at 5-21; see also supra notes 228-231 and accompanying
text.
413 1995 BiOp, supra note 11, at 99-100; see also supra notes 319-322 and accompanying
text.
414 See supra notes 359-360, 408 and accompanying text.
406
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1996 at the latest.4 15 NMFS, on the other hand, decided to operate the four
Snake River dams within one foot of MOP and delayed any further
drawdown decisions until 1999.416 All three plans recommended the im417
mediate drawdown of the John Day Reservoir on the Columbia River.
Both the Council and the tribes expected long-term drawdowns to occur
in the future, but the Council envisioned only seasonal drawdowns, while
the tribes called for permanent drawdowns. 418 In contrast, NMFS contemplated a long-term scenario in which federal water managers would
choose from three alternatives for the long-term solution to increasing juvenile survival; either drawdowns, new or improved collection devices to
increase transportation, or a combination of both would be chosen by late
1999.419
The primary difference between the proposals with regard to spill lay
in the numbers. NMFS and the Council called for spill at dams to achieve
eighty percent FPE, 420 while the tribes set a higher standard of ninety perhigh gas
cent FPE. 421 In each plan spill would be limited, if necessary, by
422
levels to avoid potential gas bubble trauma in juvenile salmon.
415 The Council recommended drawing down Lower Granite in 1995 and 1996 for the

spring migration. 1994 PROGRAM, supra note 9, at 5-25 to 5-26; see also.supra notes 199-200
and accompanying text. The tribes called for a year-round drawdown of Lower Granite in
1996. TRmAL PLAN, supra note 14, at 5B-41; see also supra notes 366-367 and accompanying
text.
416 1995 BiOp, supra note 11, at 112; see also supra note 289 and accompanying text.
Under the BiOp, the dams would be operated at this level until the 1999 decision on future
drawdowns. 1995 BIOP, supra note 11, at 112. The Council's program and the tribal plan also
recommended drawdown measures during this period. The Council called for Little Goose
to be drawn down to near spillway level beginning in 1999 and continuing during the spring
migration seasons of each year until 2002. 1994 PROGRAM, supra note 9,-at 5-26; see also
supra text accompanying notes 205-206. The tribes recommended operating the three remaining Snake River projects at MOP during the spring migration. TRIBAL PLAN, supra note
14, at 5B-41; see also supra text accompanying note 369.
417 The Council and NMFS called for John Day to be operated at near MOP level, see
supra notes 208, 291 and accompanying text, while the tribes recommended John Day to
operate at MOP level, see supra text accompanying note 370. This rather modest drawdown
ma not even occur. See supra note 291, infra notes 562-563, 616, 720 and accompanying
text.
418 See supra notes 199-205 (Council's seasonal drawdowns), 366-374 (tribal permanent
drawdowns) and accompanying text.
419 1995 BIOP, supra note 11, at 92-94; see also supra note 288 and accompanying text.
420 1995 BiOp, supra note 11, at 105; 1994 PROGRAM, silpra note 9, at 5-36, 5-40; see also
supra notes 219, 313 and accompanying text.
421 TRIBAL PLAN, supra note 14, at 5B-42. The tribes called for 80% FPE for the short-term,
but would increase it to 90% FPE over the long-term. Id. at 5B-40. See supra note 378 and
accompanying text.
422 See supra notes 225-227, 316-317, 381 and accompanying text. NMFS and the tribes
both set maximum ceilings of dissolved gas levels. NMFS's ceiling was 115%, 1995 BiOp,
supra note 11, at 106-08. The tribes would set a higher standard of 12006-125%. TRmAL PLAN,
supra note 14, at 5B-40 to 5B-41. In fact, NMFS specifically rejected the tribes' recommended ceiling. 1995 BiOP, supra note 11, at 107-09; see also supra notes 316, 381 and
accompanying text.
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3. Transportation
The Council and the tribes both concluded that transportation should
not be relied on as the primary method of improving juvenile survival,
while NMFS continued to promote transportation. The Council's program
limited transportation to "extremely adverse conditions," estimating that
less than half of juveniles would be transported in any year absent extremely adverse conditions. 423 While concluding that transportation would
help to improve juvenile survival for the short term, the Council warned
that barging should not be used as a "substitute" for effecting changes in
the river ecosystem or as "a device to delay substantial improvements" in
inriver juvenile survival. 424 The tribes, in contrast, asserted that barging
should be completely eliminated. 425 Both the tribes and the Council concluded that a reduction in (or elimination of) barging would aid in determining whether other inriver methods of juvenile passage could be
effective in restoring salmon populations. 426 On the other hand, NMFS relied primarily on transportation, 427 estimating that anywhere from fifty-six
percent to seventy-four percent of juveniles would be barged around the
dams.428 NMFS contended that continued transportation would prove ben429
eficial to the basin's juvenile salmon.
In the short run, the NMFS BiOp became the mechanism driving the
operation of the federal hydropower system in the Columbia and Snake
River basins.as0 Unfortunately, in 1995, the federal dam operators were
not able to meet even the more modest measures contained in the NMFS
BiOp, as explained in the following Part.
V.

FAILING TO IMPLEMENT THE

NMFS

BIOLOGICAL OPINION IN

1995

Although the 1995 NMFS "jeopardy" BiOp apparently represented a
turnaround from the preceding "no jeopardy" BiOps, the "major overhaul"
called for by Judge Marsh 43 1 was meant to take place in actual river operations, not merely in agency documents. The revised 1995 BiOp may have
423 1994 PROGRAM, supra note 9, at 5-47; see also supra notes 232-235 and accompanying

text.
424 1994 PROGRAM, supra note 9, at 5-46; see also supra notes 238-239 and accompanying
text
425 TRIAL PLAN, supra note' 14, at 5B-41; see also supra note 385 and accompanying text.
Like the Council, the tribes felt transportation could not be part of a long-term effort to
improve salmon survival. TRIBAL PLAN, supra note 14, at 5B-39.
426 See TRImAL PLAN, supra note 14, at 5B-39; see also supra text accompanying note 384

for the tribes' rationale. The Council, as part of its mainstem experiment, limited the number
of juveniles to be transported in an effort to have roughly the same number of fish passing

both inriver and via the barges. 1994 PROGRAM, supra note 9, at 5-47; see also supra notes
193-197 and accompanying text.

427 See supra notes 326-329 and accompanying text.
428 1995 BiOP, supra note 11, at 112; see also supra notes 333-334 and accompanying text.
429 See supra notes 326-335 and accompanying text.
430 See supra notes 254, 343 and accompanying text.

431 Idaho Dep't of Fish & Game v. National Marine Fisheries Serv.,-850 F. Supp. 886, 900
(D. Or. 1994), vacated as moot, 56 F.3d 1071 (9th Cir. 1995).
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satisfied the court's admonition for a major overhaul on paper. However,
implementation fell far short of that promise in 1995.432

As discussed earlier, 43 3 the 1995 BiOp called for increased salmon
protection measures as compared to the 1993 BiOp. And unlike the Council's program, whose mainstem passage provisions have been largely ig-

nored by federal water managers, 43 4 the 1995 BiOp is a salmon recovery
plan with some apparent legal force. 43 5 However, the real test of whether

federal management agencies have changed the status quo comes not

from the formulation of a plan, but in its implementation. This Part shows
how the federal water managers failed to comply with the NMFS BiOp in
1995. NMFS's reasonable and prudent alternative called for changes in
river operations in three key areas: 1) instream flows, 2) spill, and 3) reservoir drawdowns. Each topic is addressed in turn.
432 See also Charles Ray, 1995 River Operations Under the Endangered Species Act:
Continuing the Salmon Slaughter, 26 ENVrL. L.675, 678-80 (1996).
433 See supra notes 258-262 and accompanying text.
434 The Council, in its 1995 annual report, stated:
Implementation is largely conducted through the management actions of tribal, state,
and federal natural resource agencies. Bringing these agencies together with the funding sources to implement action in an orderly and efficient manner has been difficult
over the life of the program....
Little progress was made in 1995 in improving the coordination of implementation. Bonneville suspended monthly meetings with implementors and other involved
parties to review and coordinate implementation because participation by fishery
managers and others had dwindled. Some managers questioned whether the Bonneville meetings were the most effective opportunity to influence implementation.
1995 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 179, at 6.
435 Although the action agency has the ultimrate responsibility in carrying out its § 7 ESA
duties, see supra notes 273-274 and accompanying text, in order to determine whether an
agency has met its duties, courts defer to the opinion of the expert agency in the form of the
BiOp, not the action agency. See, e.g., Tribal Village of Akutan v. Hodel, 859 F.2d 651, 659
(9th Cir. 1988) (quoting Village of False Pass v. Watt, 565 F. Supp. 1123, 1160-61 (D. Alaska
1993), qffd, 733 F.2d 605 (9th Cir. 1984) ("The agency is not required to adopt the alternatives suggested in the BiOp; however, [i]f [the Secretary] deviates from them, he does so
subject to the risk that he has not satisfied the standard of section 7(a)(2).")); Roosevelt
Campobello Int'l Park Comm'n v. EPA,) 684 F.2d 1041, 1048-52 (1st Cir. 1982) (overturning
EPA's issuance of an NPDES permit in light of a jeopardy BiOp); Lone Rock 'lmber Co. v.
U.S. Dep't of the Interior, 842 F. Supp. 433, 440 (D. Or. 1994) (Although the action agency is
not bound by findings of the biological opinion, courts give great deference to the expertise
of the agency performing the BiOp, and an agency that attempts to proceed in the face of a
critical BiOp will almost certainly be found to have acted arbitrarily and capriciously and
contrary to law.).
In addition to section 7 duties, the ESA prohibits unauthorized "takes" of a listed species by any person, including federal agencies. 16 U.S.C. § 1538 (1994); see id. § 1532(19)
(including "harm" in the definition of take). BiOps often contain "incidental take statements"
that permit the taking of a specified number of the listed species when the takes are incidental to an otherwise lawful activity and do not jeopardize the species. Id. § 1536(b)(4)(C); 50
C.F.R. § 402.14(i) (1995); id. § 17.22(b); see also 1995 BiOP, supra note 11, at 159-66 (allowing up to 86% mortality for juvenile Snake River sockeye and up to 100% mortality for
juvenile spring/summer chinook). Incidental take statements must also contain "reasonable
and prudent measures" necessary or appropriate to minimize the number of takes, 50 C.F.R.,
§ 402.14(i)(1)(ii) (1994), and must be accompanied by NEPA documentation. Ramsey v. Kantor, 96 F.3d 434, 444 (9th Cir. 1996).
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A. Flow Augmentation Measures
The NMFS BiOp set spring and summer flow targets for both the
Snake and Columbia Rivers. However, these flow targets were phrased in
terms of seasonal averages. This leaves much more discretion in the timing of flows to the implementing agencies and the Technical Management
Team (TMT) than if the flow targets were expressed in weekly averages or
instantaneous minimum flows, as in the 1991 flow proposals of the Columbia Basin Fish and Wildlife Authority.43 6 Nevertheless, NMFS set the BiOp
target flows based on "low estimate[s] of the flow that [are] likely to avoid
high mortality."4 7 However, NMFS failed to clearly establish priorities between flows and other potentially conflicting measures, such as reservoir
elevations and drawdowns. Further, the BiOp gave priority to limiting gas
saturation levels, Which hampered implementation of measures
designed
8
to benefit migrating salmon like spill and flow increases.43
River operations met three of the seasonal flow targets, but failed to
meet the summer flow target for the lower Columbia, despite a good water
year in 1995.439 Moreover, the dissolved gas limits placed a major constraint on optimally timing flows for fish passage.
1. Spring Flows in the Snake
The NMFS BiOp specified a seasonal average spring flow target of
85,000 to 100,000 cfs at Lower Granite Dam from April 10 to June 20.4o
Based on pre-season runoff forecasts,"' a 1995 flow target of 95,000 cfs
resulted."4 2 Actual flows exceeded this target by achieving a seasonal average of 101,000 cfs." 3 However, most'smolt migration occurred during
below-target flows. For example, although juvenile chinook migration
436 See Blumm & Simrin, Unraveling Parity,supra note 75, at 707-08 n.299 (reprinting

the 1991 flow proposal).
437 NATIONAL MARINE FISHERIES SERV., NORTHWEST REGION, BASIS FOR FLOW OBJECTIVES FOR

OPERATION OF THE FEDERAL COLUMBIA RIVER POWER SYSTEM passim (Feb. 1995), [hereinafter
NMFS FLOW STUDY].

43 As discussed infra at notes 504-510 and accompanying text, the federal water managers often cited nitrogen supersaturation limits as the reason for withholding storage water
necessary to meet flow targets.
439 Pamela Russell, Water Year Just Ended Was FirstGood One in Four Years, CLEARING
Up, Aug. 14, 1995, at 9; Fish Passage Ctr., Weekly Report #95-27, at 1 (Sept. 22, 1995) (reporting precipitation above The Dalles at 148% above average for the October 1995 to September
1995 water year). January through July 1995 runoff above The Dalles was 104 MAF, 98% of
the 30-year average, up from 1994's 75 MAF,.which was just 71% of average. Id.
440 Instead of fixing flow targets, the BiOp specified a range of flows and an established
formula for fixing the ultimate flow target depending on established water forecasts. For
example, the Snake River spring flow target ranged from 85,000 to 100,000 cfs at Lower
Granite Dam, depending on the April runoff volume forecast. 1995 BIOP, supra note 11, at
104.
441 Id.
442 FISH PASSAGE CTR .: ANNUAL REPORT, SUMMARY OF THE 1995 SPRING
NILE PASSAGE SEASON 3 (Oct. 1996) [hereinafter 1995 ANNUAL REPORT].
443 Id. at 4.

AND SUMMER JUVE-
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peaked in early May, flows peaked a month later.44a During the week of
April 28 toMay 4, flows at Lower Granite averaged only 85,000 cfs. 445 This
was more than ten percent below the target NMFS found necessary to
avoid jeopardy, yet during this period an average of more than 300,000
smolts arrived daily at Lower Granite, with a record 910,000 smolts on
May 2 alone. 446 Nevertheless, in early May, the Corps denied a request
from fishery agencies and tribes to increase flows,, citing dissolved gas
constraints. 447 Flows at Lower Granite peaked during the week of June 2
to June 8, with a weekly average of 138,500 cfs. 44 Unfortunately, daily
smolt passage during this period averaged under 30,000 fish, less, than ten
percent of a month earlier, and dropped significantly toward the week's
end. 44 9 Thus, the high flows benefitted relatively few fish.
2. Spring Flows in the Columbia
The BiOp called for flows at McNary Darn of between 220,000 and
45 0
260,000 cfs from April 20 to June 30, depending on runoff forecasts.
This produced a flow target of 249,000 cfs. 4 5 1 Contrary to early flow pro45 2
jections, the 1995 seasonal average, 253,000 cfs, exceeded the target.
But, as with spring flows on the Snake, many smolts passed McNary Dam
during below-target flows. In general, flows gradually increased throughout the spring season, while smolt migration at McNary peaked in midMay. 453
Between April 20 and May 5, when most Snake River chinook smolts
began arriving in the lower Columbia, flows averaged 201,500 cfs.45 4 This
was just eighty percent of the target flows, despite available water in storage. 45 5 By June 16, seasonal flows at McNary were still below the target,
averaging only 243,300 cfs. 456 During the peak of the migration season in
45 7
mid-May, flows fluctuated both above and below the 249,000 cfs target.
444 Id.
445 Fish Passage Ctr., Weekly Report #95-9, at 1 (May 5, 1995).
446 Id. at 1-2. This figure represents total smolts, including hatchery smolts and

steelhead.
447 1995 ANNUAL

REPORT,

supra note 442, at 4; see Fish Passage Ctr., Weekly Report #95-9,

at 1 (May 5, 1995).

448 Fish Passage Ctr., Weekly Report #95-14, at 1 (June 9, 1995).
449 Id. at 2-3.
450 1995 BiOP, supra note 11, at 104.
1995 ANNUAL REPORT, Supra note 442, at 3.

,451

452

Id. at 6.

453 Id. at 9 fig. 5.
454 Fish Passage Ctr., Weekly Report #95-9, at 1 (May 5, 1995).
455 See, e.g., Fish Passage Ctr., Weekly Report #95-10, at 1 (May 12, 1995) (indicating 96%
of average runoff to date at The Dalles).
456 Fish Passage Ctr., Weekly Report #95-15, at 1 (June 16, 1995).
457 For example, on May 18, chinook and steelhead migration peaked with 144,000 and

89,000 fish, respectively. Fish Passage Ctr., Weekly Report #95-11, at 4 (May 19, 1995). Flows
from May 13 through May 18 climbed from 224,000 cfs to 288,000 cfs. Id. But, on May 21,
flows dipped to 232,000 cfs. Fish Passage Ctr., Weekly Report #95-'12, at 7 (May 26, 1995).
Fishery agencies and tribes had requested flows of at least 249,000 cfs, with weekend flows

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2982177

COLUMBIA BASIN SALMON

1997]

High flows throughout June, a period with relatively insignificant smolt
passage numbers, brought the seasonal average above the 249,000 cfs target. 468 As with Snake spring flows, the seasonal average was exceeded,

but much of the above-target flows occurred in times of low smolt
passage.
3. Summer Flows in the Snake
The NMFS BiOp called for flows of 50,000 to 55,000 cfs at Lower
Granite from June 21 to August 31, based on the runoff forecast. 4 59 A target of 52,000 cfs resulted. 460 In 1995, the summer flow average, 55,300 cfs,
managed to exceed the target. 46 1 However, flows in August averaged only
462
37,000 cfs.

As with Snake spring flows, summer flows failed to coincide with
smolt migration. In general, higher flows occurred early in the summer
flow season and steadily dropped throughout the period, dipping permanently below the target in mid-July. 463 Smolt passage, on the other hand,
peaked in mid-June through early August.4 64 The high Snake flows in early
summer, a period with less smolt migration, resulted in the above-target
seasonal average, 4 65 but most smolt passage occurred during flows that
were below target levels.466
Like spring flows, declining Snake River summer flows resulted in
part from constraints on the Dworshak Reservoir that the Corps deemed
necessary to keep dissolved gas standards below state water quality standards.467 Water shortage apparently played no role, as reduced Dworshak
outflows left more water in the reservoir at the end of August than called
468
for by the NMFS BiOp.

of at least 80% of weekday flows. Fish Passage Ctr., Weekly Report #95-10, at 1 (May 12,
1995); Fish Passage Ctr., Weekly Report #95-11, at 1 (May 19, 1995).
458 1995 ANNuAL REPORT, supra note 442, at 9 fig. 5. However, during June, McNary saw
significant numbers of subyearling hatchery chinook, Fish Passage Ctr., Weekly Report #9517, at 3 (June 30, 1995), which no doubt benefitted from the high flows.
459 1995 BiOP, supra note 11, at 104.
460 1995 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 442, at 3.

Id. at 4-5.
American Rivers Motion, supra note 21, at 5.
1995 ANNuAL REPORT, supra note 442, at 4, 8 fig. 3.
Id. at8fig. 3.
465 For example, in the week of June 23-29, flows at Lower Granite averaged 91,900 cfs.
Fish Passage Ctr., Weekly Report #95-17 (June 30, 1995). During late June, smolt migration
generally averaged 3,000 fish, with hatchery steelhead comprising the majority of migrants.
Id. at 9-10.
466 Wild sub-yearling chinook peaked at 960 fish on July 28. Fish Passage Ctr., Weekly
Report #95-22 (Aug. 4, 1995). Flows during the week of July 28 through August 3 averaged
46,600 cfs. Id. Flows for the week of August 3-10 averaged 42,500 cfs, 23% below target. Fish
Passage Ctr., Weekly Report #95-23 (Aug. 11, 1995). Daily wild sub-yearling chinook averaged close to 400 fish. See id. at 7.
467 See infra notes 504-510 and accompanying text.
468 1995 BIOP, supra note 11, at 95 (establishing a 1520 foot limit at Dworshak). Dworshak had an elevation of 1530 feet by the end of August. DEHART, supra note 316, at 3.
461
462
463
464
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4. Summer Flows in the Columbia
From July 1 to August 31, the NMFS BiOp called for 200,000 cfs at
McNary.4 69 Summer flows fell short of the target,. however, yielding a seasonal average of only 164,700 cfs.470 This was about eighteen percent below the target, which was NMFS's "low-estimate of flow that is likely to
avoid high mortality." 471 August flows averaged just 138,000 cfs,472 over
thirty percent below the target. However, unlike the Snake, the highest
summer flows in the Columbia did roughly coincide with the periods of
heaviest smolt passage. 473 Both- flows and smolt passage peaked in early
July.474 Ironically, although summer flows in the lower Columbia failed to
meet the flow target, high flows appeared to best match migrating smolts.
As discussed in the following subpart, failure to operate Columbia River
storage projects as called for by the BiOp likely contributed to the nonattainment of the summer flow target.
5. Water Supplies for Fish Flows
To provide the water necessary to achieve in-season target fish flows,
NMFS's BiOp required changed operations before and during the smolt
475
migration seasons at upper Snake and Columbia River storage projects.
Through these changes, NMFS intended to reprioritize storage reservoir
operations, replacing hydropower operations with fish flows as the dominant purpose. 476 However, federal water managers generally failed to operate storage reservoirs consistently with the BiOp, resulting in less water
for salmon flows rather than more.
a. Water from the Upper Columbia Reservoirs
At the upper Columbia storage projects, the BiOp established two
sets of constraints. 477 First, to store the needed water, the BiOp directed
the TMT and federal water managers to operate upper Columbia storage
projects through the fall and winter months so that they would be full by
June 30, 1995, while still releasing the water needed to meet spring flow
469 1995 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 442, at 3. Dworshak continued to be drafted after
August 31, 1995 to benefit migrating adults and juveniles. Fish Passage Ctr., Weekly Report
#95-26, at 1 (Sept. 8, 1995).
470 Id. at 5.

471 NMFS FLoW STUDY, supra note 437, at 13.

472 American Rivers Motion, supra note 21, at 5.
473 1995 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 442, at 6-7, 9 fig. 5.
474 Id. From July 3-6, smolt passage peaked at an average of 653,000 fish per day. Fish
Passage Ctr., Weekly Report #95-18, at 3 (July 7, 1995). Flows averaged 222,300 cfs at McNary during the same four-day period, over 10% above the target. See id. at 5.
475 1995 BiOp, supra note 11, at 95-96, 102.
476 Id. at 96.
477 Id. at 95. The BiOp stated that winter operating constraints and draft limits were
interim. Id. at 96. However, the goal of achieving full reservoirs on June 30 appears
permanent.
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targets. 478 If the federal water managers complied with this provision,
NMFS calculated that the likelihood of meeting Columbia flow targets
would increase over the previous BiOp by twenty-five percent in the
spring and ninety percent in the summer.479 Second, NMFS specified minimum reservoir elevation levels, or "draft limits" for Grand Coulee, Libby,
and Hungry Horse reservoirs on August 31, 1995.480 This second set of
constraints responded to concerns about resident fish in reservoirs, a concern arguably beyond the scope of a BiOp. 48 l Nevertheless, these constraints limited the amount of water available to achieve targeted fish
flows, while leaving water in storage for summer recreation and power
production in the fall and winter. 48 2 Astonishingly, a NMFS study concluded that under the reservoir limits the flow targets would not be met
between forty and one hundred percent of the time, depending on the runoff and time of year.48 3 Taken together, both sets of reservoir constraints
specified the amount of storage water available for fish flows.
To achieve summer flow targets, NMFS apparently intended for the
TMT and federal water managers to begin the summer flow season with
full storage reservoirs and to draft them throughout the summer, down to
the minimum levels set in the BiOp, if necessary. 48 4 However, the federal
water managers did not in fact use the available reservoir storage to store
water for fish flows, thereby contributing to the failure to meet the Columbia summer flow target. Even if the managers adhered to the reservoir
operation measures specified in the BiOp, there was little chance of
achieving the target flows NMFS found necessary to avoid high salmon
mortality. 485

On June 30, 1995, none of the three Columbia storage projects were
operating at specified capacity. 48 6 By August 31, the end of the summer
flow season, federal water managers had drafted none of the three reser478 Id. at 95, 102. This goal was to be achieved by refilling reservoirs to April 20 flood
control levels. Id, at 95. The BiOp stated minimum confidence levels for April 20 refill of 75%
at Libby and Hungry Horse, 85% at Grand Coulee beginning January 1, and 9096 at Albeni
Falls. Id.
479 Id. at 96. If the 1995 BiOp had been in place between 1992 and 1994, the reservoirs
would have released 13 to 16 MAF in the spring and summer, instead of the 10 to 11 MAF
they actually released. Id.; see also note 286.
'480 1995 MOP, supra note 11, at 95.
481 Id. at 97-99; see also supra note 285 and accompanying text.
482 Because the BiOp phrased the draft limits as absolute constraints and the flow measures as "targets," the draft limits appear to take precedence. See 1995 BiOP, supra note 11,
at 95, 100-04.
483 See American Rivers Motion, supra note 21, at 6-7 (citing AL WmGHT, REVIEW OF COLUtMBiA RIVER OPERATING CRIRIA (Apr. 1996) (report commissioned by NMFS that examined
FCRPS operation under the BiOp)); see also id. at app. C. The flow target for the Snake
River in August virtually would never be met. Id. at 7 n.3.
484 1995 BOP, supra note 11, at 96, 102. The BiOp set no priority between achieving June
30 refill and providing the water necessary to achieve spring flow targets, should water
supplies be insufficient to achieve both. DEHART, supra note 316, at 1.
485 See supra note 483 and accompanying text.
486 On June 30, 1995, Libby was. 19 feet below full; Hungry Horse was 12 feet below full;
Grand Coulee was 3 feet below full. 1995 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 442, at 6.
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voirs to the draft limits called for by NMFS. 487 In fact, water elevations
actually increased at two of the three upper Columbia storage projects
488
during the migration season.
The water managers did not base their refusal to release water from
upper Columbia projects on dissolved gas concerns, as they did on the
Snake. 48 9 Instead, mid-season decisions made by the federal agencies affecting operations at the upper Columbia storage reservoirs were driven
by nonsalmon concerns. At Libby and Hungry Horse, low releases resulted
from last-minute agreements with the state of Montana.490 That state, supported by Senator Max Baucus (D-Mont.), expressed concern about the
adverse effects on recreation and resident fish and wildlife that would ensue due to deep reservoir drafts, and threatened legal action if releases at
91
4
Libby exceeded 16,000 cfs.

At Libby, a water exchange agreement between BPA and BC Hydro
had kept reservoir drafts to 8000 cfs, but that agreement was to expire on
August 7.492 Without additional water from Canada, the NMFS BiOp required drafts of 20,000 cfs at Libby to meet the Columbia summer flow
target.49 3 On August 5, 1995, despite the BiOp's summer flow target, NMFS

acquiesced to Montana's demands 494 and agreed to limit Libby drafts to
16,000 cfs until August15; and after that, to release only inflow for the rest
of the migration season-approximately 9000 cfs. 495 At Hungry Horse,
NMFS'agreed to delay any releases until a selective withdraw system was
in place, a system that would draw water from high in the reservoir and
thus prevent over-cooling downstream. 496 As a result of these agreements
with Montana, flow augmentation in the Columbia terminated on August
487 Id. at 7 tbl. 7.
488 Id. For Libby and Hungry Horse, the BiOp called for drafts up to-20 feet between June
30 and August 31. See id. Yet, over this period, water elevations increased 14.2 feet at Libby

and 4.8 feet at Hungry Horse. See id. The BiOp called for a draft of up to 10 feet at Grand
Coulee; instead, only a 7.1 foot draft occurred. See id.
489 See infra notes 504-510 and accompanying text.
490 1995 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 442, at 7.

491 Lynn Francisco, Battle over Montana ReservoirsHeats Up as Draws Continue, CLEARING Up, Aug. 7, 1995, at 1.

492 Id. at 6. The agreement, reached July 10, 1995, called for releases from B.C. Hydro's
Arrow Reservoir to make up the difference between the TMT recommendations and actual
Libby outflows. Technical Management Team Meeting Minutes 1 (July 19, 1995).
493 Id.

494 Montana, U.S. Reach Water Release Pact, THE NEWS TRIBUNE (Tacoma, Wash.), Aug. 6,
1995, at B3. The plaintiffs in American Rivers v. NMFS No. 96-384MA (D. Or. filed Mar. 13,
1996) charged that the terms of this agreement were never publicly disclosed. American
Rivers Motion, supra note 21, at 11.
495 Pamela Russell, Montana.Wins Reprieve for Libby, Hungry Horse; Spill Continues,
CLFARING Up, Aug. 14, 1995, at 6.

496 Id. Montana officials expressed concern that releasing only cold water from deep in
the reservoir would encourage lake trout to migrate downriver, harming sensitive bull trout
,populations. Montana, U.S.Reach Water Release Pact, THE NEWS TRIBUNE (Tacoma, Wash.),
Aug. 6, 1995, at B3. In addition, as a result of an agreement with NMFS, BPA shifted 72,000
acre-feet to be released from Hungry Horse from August to September. Fish Passage Ctr.,
Weekly Report #95-26, at 1 (Sept. 8, 1995).
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15, two weeks early.4 7 Yet both Libby and Hungry Horse ended the migration season with significant amounts of water in excess of the draft limits
set by NMFS. 49 8 At Grand Coulee, BPA implemented a two-foot operating
range instead of maintaining an elevation of 1280 feet as specified in the
BiOp. The unavailability of water from the upper Columbia reservoirs
con499
tributed to the failure to meet the summer Columbia flow target.
b. Waterfrom the Snake Reservoirs
On the Snake River, Dworshak and Brownlee reservoirs served as the
primary sources of water for fish flows. For Dworshak, the BiOp.included
both elevation guidelines and a limit on outflows after September 1.500 By
limiting fall and winter outflows, NMFS apparently intended Dworshak to
fill during this period. Like the upper Columbia reservoirs, Dworshak was
to provide fish flows through operations consistent with specified fill and
draft limits. 50 At Brownlee, operated by the Idaho Power Company,
497 Fish Passage Ctr., Weekly Report #95-24, at 1 (Aug. 18, 1995). Grand'Coulee reached
its minimum draft level the first week of August, leaving Montana reservoirs as the only
source of flow augmentation. Lynn Francisco, Dworshak,Libby, Hungry Horse Continue to
Provide Replacement Flows, CLEARING UP, July 31, 1995, at 1. In addition, the Corps declined
to draft Dworshak to help achieve summer target flows in the Columbia. DEHART, supra
note 316, at 6.
Agreements between BPA and BC Hydro, its Canadian counterpart, regarding nontreaty storage space also negatively affected summer fish flows. Id. By June, it appeared that
the McNary spring flow target would be exceeded. Consequently, BPA and BC Hydro agreed
to allow BC Hydro to store water in nontreaty storage space in June for delayed releases
until early August-or so it was generally understood. Id. at 5-6; Fish Passage Ctr., Weekly
Report #95-21, at 1 (July 28, 1995); Rob Lothrop & Jim Weber, 1995 River Operations: Failing
to Implement the National Marine Service's Biological Opinion 5 (1995) (on file with the
Northwest Water Law & Policy Project, Northwestern School of Law of Lewis & Clark College). However, BC Hydro maintained control over the timing of the release of that storage
water throughout August, as well as retaining half the power benefits of that water. DEHAwr,
supra note 316, at 5. Because BPA failed to request storage releases earlier, BC Hydro chose
to delay storage releases until late August, so as to coincide with higher demand for hydropower. Id. at 6; Fish Passage Ctr., Weekly Report #95-21, at 1 (July 28,, 1995). The tribes
strongly objected to the agreement at the time, but were unable to officially voice their
opinions because they were excluded from discussions. Lothrop & Weber, supra, at 9-10.
For a brief discussion of the "Non-treaty Storage Agreement" between BPA and BC Hydro,
see Blumm & Simrin, Unraveling Parity, supra note 75, at 709-10.
498 Libby ended the 1995 migration season with 385,000 acre-feet of water above the draft
limit. 1995-ANNuAL REPORT, supra note 442, at 7 (explaining that on August 31, Libby was 15
feet over the limits set in the BiOp; Hungry Horse was 12 feet over); supra note 488.
499 Even before the agreement with Montana went into effect, the TMT agreed to keep
flows at McNary just above 150,000 cfs, 50,000 cfs short of the target, apparently due to the
exchange with BC Hydro. Lynn Francisco, Battle over Montana Reservoirs Heats Up as
Draws Continue,CLEARING Up, Aug. 7, 1995, at 1, 6; see also supra note 284 and accompanying text.
500 1995 BiOP, supra note 11, at 95. During the spring and summer smolt migration seasons, NMFS limited Dworshak drafts to an elevation of 1520 feet. Id. Unless flood control
needs conflicted, the BiOp restricted outflows at Dworshak to minimum within system restraints beginning September 1. Id.
501 Id. at 96 (discussing the purpose of fill measures for upper Columbia Basin
reservoirs).
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NMFS specified a series of draft levels and operations, subject to TMT
modification if necessary to meet target flows. 50 2 But a July 1995'agreement between Idaho Power-and BPA restricted releases from Brownlee in
order to allow refill of Brownlee reservoir by June 30, an agreement that
environmentalists claimed was inconsistent with the NMFS BiOp. 50 3
At Dworshak, dissolved gas concerns substantially limited storage releases designed to meet target-level flows.5 °4 The Corps reduced Dworshak outflows whenever necessary to reduce spill at downriver projects,
in a largely unsuccessful attempt to avoid violations of state water quality
standards for nitrogen supersaturation. As with spill operations, discussed
below, dissolved gas concerns placed a major constraint on Dworshak releases for flow augmentation.
Ice Harbor, a Corps-operated dam, proved particularly troublesome
for Snake River operations. Due to equipment failure throughout 1995, Ice
Harbor frequently experienced the outage of two or more power turbines,
reducing the amount of water that could be passed through the dam's
powerhouse and consequently increasing the amount that had to be
spilled.50 5 The outages at Ice Harbor led to uncontrolled spill and frequent
violations of state water quality standards for nitrogen supersaturation.50 6
The Corps responded by substantially altering operations throughout the
Snake River, in the process sacrificing many measures designed to benefit
endangered salmon.50 7 For example, the Corps dramatically reduced releases from Dworshak throughout May.50 8 Despite the reduced salmon
flows, these efforts proved largely unsuccessful in curtailing nitrogen
levels.50 9 Dissolved gas concerns left Dworshak with an elevation of
502 Id. at 101. The BiOp called for drafts to elevation 2069 feet in May, 2067 feet in July,
and 2059 feet in August or September, passing inflow without refill throughout the season.
Id.
503 See American Rivers motion, supra note 21, at 9-10 (citing Letter from Mark W.
Maher, Manager, Power Supply, Bonneville Power Adminstration, to James Colingwvood,
General Manager, Power Production, Idaho Power Company 1-2 (July 20, 1995)); see also id.
at app. G.
504 1995 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 442, at 4.
505 Id. at 12.
506 Id. Controlled spill at Ice Harbor required flows of approximately 90,000 cfs. Fish

Passage Ctr., Weekly Report #95-10 (May 12, 1995). State water quality standard waivers
granted by each state allowed tailrace nitrogen levels of 120% over a 12-hour average, with
an instantaneous limit of 125%. 1995 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 442, at 11.
507 1995 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 442, at 12. During the last week of May, the Corps
radically altered river operations in an attempt to stop water quality violations at Ice Harbor
and McNary, the next dam below Ice Harbor. Id. These efforts included major reductions in
spill at Lower Granite, Little Goose, and Lower Monumental; reduction of Dworshak outflows to minimum; operating all turbines outside the 1%peak efficiency required by the
BiOp; filling Snake River projects to the upper one foot of their operating ranges; and modifying spillway openings. Id.
50 MIcHELE DEHARr, FMH PASSAGE CTR., SUMMARY OF THE 1995 SPRING AND SUMMER JUVENnz PASSAGE SEASON (Oct. 13, 1995). For example, on May 8, the Corps unilaterally reduced
outflow from Dworshak by more than two-thirds, from 23,000 cfs to 9,300 cfs. Fish Passage
Ctr., Weekly Report #95-10, at 1 (May 12, 1995). Fishery agencies and tribes had requested
Dworshak outflows of 23,000 cfs to help achieve flows of 110,000 cfs at Lower Granite. Id.
509 1995 ANNUAL RE'PORT, supra note 442, at 12.
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1530.9 feet on August 31, 1995, ten feet above the draft limit level specified
in the BiOp.5 10 Thus, a good deal of the failure to consistently maintain
target flows and shape flows to smolt migration in the Snake River can be
attributed to this conflict with state water quality standards.
Operations at Brownlee differed from the operations specified in the
BiOp, perhaps as a result of reliance on supplies of water from other
sources during the spring migration season.5 1' The reservoir filled
throughout May5 12 and remained full throughout June and July, passing
August, Brownlee provided flow augonly inflow.5 13 In late July and early
514
mentation of 18,000 to 20,000 cfs.
To enhance water supplies available for Snake River flows, the BiOp
required the Bureau to purchase water from upper Snake River reservoirs. 51 5 NMFS directed the Bureau to "continue to provide" 427,000 acrefeet and to take steps to acquire an unstated amount of additional
water.5 1 6 Although NMFS considered this additional water "essential" for
510 Id. at 7 tbl. 7.

511 The BiOp called for Brownlee augmentation only if necessary to meet Lower Granite
flow targets. 1995 BiOp, supra note 11, at 101. Although the BiOp called for coordination
between the TMT and the Idaho Power Company, id., an agreement between BPA and the
Bureau of Reclamation to shape water for fish flows was not reached until June 30, 1995.
Fish Passage Ctr., Weekly Report #95-6, at 1 (Apr. 14, 1995); Technical Management Team
Meeting Minutes 1-2 (July 5, 1995); see also 1995 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 442, at 2 (discussing Brownlee operations).
512 See Fish Passage Ctr., Weekly Report #95-12, at 1 (May 26, 1995) (noting that Idaho
Power planned to fill Brownlee to 2076 feet and then pass inflow). The BiOp called for drafts
of Brownlee to 2069 feet during May, passing all inflow, and drafts to 2059 feet in August or
September as determined by the TMT, if necessary to meet the Lower Granite flow objectives. 1995 BiOp, supra note 11, at 101. Refill of Brownlee could begin in September. Id.
Brownlee passed between 35,000 and 40,000 cfs in June, and between 16,000 and 30,000 cfs
in the first three weeks of July.
513 For June flows, see Fish Passage Ctr., Weekly Report #95-14 at 1 (June 9, 1995); Fish
Passage Ctr., Weekly Report #95-15, at 1 (June 16, 1995); Fish Passage Ctr., Weekly Report
#95-16, at 1 (June 30, 1995). See also Fish Passage Ctr., Weekly Report #95-12 (May 26, 1995)
(noting inflow of approximately 38,000 to 40,000 cfs). For July flows, see Fish Passage Ctr.,
Weekly Report #95-18, at 1, 5 (July 7, 1995); Fish Passage Ctr., Weekly Report #95-19, at 1, 61
(July 14, 1995); Fish Passage Ctr., Weekly Report #95-20, at 1, 4 (July 21, 1995).
514 Fish Passage Ctr., Weekly Report #95-21, at 1 (July 28, 1995). Idaho Power reduced
augmentation to 18,000 cfs.due to recreation and BPA load fluctuation concerns. Id. Augmentation ended August 8, 1995, to allow refill to 2058.5 feet, half a foot below the draft level
specified in the BiOp. Fish Passage Ctr., Weekly Report #95-23 (Aug. 11, 1995). Environmentalists have called upon NMFS to enter into § 7 consultation with FERC regarding Brownlee
operations, relying on references made by NMFS in its BiOp. See American Rivers Motion,
supra note 21, at 9 (citing 1995 BiOP, supra note 11, at 101, 165).
515 1995 BiOP, supra note 11, at 99-100.
516 Id. The Northwest Power Planning Council's 1992 Strategy for Salmon required the
same 427,000 acre-feet. However, the 1994 amendments to the Council's program called for
the purchase of an additional million acre-feet. See supra notes 228-231 and accompanying
text. In contrast, the BiOp vaguely called for "an additional amount of water, in coordination
with the states of Idaho and Oregon, as may be necessary to further reduce human-caused
mortality of endangered salmon in the Snake River." 1995 BiOP, supra note 11, at 99; see also
supra notes 320-322 and accompanying text. By 1998, the BiOp requires the Bureau to have
taken the measures- necessary to "ensure a high probability" of continued provision of
427,000 acre-feet. 1995 BiOp, supra note 11, at 99.
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listed species in low flow years, NMFS opined that it would not be "realis-

tic" for the Bureau to provide this water in the near future, 5 17 a judgment
that had nothing to do with science and everything to do with what NMFS
believed was politically feasible.5 18 In obtaining this "essential" water, the
BiOp required the Bureau to comply with applicable state law and to
purchase water only from willing sellers.5 19 Environmentalists faulted
NMFS for failing to enter into ESA consultation with the Bureau regarding

the effects of the operation of the Bureau's storage projects in the upper
520
Snake Basin.
The Bureau complied with the 1995 BiOp requirement of providing
427,000 acre-feet during July and August. 521 Water provisions took the
form of rentals and purchases. 522 However, the Bureau appeared to make
no progress in securing additional water in 1995.523
In 1995, federal water managers satisfied three of four seasonal average flow targets, but August flows in both the Columbia and Snake Rivers
fell far short of the flow targets. Further, target flows often failed to coincide with the heaviest periods of smolt migration. Although operations
clearly failed to comply with the BiOp, flows in 1905 generally exceeded
524
those of the two previous years
B. Spill Measures

Although it endorsed both spill and transportation, the NMFS BiOp
relied on transportation under most river flows, relegating spill only to
517 1995 BIOP, supra note 11, at 100.
518 The ESA requires agencies to employ "the best scientific and commercial data avail-

able." 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (1994); see also supra note 301.,
519 1995 BIOP, supra note 11, at 99. The BiOp suggested dry-year leases, land fallowing,
and purchases of storage space. Id. The Bureau and Idaho claimed that water additional to
the 427,000 acre-feet could be obtained only by condemnation, a measure beyond the terms
of the BiOp. Id. at 100. If the Bureau failed to secure additional water, the BiOp called for
reinitiation of section 7 consultation. Id.
520 American Rivers Motion, supra note 21, at 8.
521 See Fish Passage Ctr., Weekly Report #95-6, at 1 (Apr. 14, 1994) (noting plans to
deliver 427,000 acre-feet); Letter from Patti Llewellyn, Program Manager, Lands and Recreation, Bureau of Reclamation, to Michael C. Blumm (Nov. 20, 1995) [hereinafter Llewellyn
Letter] (on file with authors).
522 Llewellyn Letter, supra note 521. The Bureau purchased a total of 22,396.09 acre-feet
in 1995. It rented most of the 427,000 acre-feet from state water banks, at a cost of
$2,332,586. Id. Curiously, the state of Idaho paid only $1 million for 300,000 acre-feet for
rental water to replenish depleted aquifers. Fish Passage Ctr., Weekly Report #95-6, at 1
(Apr. 14, 1995).
The Bureau is pursuing applications with the Idaho Department of Water Resources to
amend its state water permits, authorizing permissible changes of use to include fish flows.
Llwellyn Letter, supra note 521.
523 United States Bureau of Reclamation, Pacific Northwest Region, State of Idaho Department of Water Resources Application for Amendment of a Permit, Permit No. 63-3618
(May 15, 1995) (promising not to release any water greater than that needed to achieve
427,000 acre-feet).
1 524 1995 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 442, at 4-7 (comparing 1993, 1994, and 1995 spring
and summer flows on the Snake and Columbia). However, Snake River spring' flows were
higher in 1993, despite a lower runoff in that year. Id. at 4.
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unusually high flow conditions in the Snake River. During the spring and
summer juvenile passage seasons, 52 5 the BiOp called for spill necessary to
achieve eighty percent FPE, 5 2 6 the proportion of fish that avoid passage
through turbines.5 27 However, at Snake River dams NMFS limited the
eighty percent FPE requirement to high flow conditions, such as 100,000
528
cfs at Lower Granite Dam. When flows fall short of such "spill triggers,"
the BiOp called for maximum possible transportation, thus increasing the
proportion of fish that are transported in low Snake flow conditions. Perhaps most significantly, the BiOp also limited spill to avoid high levels of
dissolved nitrogen, 529 the condition that may lead to juvenile salmon mortalities caused by gas bubble trauma. 53 0 However, the BiOp attempted to
reduce the somewhat arbitrary nature of the Snake River spill triggers by
giving the TMT discretion to order spill when flows at Lower Granite did
53 1
not reach the spill triggers.
Implementation of the BiOp's spill requirement in 1995 was a dismal
failure. Federal water managers achieved the required eighty percent
FPE5 32 consistently at only one dam, Ice Harbor, and there only because
of uncontrolled spill caused by the outage of two turbines. 533 Only three
dams-The Dalles, McNary, and Ice Harbor-even momentarily achieved
eighty percent FPE. 5- The highest overall FPE on a Snake River dam was
just sixty-six percent.5 35 With NMFS's concurrence, spill was reduced at
four dams on the lower Snake and Columbia on August 23 due to cost
536
concerns, despite the fact that salmon were still migrating.
The Snake River spill triggers proved to be unworkable. Record numbers of migrating smolts arrived at Lower Granite Dam during the first
days of May. 537 However, because flows had not reached 100,000 cfs, spill
was not occurring. Without spill, and with transportation systems overwhelmed, many fish passed through the turbines. 538 On May 3, 1995, the
Corps acceded to requests by the TMT and initiated' spill despite belowspill trigger flows. 5 39
525 See supra note 323.
526 1995 BiOp, supra note 11, at 105.
527 Id. at 45; see supra note 220 and accompanying text.
528 1995 BiOp,.supra.note 11, at 105; see supra note 326.
529 See supra note 316 for an explanation of "gas caps."
530 See supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
531 1995 BiOp, supra note 11, at 105; see also supra note 317 and accompanying text.
532 See supra notes 313-316 and accompanying text for a discussion of the 80% FPE

requirement in the BiOp.
533 1995 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 442, at 12. Ice Harbor routinely exceeded total dissolved gas levels of 130%. Id. at 14.
534 Id. at 12.

535 Id. The monthly FPE averages at Snake River dams remained between 50% and 60%.
Id. tbl. 1.
536 See American Rivers Motion, supra note 21, at 13-14.

537 Fish Passage Ctr., Weekly Report #95-9 (May 5, 1995). Approximately 910,000 smolts
arrived at Lower Granite on May 2. Id.

538 See Ray, supra note 432, at 677-78.
539 DEHART, supra note 316, at 7; 1995 ANNUAL

REPORT, supra note 439, at

11-12; Techni-

cal Management Team, Meeting Minutes (May 4, 1995).
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As a result of the low spill throughout the migration season, the
Corps transported much higher numbers of smolts than apparently antici-

pated by the BiOp.5 40 In total, an estimated seventy-eight percent of Snake

River smolts were transported.54 1 This heavy reliance on transportation
contrasts with NMFS's characterization of the transportation provisions of
the BiOp as "experimental."542 The high levels of transported fish led
salmon advocates to charge that the federal "spread the risk" policy was
543
nothing more than a clever public relations tool.
Like most failures to implement the 1995 BiOp, the failure to achieve
the eighty percent FPE spill requirements and the resulting heavy reliance
on transportation can be traced to the gas cap constraints on spill operations. 544 Keeping levels of dissolved nitrogen below the gas cap became
the primary management consideration throughout 1995. 54 5 The policy of
strict adherence to gas caps by the federal water managers and the TMT
stemmed from concerns about gas bubble trauma. However, the minimal
observed effect of gas bubble trauma calls this rationale into question. The
BiOp created an extensive biological monitoring 'program to examine
smolts for any signs of gas bubble trauma throughout the migration season. 546 Even at Ice Harbor, where total dissolved gas levels routinely exceeded 130 percent,5 47 the biological criteria for gas bubble trauma were
never exceeded during 1995.548 In light of the benefits associated with
540 Bruce, supra note 54, at 1-2; see 1995 BiOP, supra note 11, at 111 (describing transportation as an experimental approach and stating NMFS's intent to allow sufficient inriver
migration so as to compare' transportation and spill).
541 DEHART, supra note 316, at 28 fig. 9. The Snake River produced 1.8 million wild
spring/summer chinook for a total of 6.5 million. Id. The Corps collected an estimated 1.4
million wild Snake River smolts, transporting 1.2 million. Bruce, supra note 54, at 1. Some
collected fish were tagged and released for research purposes. Id.
542 1995 BIOP, supra note 11, at 111. In part, NMFS rejected the federal water managers'
proposal because it relied primarily on transportation. Id. at 45,
W See Ray, supra note 432, at 678-80. "Spread the risk," a policy originally developed by
state and tribal fishery agencies and adopted by NMFS, seeks to prevent over-reliance on
any one method of juvenile passage. See 1995 BIOP, supra note 11, at 112 (discussing the,
"spread the risk" policy); see supra note 263 and accompanying text.
544 1995 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 442, at 13..
545 DEHART, supra note 316, at 20.
546 1995 BiOp, supra note 11, at 123; DEHART, supra note 316, at 16.
547 1995 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 442, at 20; see supra notes 505-509

and accompany-

ing text.
548 1995 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 442, at 27. NMFS set the Biological Monitoring Program criteria as a maximum occurrence of 15% of the sampled population having bubbles in
25% or less of the smolt's surface area. Id. at 23. Data show that the effects of gas bubble
trauma were completely absent throughout most of the season. Id. at 26-31 (graphs). Perhaps most significantly, the Ice Harbor episode, supra notes 505-509 and accompanying
text, may have conclusively demonstrated that smolts can tolerate dissolved gas levels much
higher than those set in the BiOp. See also supra note 55 and accompanying text.
A NMFS net pen experiment, where smolts were placed in pens at selected depths in
the tail race of Ice Harbor, exposed smolts to 128.3% dissolved nitrogen and produced significant mortalities. DEHART, supra note 316, at 20. Stress from handling and confinement in
pens may have contributed to the result. Id. The Fish Passage Ctr. concluded that the Ice
Harbor net pen experiments tell nothing about the effects of dissolved gas on migrating
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spill and the importance of achieving eighty percent FPE, the lack of observable gas bubble trauma suggests that the BiOp set maximum dissolved
nitrogen levels too low.
Also, theBiOp specifically required modifications to dam spillways
and stilling basins to reduce gas supersaturation at Ice Harbor and John
Day Dams "as soon as possible."5 4 9 However, the Corps has postponed the
decision to modify stilling basins until December 1999.550 Spillway flow
detectors, or "fliplips,"will be installed by 1997.551
C. Reservoir Drawdowns
The NMFS BiOp required limited reservoir drawdowns at John Day
52
Dam on the lower Columbia and the four lower Snake River reservoirs.
Although much controversy existed surrounding the merits of
drawdowns, 553 NMFS considered drawdowns to be one of the most significant measures to avoid jeopardy. 55 4 The BiOp required federal water
managers to operate lower Snake River reservoirs at MOP from April 10
through late August, when adult fall chinook begin to enter the lower
Snake River. 555 At John Day, the BiOp required MIP level from April 20 to
September 30.556
Implementation of Snake River drawdowns in 1995 had mixed results.
To allow testing of a surface collection system, Ice Harbor was never,
drafted.55 7 While the federal water managers drafted Lower Granite, Little
Goose, and Lower Monumental to within one foot of MOP by April 1,558
they failed to maintain the drawdown until the return of adult fall chinook
in late August,. as specified in the BiOp. 559 Instead, the reservoirs were
filled in early May, in an attempt to reduce flows and thus reduce dissolved gas levels downstream at Ice Harbor.5 60 Despite no discussion of
the' relative priorities of drawdown and compliance with state water qualsmolts because the net pen experiments differed from natural conditions with respect to
holding conditions, exposure time, depth, and species differences. Id. at 2; see also Lothrop
& Weber, supra note 497, at 8-9 (discussing the significance of the net pen experiment
results).
549 1995 BOP, supra note 11, at 124-25. On stilling basins, see supra note 54.
550 See American Rivers Motion, supra note 21, at 16-18.
551 Id. On spillway deflectors, see supra note 54.
552 1995 BiOp, supra note 11, at 112-14. Unlike flow augmentation, spill, and transportation, drawdowns were completely absent from FCRPS operations proposed by the federal
water managers. See id. at 38-81 (describing the effects of the proposed action).
553 Id. at 114 (discussing disagreement on the value of drawdowns).
554 See supra note 302 and accompanying text.
555 1995 BiOP, supra note 11, at 112. NMFS directed filling of the reservoirs in late August
to allow operation of adult fish ladders. Id.
556 Id. at 113.
557 DEHART, supra note 316, at 2. In 1995, Ice Harbor, was initially drafted, but it quickly

refilled to reduce spill in an attempt to comply with state dissolved gas standards. Fish
Passage Ctr., Weekly Report #95-5, at 1 (Apr. 7, 1995).
558 Fish Passage Ctr., Weekly Report #954, at 1 (Apr. 7, 1995).
559 Id.

560 Id.; Bruce, supra note 54, at 3; Fish Passage Ctr., Weekly Report #95-9, at 1 (May 5,
1995).
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ity standards in NMFS's BiOp, federal water managers chose to ignore the
drawdown provisions; instead, they attempted to comply with the dissolved gas standards.
With dissolved gas levels placing a major constraint on river operations, implementation of the John Day drawdown followed a similar pat561
tern. By April 20, the John Day Reservoir levels met MIP,as required.
However, with high levels of dissolved nitrogen below John Day, the
Corps maintained low levels of spill, soon causing the reservoir to fill
above MIP.562 As with spill, dissolved gas constraints formed the dominant
management consideration in drawdown implementation. After the 1995
migration season, the Corps abandoned design activities aimed at mitigating the effects of a drawdown to MOP on irrigators and migrating
salmon.5 3
The NMFS BiOp established an apparently legally binding plan for
increasing Columbia Basin salmon survival. But this plan, not nearly as
ambitious as the Council's program or the tribal plan in its effort to change
the status quo of hydrosystem operations, was not implemented by the
federal water managers in 1995, and consequently became the subject of a
court challenge. 564 Beyond the failure to implement its provisions, the
BiOp suffers from serious design flaws: 1) its use of seasonal flow averages allowed water managers to fail to shape flows to produce optimal
salmon migration; 2) its dissolved gas limits constrained almost every aspect of river operations and prevented implementation of many measures
NMFS determined were necessary to avoid jeopardy to the listed species;
and 3) its reliance on the TMT to make the adjustments required to produce the flow and passage measures specified in the BiOp proved to be
565
misplaced.
VI. IMPOSING A FISH AND WILDLIFE BUDGET, RESTRUCTURING RIVER
GOVERNANCE, AND IMPROVING "SALMON SCIENCE"

Funding for Columbia Basin fish and wildlife restoration is largely
from electric rates charged by BPA, the region's federal wholesale electric
power supplier.5 66 In the mid-1990s, BPA experienced a financial crisis
561

Bruce, supra note 54, at 3-4.

Id. Despite the Corps' efforts to comply with the dissolved gas standards, total dissolved gas levels in the John Day tailrace frequently exceeded 120% from April 26 to July 26,
1995. DEHArT, supra note 316, at 13 (graph), 15. These high dissolved gas levels, even
though spill rarely exceeded an insignificant 2-3% of projected flow, were due mainly to the
lack of gas abatement structures at John Day. Id. at 8, 15.
563 American Rivers Motion, supra note 21, at 15; see also supra note 291 (discussing
federal water managers' decision not to proceed with the John Day drawdown in 1996).
564. See supra note 13.
565 The TMT did deviate from the BiOp in one instance to protect salmon by initialing spill
before Snake River flows reached the spill trigger contained in the BiOp. See supra note 539
and accompanying text.
566 BPA markets electric power produced at 30 federal dams and one nuclear power plant
to utilities and industrial customers, with a capacity of 8720 megawatts in 1995. BPA BusiNESS PLAN, supra note 18, at 3-4 to 3-5. BPA is not an electric retailer, however; it does not
562-
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due to deregulation of the wholesale electric power industry, competition
from emerging natural gas-fired electric generators, a heavy debt load
from an ill-conceived (and mostly nonfunctioning) nuclear power plant
program, a variety of subsidies to aluminum plants and irrigators, and rising fish and wildlife costs. 5 67 The agency responded by lobbying Congress
to impose a "cost cap" on fish and wildlife measures and to exempt BPA
from environmental laws. While Congress considered the legislation, the
heads of BPA, the Council, and NMFS brokered an administrative agreement that capped BPA's fish and wildlife costs, so a legislative solution
was deferred. Congress did, however, instruct the Council to investigate
changes in fish and wildlife governance that would increase regional control. These developments made implementation of any of the competing
salmon restoration plans uncertain.
A. BPA's FinancialCrisis
Until the mid-1990s, the electric power industry was comprised of a
series of vertically integrated monopolies serving specific, limited geographic areas. But the electric industry, like the telephone, airline, and
natural gas industries before it, is now in the process of deregulation. The
Energy Policy Act of 1992 authorized new electric producers and brokers
to supply wholesale electricity.5 68 And in 1996, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) promulgated a rule requiring high voltage transmission owners to provide open access to third parties on terms, prices,
and conditions similar to those they charge themselves.5 69 This rule,
among other things, requires regulated electric utilities to separate power
generation from transmission line functions. 57v The upshot of these measures will be a Northwest electric industry characterized by new electric
producers not limited to specific geographic areas, serving both utilities
57 1
and industrial users, and using BPA transmission lines.
This new era of competition, which eventually could see consumers
choose among electric retailers, much as they now choose long distance
telephone suppliers, is expected to reduce electric prices, at least for large
customers. The emergence of a new low-cost electric supplier, natural gasserve residential consumers. The agency also built and operates 75% of the Northwest's
high-voltage transmission lines. Id. at 3-6. See generally Blumm, Hydroelectric Heritage,
supra note 23, at 198-240.
567 See AMERiCAN RIVERS ET AL., ON THE BRINK: SUBSIDIES, NucLEAR DEBT, AND THE FUTURE
OF BPA (1996).

568 15 U.S.C. § 79z-5a (1994); 16 U.S.C. §§ 796(22)-(25), 824a-1 (1994); see Am'

ABEL

&

LARRY PARKER, ELc'rmcrry: THE ROAD TOWARD RESTRUCTURING (Congressional Research

Serv. Issue Brief, June 20, 1996).

569 61 Fed. Reg. 21,540, 21,693-95 (May 10, 1996) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. § 35.28).

570 Id.; see also id. at 21,551-52 (explaining the "functional unbundling" requirement).
Whether the FERC rule would forbid BPA from imposing a "system benefit charge" on trans-

mission services, as advocated in- this Article, see infra notes 642-644 and accompanying
text, is not entirely clear, see 1994 PROGRAM, supra note 9, at C-28 to C-29, although FERC
apparently believes such a charge would be permissible. See infra note 642.
571 See BONNEVILLE POWER ADMIN., THE BENEFITS OF POWER, THE POWER OF BENEFITS: 1995
ANNUAL REPORT 23 (1995) [hereinafter THE BENEFITS OF POWER].
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driven combustion turbines, is also driving prices down. Low natural gas
prices, themselves the product of deregulation, improvements in drilling
technology, and advances in gas turbine technology (borrowed from the
aircraft industry), have combined to make it possible to construct efficient
electric generation at costs often lower than existing generation, especially nuclear generation.5 72 Coupled with these regulatory and technological innovations is a West Coast-wide surplus of electric generating
5 73
capacity that is likely to persist for some time.

This new competitive environment will prompt a dramatic restructuring of both the Northwest electric industry and BPA. 574 BPA has found
itself in a particularly vulnerable position because of its large bureaucracy,5 75 its staggering nuclear power plant debt,5 76 and rising fish and
wildlife costs. 577 A variety of activities subsidized by the agency add to its

financial and regulatory burden, including conservation and renewable resource programs as well as programs providing low rates for industrial
customers, residential consumers served 1 y investor-owned utilities, and
irrigators.5 78 These costs and subsidies threaten to make BPA power un572

See

NORTHWEST POWER PLANNING COUNCIL, STAFF ISSUE PAPER ON THE, ROLE OF THE

BONNEVILLE POWER ADMINISTRATION IN A COMPETrIVE ENERGY MARKET 3
ter STAFF ISSUE PAPER].

(July 1995) [hereinaf-

573 Randy Hardy, The Future of the Northwest Electric Power System in the Deregulation
Era, Remarks at the 2d Annual Northwest Water Law & Policy Conference (May 9, 1996)
(transcript available at the Northwest Water Law & Policy Project, Northwestern School of
Law of Lewis & Clark College).
574 See STAFF ISSUE PAPER, supra note 572 (exploring issues and alternatives confronting
BPA in a competitive energy market); Timothy A. Johnson, Coping with Change: Energy,
Fish, and the Bonneville Power Administration,26 ENVTL. L 589, 596-600 (1996) (discussing the Northwest Power Act, deregulation's effect on BPA, and BPA's ratesetting).
575 Professor Daniel J. Rohlf has pointed out that in 1995 BPA's employees outnumbered,
the adult chinook salmon that managed to surmount Lower Granite Dam on the Snake River.
See Second Annual Conference Tracks Changes in Regional Water and Energy Policy, 2 BIG
RIVER NEWS, Summer 1996, at 4.
576 Due to financing three nuclear power plants constructed by the Washington Public
Power Supply System-only one of which has produced any electricity-BPA accumulated
a debt in excess of $7 billion. THE BENEFTrs OF POWER, supra note 571, at 22.
577 BPA claimed its fish and wildlife costs rose from $150 million in 1991 to $400 million
in 1995, $160 million of which BPA attributed to implementing the 1995 NMFS BiOp. Id. at
11. However, BPA received a $56 million credit in 1995 toward its federal debt to pay for fish
and wildlife costs attributable to the nonpower uses of federal dams. Id. at 18. BPA's actual
1996 fish and wildlife costs were lower than the alleged 1995 figures, however. See infra
notes 599, 606 and accompanying text.
578 A coalition of environmental and taxpayer groups estimated that below-cost sales to
industry customers cost BPA $214 million annually, and that special rates for the Bureau of
Reclamation, irrigation districts, and individual irrigators cost the agency $80 million annually. FRIENDS OF TIE EARTH ET AL, RIVER OF RED INK: A COMMON SENSE GUIDE TO SAVING
TAXPAYERS MONEY AND RESTORING NORTHWEST SALMON 6, 8-10 (Feb. 1996) [hereinafter RIVER
OF RED INK]. The cost of the "residential exchange" program, which reduces rates of residential consumers of Northwest investor-owned utilities, was $198 million in 1995. THE BENEFITS
OF POWER, supra note 571, at 21. However, the Energy and Water Development Appropria-

tions Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-46, 109 Stat. 402 (1995) (codified in scattered section of 16,
42, and 43 U.S.C.), fixed the cost of the program during fiscal year 1997 at $145 million, and
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competitive with the new generation of gas-fired electricity production facilities coming on line.
BPA's response to the new competitive era was fourfold. First, it cut
its budget and staff by twenty percent.5 7 9 Second, it proposed a rate reduction for its preference customers. 58 0 Third, it agreed to new five-year contracts with its industrial customers that ensured that those customers
would not seek power from new sources. Fourth, while unable to secure a
congressionally imposed cap on fish and wildlife measures, BPA managed
to broker an administratively imposed cap. The latter two measures were
extremely controversial and are discussed in the succeeding subparts.
B. New IndustrialPower Contracts and the "StrandedCosts" Issue
BPA's chief fear was that its industrial customers, mostly aluminum
companies, would sign power contracts with the agency's new competition, leaving BPA with a $7 billion nuclear debt,5 8 ' fewer customers, and
declining revenues. The new open market seemed to offer industrial customers, which produce one-fourth of BPA's revenue, 58 2 the opportunity to
abandon BPA and thereby avoid paying a share of this debt. This so-called
"stranded costs" issue was controversial because BPA's primary argument
,for embarking on what turned out to be a failed nuclear power progranin
the 1960s and 1970s was that it needed the generating capacity to continue
to serve industrial and utility loads in an era of rising demand. 583
Although BPA's industrial power contracts would not expire until
2001, one contract provision allowed customers to terminate by giving one
year notice.5 84 BPA's contracts also allowed the agency to charge any terminating industrial or utility customer for "any otherwise unrecoverable
costs" incurred by BPA through the year 2001 as a result of the termination.5 8 5 This provision seemed to offer BPA the option of billing departing
the legislative history called for phasing out the program in five

years. See

BONNEVILLE

POWER ADMIN., KEEPING CURRENT 4 (Dec. 1995).

570 See Tim BENEFITS OF POWER, supra note 571, at 6 ("BPA is reducing staff and contractors by 20 percent by 1997 compared to 1994 levels."); Remarks of Randy Hardy, supra note

573 (reporting a reduction of $500 million in a budget of $2.5 billion).
580 See THE BENEFITS OF POWER, supra note 571, at 6-7 (discussing a proposed 8.2% reduc-

tion to publicly owned utilities, to which BPA must give preference under the terms of the
Bonneville Project Act, 16 U.S.C. § 832c (1994)).
581 See supra note 576.
82
THE BENEFMTS OF POWER, supra note 571, at 7.

583 See Blumm, HydroelectricHeritage,supra note 23, at 221-30 (discussing the rise and
fall of BPA's Hydro-Thermal Power Program).
584 See THE BENEFTrS OF POWER, supra note 571, at 7. However, BPA's 1986 environmen-

tal impact statement on the contracts claimed that the customers could not seek alternative
power supplies without BPA's approval. BONNEVILLE POWER ADMIN., FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL
IMPACT'STATEMENT, DIRECT SERVICE INIDUSTRY OPTIONs 7 (1986); see also 1 BONNEVILLE POWER
ADMIN., DRAFr ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT, INIAL NoRTHwEST POWER ACT POWER

SALEs CoNTRACTS 2-24 (1990).

585 See Letter from Steven G. Hickok, Vice President for Sales and Customer Service,
Bonneville Power Adminstration, to DSI Customers 2 (May 22, 1995) (discussing § 2(b) of

the industrial power sales, contracts).
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customers for an appropriate share of stranded costs as a kind of "exit
fee," an interpretation that would have provided a strong disincentive for
any customer to terminate its contract before its expiration in 2001.
BPA initially suggested that it might interpret the provision to allow
imposition of an exit fee, 586 but after its industrial customers howled in

protest,58 7 the agency agreed that in their case "any otherwise unrecoverable costs" meant only minor costs associated with transmission facilities

used to serve the customer, not exit fees designed to recover stranded
costs associated with the agency's nuclear debt.58 8
As a result of this contractual. interpretation, BPA contended that it
had no assurance that its industrial customers would not terminate their
contracts, making roughly one-quarter of its revenue unstable. Consequently, the agency quickly signed new five-year contracts giving it the
stability it sought. 58 9 The contracts also provided BPA's industrial custom-

ers a rate decrease of 12.7 percent 590 and formally excused them from
helping to pay BPA's nuclear debt in the form of an exit fee. Combined
with the proposed rate decrease, for its utility customers, this decrease
caused BPA to seek to reduce costs, by cutting its staff591 and lobbying for

a cap on fish and wildlife expenditures.

586 Id.
587 Letter from Charles D. Reali, Vice President and General Manager, Vanalco, Inc., to

Steven G. Hickok, Vice President for Sales and Customer Service, Bonneville Power Adminstration (June 6, 1995); Letter from Jim Reddy, Vice President, Intalco Aluminum Corp., to
Steven G. Hickok, Vice President for Sales and Customer Service, Bonneville Power Adminstration (May 26, 1995); Letter from Dan Ten Eyck, Northwest Power Manager, Reynolds
Aluminum, to Randy Hardy, Administrator, Bonneville Power Adminstration (July 5, 1995);
Letter from James D. Stramberg, Vice Presidentfor Power Management, Columbia Falls
Aluminum Co., to Steven G. Hickok, Vice President for Sales and Customer Service, Bonneville Power Adminstration (May 23, 1995). The industrial customers cited a series of letters
from BPA since the mild-1980s which arguably excused them from stranded costs associated
with the nuclear debt. Also, they argued that the contract language should not be construed
to include such stranded costs because, unlike certain utilities, the industrial customers
never signed "net billing" agreements back in the 1970s. See generally Blumm, Hydroelectric
Heritage, supra note 23, at 221-24 (explaining net billing as a financial scheme under which
BPA gave public utilities credits on their BPA bills, in return for BPA's purchase of electric
"futures").
588 Letter from Steven G. Hickok, Vice President for Sales and Customer Service, Bonneville Power Adminstration, to DSI Customers (July 14, 1995) ("This replaces May 22, 1995
letter to you which was in error. Please disregard that letter and accept my sincere apology
for the anger and confusion it caused.")..
589 See THE BENEFITS OF POWER, supra note 571, at 7.
590 BPA ProposesRate Reduction, ISSUE ALERT (Bonneville Power Admin., Portland, Or.),
July 1995, at 2.
591 See supra note 579 and accompanying text.
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C. The Fish and Wildlife "Budget"and the Concept of Foregone
Hydropower Revenues'
Although the annual carrying costs of BPA's nuclear debt exceeded
its fish and wildlife expenditures, 92 BPA instead chose to ask Congress
to "cap" its fish and wildlife expenditures, 593 despite the specification in
the Northwest Power Act that all fish and wildlife costs attributable to the
.construction and operation of the federal Columbia Basin hydroelectric
system were costs of doing business, to be paid by the hydroelectric system.59 4 Senator Mark Hatfield (R-Or.) led a legislative effort to restrict
BPA's fish and wildlife expenditures and to deem suchexpenditures sufficient to meet the requirements of environmental laws like the ESA. 595 A
similar effort earlier in 1995 led to passage of what became known as the
timber salvage, rider, which effectively exempted certain federal timber
sales from environmental laws.596
The proposed legislative cost cap was especially controversial because it sought to put a ceiling not only on BPA's out-of-pocket expenditures for fish and wildlife, but also on the amount of "foregone
hydropower revenues" due to operational changes at the dams that benefit
migrating salmon. In other words, the alleged "costs" of flow augmentation and spill measures to hydropower generation would be calculated and
charged against the budget amount. This was a deeply flawed concept, for
592 For example, in 1995 BPA claimed its fish and wildlife expenditures were $400 million,

minus a $56 million credit toward its Treasury repayment obligations (to help pay for fish
and wildlife measures aimed at nonpower uses of the federal dams). See T-E BENEFTrs Of
POWER, supra note 571, at 11, 18. On the other hand, BPA's debt service on nonfederal
projects, which is essentially its nuclear power debt, was $485 million, down from $600
million in previous years due to a refinancing of nuclear plant bonds. Id. at 20-21. In 1996,
BPA's fish and wildlife costs were considerably lower than the agency claimed in' 1995,
roughly $345 million. See infra notes 599, 606 and accompanying text.
593 The entire Pacific Northwest Senate delegation sent letters to the four Northwest governors and to President Clinton calling for a limit to fish and wildlife costs. Letter from
Pacific Northwest Senate Delegation to the Honorable Bill Clinton (Dec. 20, 1994); Letter
from Pacific Northwest Senate Delegation to Pacific Northwest Governors (Aug. 11, 1995).
These letters illustrate the delegation's openess to BPA's entreaties for a fish cap.
594 See 16 U.S.C. § 839(4), (6) (1994) (stating that BPA customers are to pay all costs of
hydropower generation; fish and wildlife are a purpose of the operation of the FCRPS); id.
§ 839b(h)(8)(B) (stating that electric consumers are to pay costs of measures designed to
respond to the adverse effects of the development and operation of electric power
facilities).
595 Pamela Russell, Hatfield Releases Draft Legislation on Bonneville Fish Budget,
CLEARING UP, Sept. 25, 1995, at 1, 14-15.
596 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations for Additional Disaster Assistance, for AntiTerrorism Initiatives, for Assistance in the Recovery from the Tragedy That Occurred at
Oklahoma City, and Rescissions Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-19, § 2001, 109 Stat. 194, 240-47.
See also Michael Axline, Forest Health and the Politics of Expediency, 26 ENmrL. L. 613
(1996) and Slade Gorton & Julie Kays, Legislative History of the Timber and Salvage
Amendments Enacted in the 104th Congress: A Small Victory for Timber Communities in
the Pacific Northwest, 26 ENvTL. L. 641 (1996), for a point and counterpoint discussion of
the purpose, legislative history, interpretation, and potential effect of the timber salvage
rider.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2982177

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

[Vol. 27:21

not only did it erroneously assume that the principal purpose of Columbia
Basin dams is hydropower production, 597 it also singled out fish and wildlife and imposed a hydropower "surcharge," while ignoring other uses of
the river that "cost" hydropower revenues, such as flood control, navigation, and irrigation.59 8 Moreover, the amount that fish and wildlife "costs"
hydropower vary widely from year to year, depending on water conditions, electricity markets, and how the formula to estimate such costs is
structured. In 1996, for example, 3PA found it considerably "cheaper" to
implement the NMFS BiOp than the agency claimed previously. 599
Although there was support for the cost cap legislation among the
Northwest Senate delegation, 60 0 negotiations between representatives of
the Northwest Power Planning Council, BPA, and NMFS produced a draft
interagency agreement designed to provide both financial stability for BPA
and sufficient fish and wildlife expenditures to support recovery of the
listed Columbia River salmon. 601 This draft agreement, endorsed by both
597 See, e.g., Michael C. Blumm, Hydropower vs. Salmon: The Struggle of the Pacific
Northwest's Anadromous Fish Resources for a Peaceful Coexistence with the Federal Co-

lumbia River Power System, 11 ENVTL L. 211, 223-49 (1981) [hreinafter Blumm, Hydropower vs. Salmon] (reviewing the legislative authorizations of Columbia Basin dams and
concluding that hydropower was an incidental or secondary purpose of the dams).
598 For example, a coalition of environmental and taxpayer groups has estimated that
irrigation "costs" hydropower $47.5 million annually, while navigation "costs" $29.5 million
annually. RIVER OF RED INK, supra note 578, at 8-11.

599 See infra note 606 and accompanying text. A cynic might suggest that, in addition to
the fact that 1996 was a high water year, the reason why implementing the BiOp's system
operation measures was about half as expensive as-originally alleged had to do with BPA's
congressional lobbying strategy. The agency may have originally inflated the cost of restructuring system operations in hopes that Congress would exempt it from the ESA and other
environmental laws, as occurred in the case of timber harvests, supra note 596 and accompanying text. When those hopes failed to materialize, BPA appeared to be stuck with the
exaggerated financial figures it used, at least until the MOA adopted the "dual budget" approach, which does not specify a cost figure for system operations. See infra notes 605-606
and accompanying text.
600 For example, Senator Slade Gorton (R-Wash.) was (and apparently remains) especially interested in imposing a legislative cost cap that would include -an exemption from
environmental laws. See Lynn Francisco, Fish Cost Cap Not Likely to Bring Lower Rates,
Says BPA, CLEARING UP, Oct. 30, 1995, at 8; Larry Swisher, Sen. Gorton Is Trying to Sell His
Salmon Cap Scheme Again, LEWISTON MORNING TRhi., Mar. 11, 1996, at 9A.
601 Angus Duncan, former Chairman of the Council and chief negotiator for the Council in
the negotiations, noted that the following two factors were critical in arriving at an agreement: 1) the Clinton Administration's willingness to agree, at the urging of Senator Patty
Murray (D-Wash.), to establish a contingency fund to cover unanticipated costs associated
with low water conditions and court orders; and 2) Senator Gorton's unsuccessful attempt
to expand BPA's proposed exemption from environmental laws to include nonfederal dam
operators on the mid-Columbia. Telephone Interview with Angus Duncan (Sept. 25, 1996).
According to Duncan, Senator Gorton's efforts caused the Clinton Administration to back
away from authorizing any exemption from environmental laws, and Senator Hatfield, BPA's
chief congressional ally, eventually agreed. Id. Senator Larry Craig's (R-Idaho) Chief of Staff
blamed the failure to obtain a waiver from environmental laws on a threatened presidential
veto. See Michael R. Wickline, Agreement Kills Dworshak Protection, LEWISTON MORNING
TRm., Oct. 24, 1995, at IA; Iynn Francisco, Fish Cost Cap Not Likely to Bring Lower Rates,
Says BPA, CLEARING UP, Oct. 30, 1995, at 8.
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Republican senators and the Democratic administration in October 1995,
called for a formal memorandum of agreement among BPA, the Council,
NMFS, and other federal agencies establishing a six-year average "budget"
for fish and wildlife expenditures, widely reported at $435 million annually, with a $325 million contingency fund to coveradditional expenditures
due to court orders or low water years.60 2 The draft agreement supplanted, at least temporarily, the effort to suspend the application of environmental laws.
Throughout 1996, negotiations continued among federal water,
power, and fish and wildlife agencies, in consultation with the region's
Indian tribes, over the specific terms of the interagency agreement. 60 3 By
'the time a formal agreement was finally reached in September 1996,60 4 the
details were significantly different than the agreement announced the year
before. Most noticeably, the $435 million budget had been transformed
into separate "dual budgets": one a fixed amount of $252 million covering
BPA's out-of-pocket expenditures, the other an unfixed amount covering
system operations necessary to implement the BiOp and other specified
05

actions. 6

The dual budget approach seemed to avoid the problems of the "foregone hydropower revenues" concept, but also appeared to allow BPA to
back away from expending $435 million annually. In 1996, a high water
year,,the estimated cost of system operations for fish and wildlife was less
than $100 million, leaving roughly $90 million of the original $435 million
unexpended.6 0 6 Although the tribes argued that BPA should apply this
money to measures not covered by the budget, like lower Snake River
reservoir drawdowns, 60 7 the Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) only re602 See Tom Alkire & Brian Broderick, Gore, Senators Announce Cap on ColumbiaRiver
Salmon Recovery Effort, S.E.D. (BNA), (Oct. 25, 1995), availablein WL at 10/25/95 SED d4;
John A. Harrison, A Negotiated Budget, NORTHWEST ENERGY NEWS, Spring 1996, at 23.
603 See Harrison, supra note 602, at 23.
604 Memorandum of Agreement' Among the Department of the Army, the Department of
Commerce, the Department of Energy, and the Department .of Interior Concerning the
Bonneville Power Administration's Financial Commitment for Columbia River Basin Fish
and Wildlife Costs (Sept. 16, 1996) [hereinafter Federal MOA].
605 Id. §§ IV(a), V(a). The MOA recognized that operations required by the BiOp could
'change over time and might be subject to dispute, so the MOA authorized a dispute resolution process involving consultation with all parties and a regional forum, with NMFS making
the ultimate determination as to whether a particular operation is required by the BiOp. Id.
§ V(a).
606 Interview with Daniel J. Rohlf, Attorney for Plaintiffs in American Rivers v. NMFS,
Portland, Or. (July 31, 1996). ,The MOA negotiators estimated that in an average water year
the cost of implementing BiOp-specified operations would be $183 million, meaning that
with the $252 million in out-of-pocket expenditures, the total cost to BPA in an average
water year would be $435 million. Interview with Angus Duncan, supra note 601.
607 The MOA expressly committed BPA to absorbing the costs of operating the John Day
reservoir at MOP. Federal MOA, supra note 604, § IV(c) (specifying that such costs are to be
considered "above and beyond, and not charged" to BPA's budget as established -by the
MOA). However, NMFS subsequently eliminated the requirement of drawing down John Day
to MOP from its BiOp. See supra note 291 (explaining the tortuous history of the John Day
MOP provision); see also infra notes 713, 720 and accompanying text.
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quired BPA to annually publish an accounting of the actual cost of operations necessary to meet fishery obligations and report whether the cost
was below $183 million (the difference between the publicized $435 million cost and the $252 million which the MOA commits BPA to spend).608
The MOA merely provided that "any net amount [under an average of $183
million per year] will be considered in determining the funding available to
meet fish and wildlife obligations" after the MOA expires in 2002.6)9
Despite failing to hold BPA to the publicized $435 million budget, the
tribes did manage to negotiate an "annex" to the MOA establishing detailed management and accounting procedures, such as annual prioritization of projects to be funded, integration of the privatization process with
the federal budget process, quarterly reporting of expenditures, and review by the independent scientific advisory board. 610 The MOA also restricted use of the $325 million contingency fund to adverse water
conditions, court orders, natural disasters declared by the President, and
"fishery emergencies" declared by joint resolution of the Secretaries of the
Interior and Commerce. 6 11 These restrictions would seem to make the
contingency fund unavailable for the financial consequences of unforeseen events or even some foreseen events, such as costs related to new
61 2
ESA listings.
Although the fish and wildlife budget may achieve financial security
for BPA while meeting the agency's fish and wildlife obligations and ensuring that funds are spent wisely and efficiently, 6 13 it remains controversial
for several reasons. First, although the amount of the budget originally
was designed to allow implementation of both the NMFS BiOp and the
Council's program,6 1 4 the budget does not actually allow implementation
of all measures in those restoration plans. Implementation of the budget
608 Federal MOA, supra note 604, § V(d).
609 Id.
610 Id. Annex. §§ a(l) (annual prioritization and coordination with federal budget process), b (quarterly reporting of expenditures), c (independent scientific review of prioritization criteria and annual work plans). An interesting part of the MOA promises development
by April 1997 of "options" for direct BPA funding of all activities currently funded by congressional appropriations. Id. § a(2). For example, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service is apparently interested in funding some or all of the activities under its Lower Snake River -

Compensation Plan. See Memorandum to Interested Parties from Steve Crow, Northwest
Power Planning Council Executive Directbr 5 (Sept. 11, 1996) [hereinafter Crow
Memorandum].

611 Federal MOA, supra note 604, § VII. Use of the contingency fund for natural disasters
and fishery emergencies is limited "in the aggregate" to $15 million per year. Id. § 7(a)(3).
612 See Crow Memorandum, supra note 610, at 3.
613 See Federal MOA, supra note 604, § III (discussing goals of providing BPA with financial security, identifying a budget that will meet- BPA's fish and wildlife obligations, and
ensuring that those funds are expended soundly and efficiently).
614 Thomas Jensen, Remarks at the 2d Annual "Who Runs the River?" Conference (Oct.

27, 1995) (available at the Northwest Water Law & Policy Project, Northwestern School of
Law of Lewis & Clark College); Letter.from Alice M. Rivlin, Director, OMB, to Sen. Mark
Hatfield, Chairman, Appropriations Committee (Oct. 24, 1995) (on file in Remarks at 2d Annual "Who Runs the River?" Conference (Oct. 27, 1995) (available at the Northwest Water
Law & Policy Project, Northwestern School of Law of Lewis & Clark College)).
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has focused almost exclusively on immediate measures called for by the
NMFS BiOp, paying only lip service to additional changes in the operation
of federal dams in the future called for by both the BiOp and the Council's
program.61 5 Second, certain measures in both the BiOp and Council's program are not authorized by the budget. For example, drawdowns of the
lower Snake and John Day reservoirs will apparently require separate congressional approval, as will additional purchases of water in the Snake
Basin to boost flows in the Snake River. 616 Third, the fish and wildlife
budget appears to confirm that economicsnot biology, is the ultimate determinant of salmon recovery. 6 17 This is inconsistent with the ESA and the
Northwest Power Act, both of which call for science-based decision making and relegate economics to a secondary consideration. 6 18 Implementation of the budget may be vulnerable to judicial challenge, since the
619
budget does not override these statutes.
D. Fish and Wildlife Governance
Although Congress decided against legislating a fish and wildlife cost
cap in 1995, the Energy and Water Development Appropriation Act of
1996,620 adopted in November 1995, directed the Council to report to Congress within 180 days "regarding the most appropriate governance structure to allow more effective regional control over efforts to conserve and
enhance anadromous and resident fish and wildlife with the Federal Columbia River Power System." 62 1 After consulting with interested parties,
conducting a two-day workshop, and circulating a draft proposal for pub615 Charles Ray & Dan Rohlf, What Happened to the Salmon Cost Cap?, CURRENLY
(Idaho Rivers United), Winter. 1996, at 7. One of the plaintiffs attorneys in the American
Rivers v. NMFS case, discussed supra notes 13, 21, 36 and accompanying text, observed
that it is hardly clear what implementing the NMFS BiOp requires, referring to the "side
deals" made by NMFS with Montana in 1995, supra notes 490-499 and accompanying text,
and noting that NMFS attorneys in the negotiations that temporarily settled the case described the BiOp as an "adaptive document." Interview with Daniel J. Rohlf, supra note 606.
616 Ray & Rohlf, supra note 615, at 7. On the John Day rationale, see supra note 291.
617 We acknowledge that the budget was conceived by those who negotiated it as something quite different from legislation that would supplant environmental laws, and that it
was in fact perceived to be sufficient to carry out the directives of the NMFS BiOp and most
of the Council's program (except for the Snake River drawdowns and new water purchases
in the Snake Basin). But given the overwhelming historic dominance of economic concerns
over biological needs, see Blumm, Hydropower vs. Salmon, supra note 597, at 214-23;
Blumm, Saving Idaho's Salmon, supra note 87, at 669-77, we predict that the budget will
repeat this history by elevating economic accounting over biology.
618 See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (1994) (ESA provision requiring agencies to use "the best
scientific and commercial data available"); 16 U.S.C. § 839b(h)(6)(B)-(C) (1994) (Northwest
Power Act provisions calling for decision making based on the "best available scientific
knowledge" and authorizing minimum economic cost alternatives only where they achieve
"the same sound biological objective"); see also supra notes 300-301 and accompanying text.
619 The MOA twice disclaimed any intent to affect any statutory duties. FEDERAL MOA,
supra note 604, §§ VII(d), IX(e).
620 Energy and Water Development Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 104-46, § 508(c), 109
Stat. 402 (1995).
621 Id. § 508(c), 109 Stat. at 420.
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lic review, the Council submitted its governance report to Congress in May
1996.622

In many ways, the Council's report was as significant for what it did
not recommend as for what it did recommend, especially in light of the
eagerness of some senators in the Northwest delegation to legislate a,new
structure for governing Columbia Basin fish and wildlife that would include an exemption from the ESA. 623 The report's principal recommendation concerned administrative action: an executive order to require federal
agency consistency with the Council's program. 624 The Council recommended legislation only if administrative collaboration failed; 625 even
then, it specifically rejected waiving the requirements of the ESA. 626 Thus,
representatives of the Columbia Basin states went on record as supporting
salmon recovery under the ESA as well as the Northwest Power Act.
The Council observed widespread regional agreement that there
should be one fish and wildlife plan, rather than multiple plans. 27 However, the Council failed to recommend a specific process for reconciling
the various plans. The report stated only that the Council would "help fa-cilitate efforts to bring sovereigns together periodically, on the basis of
equality, to work toward a single fish and wildlife program, and to coordinate technical and policy aspects of implementation."6 28 This rather vague
promise 629 was perhaps a reflection of the fact that a successful reconcili622 COUNCIL GOVERNANCE REPORT, supra note 27.
623' Id. at 6.
624 Id. at 2, 12. This executive order would.direct

federal agencies to act in a manner
consistent with the Council's program "insofar as permitted by their statutory responsibilities, and to provide detailed, written explanations if they diverge from the program." Id. The
council's program does include a similar requirement, see supra note 279, but, as the council
noted, "[tihe seriousness with which federal agencies have implemented the Council's program.. . has varied from agency to agency and time to time." COUNCIL GOVERNANCE REPORT,
supra note 27, at 4.
625 COUNCIL GOVERNANCE REPORT, supra note 27, at 12-13.
626 Id. at 15 ("For all consistency alternatives, we assume no changes in the Endangered
Species Act or other environmental laws. That is, if there were a conflict between the Council's fish and wildlife program and the Endangered Species Act, the Endangered Species Act
would govern."). The Council did note some of the shortcomings of decision making under
the ESA, including its relative lack of public processes, its focus only on species in peril of
extinction, and its relative lack of accommodation for community and economic impacts, as
well as the legal rights of Indian tribes. Id. at 5-6.
627 Id. at 6, 13-14.

628 Id. at 2. The Council subsequently took steps toward integration by signing an interagency agreement with NMFS to integrate scientific reviews, see infra note 647 and accompanying text, and by establishing an Executive Implementation Committee, composed of
representatives of the Council, the tribes, and NMFS, to coordinate in-year migration decisions. Interview with Angus Duncan, supra note 601.
629 The Council did suggest that the sovereigns (federal, state, and tribal) could be 6onvened to develop a "cohesive set" of recommended amendments to the Council's program.
COUNCIL GOVERNANCE REPORT, supra note 27, at 13. Then, the Council would ask NMFS and

the JSFWS to determine whether the amended program would satisfy the ESA. Id. If it did
not, the Council promised to "engage the region in focusing on the specific statutory requirements at issue and determine the most appropriate regional response." Id. In practice, this
has meant that the Council, BPA, and the fish and wildlife agencies and tribes are attempting
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ation process will require an effective dispute resolution, mechanism, on
which the Council promised a further report later in 1996.630
The Council promised to undertake certain reforms itself as a means
of increasing accountability. First, perhaps recognizing its dismal record
in enforcing its program,631 the Council promised to begin making regular
findings of consistency or inconsistency of program implementation efforts and to publish those findings for the benefit of the region and Congress. 632 Second, the Council committed itself to establishing an effective
biological monitoring and evaluation program and asked for help in this
regard from the region's fish and wildlife managers. 633 Third, the Council
proposed that, as a general rule, it would require "all but proven measures" in its program to have a monitoring and evaluation
component, the
4
results of which would influence future funding.6
Although in many respects the Council's governance report was an
enlightened one, the report failed to seize the opportunity to explain to
Congress why integrating the sovereigns-with their various plans, authorities, and responsibilities-is a pre-condition to a unified approach to
Columbia Basin system management. The report also failed to explain just
how much the Council's program has been hampered by the federal water
management agencies' failure to implement it. While the political environment may have cautioned against recommending new legislation to a Congress that had enacted a timber salvage rider, waiving environmental
laws,63 5 the Council missed an important opportunity to document how
the Northwest Power Act's vague enforcement provisions encouraged a
cavalier long-term attitude on the part of the federal agencies responsible
for carrying out the program's measures.6 6 The governance report also
failed to recommend a dispute resolution process, despite widespread recto draw upon the three plans in formulating a five-year work plan that eventually could
become the subject of amendments to the Council's program. Letter from John Volkman,
supra note 96, at 4.
Another version of a reconciliation process was proposed by an inter-tribal workgroup, which recommended an expanded version of the Columbia Basin Fish and Wildlife
Authority as a regional forum in which all sovereign entities-federal, state, and tribal, and
even Canadian representatives on selected issues-would participate. Although the tribes
recognized the need for a dispute resolution process, they did not recommend one. However, they did suggest creation of a regional fiscal management entity to supplant BPA's role

as financial manager of fish and wildlife expenditures, creation of a regional science advisory panel, and a focus on watershed planning and implementation. COUNCIL GOVERNANCE
REPORT, supra note 27, app. 5 at 22-23.
630 COUNCIL GOVERNANCE REPORT, supra note 27, at 2, 12. The Council also promised to

report later to Congress on measures to integrate management of fish and wildlife expenditures. Id. at 2.

631 See Blumm & Simrin, UnravelingParity,supra note 75, at 676-77, 688-89, 711-12, 731,
737-38.
632 COUNCIL GOVERNANCE REPORT, supra note 27, at 14.
633 Id.
634 Id. at 14-15.
6W See supra note 596 and accompanying text.
6N See, e.g., Blumm & Simrin, Unaveling Paity, supra note 75, at 676-77, 688-89, 705,

709.
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ognition among commentators that the lack
of such a process was a cen63 7
tral problem with the Council's program.
The Council's governance report may ultimately prove to be an important document, but its influence is likely to be undermined by its separation from a contemporaneous review of the region's power system
conducted under the auspices of the Northwest governors. 6as This separation illustrates two fundamental flaws in the process for resolving the
salmon crisis. First, it repeats the critical historical mistake of assuming
that decisions about how the power system should function can be made
in the absence of. fish and wildlife needs because these needs can be accommodated later.63 9 The chief result of this mistaken assumption is the
current endangered status of Snake River chinook and sockeye. 640 Fish
and wildlife managers and hydropower planners must make simultaneous
decisions about river operations, instead of continuing the disunion of fish
and wildlife needs and power system management,
The second flaw in separating fish and wildlife governance from decisions about the future of the region's power system is that the revenues
available to implement fish and wildlife restoration will be affected considerably by decisions about the power system. For example, fish and
wildlife restoration efforts could be damaged irretrievably if the governors' regional review were to lead to a separation of BPA's transmission
and power sale functions, or if transmission rates were not designed to
fund BPA's fish and wildlife (or nuclear) debts, or if federal power sales
had to compete with power suppliers that had no obligation to pay for
such debts. 64 1 On the other hand, BPA's power would remain competitive
and stable fish and wildlife funding could be assured if, in separating
BPA's transmission and power sale functions, a "system benefit charge"
were imposed to fund fish and wildlife -restoration and .other public pur637

See, e.g., NORTHWEST POWER

PLANNING COUNCIL, REPORT TO THE NORTHWEST POWER

PLANNING COUNCIL FROM THE WORKSHOP ON FISH AND WILDLIFE GOVERNANCE 9,

17 (1996) (re-

port to the Council from a workshop-consisting of 40-50 representatives from the federal,

state, tribal, power, agricultural, and environmental sectors-on fish and wildlife governance in the basin,. concluding that dispute resolution mechanisms are needed for the implementation of salmon restoration plans). Salmon advocates not only sought an effective
dispute resolution process, they unsuccessfully advocated that the Council's report recommend that Congress revoke BPA's role in making funding decisions regarding fish and wildlife measures. See

LORRAINE BODI & RICK APPELGATE, FISH

ISSUES

AND THE REGIONAL ENERGY

A DISCUSSION PAPER 2 (May 1996).
638 See Bill MacKenzie, N.W. Energy System Faces Review Starting Thursday, THE ORE.
GONIAN, Jan. 3, 1996, at B12 (describing the goals of the regional review). Although the Council was well aware of the regional energy review, it failed to recommend that any
restructured power system be required to fund fish and wildlife restoration obligations, or to
insist that no portion of a restructured system be excused from such obligations. See BODI &
APPELGATE, supra note 637, at 1-2.
639 See generally Blumm, Hydropower vs. Salmon, supra note 597.
640 See generally Blumm & Simrin, Unraveling Parity, supra note 75.
641 William Stelle, Northwest Director, National Marine FIsheries Serv., Remarks at the
2nd Annual Northwest Water Law and Policy,.Conference (May 9, 1996) (materials available
at the Northwest Water Law & Policy Project, Northwestern School of Law of Lewis & Clark
College).
REVIEW:
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poses. 642 The BPA Administrator, the Regional Director of NMFS, and the

former Chairman of the Northwest Power Planning Council have all recently objected to the separation of fish and wildlife governance from the
regional review of the power system.6 43 Failure to successfully integrate
these processes would be a mistake of cataclysmic proportions for the
region's fish and wildlife and those who care about them. Salmon advocates have set forth a comprehensive set of proposals to restructure the
Northwest power system644 but, as of this writing, these proposals have
been ignored.

E. Improving the Science of Salmon Restoration
One. of the most widespread complaints about salmon restoration efforts has been an alleged lack of scientific justification for certain program

measures, particularly mainstem passage measures. 64 5 In response, the
642 The "system benefit charge" was endorsed by BPA Administrator Randy Hardy. See
Hardy, supra note 573. Also, nothing in the new FERC open transmission rules would foreclose the system benefit charge endorsed by Hardy. Promoting Wholesale Competition
Through Open Access Non-Discriminating Transmission Services by Public Utilities; Recovery of Stranded Costs by Public Utilities and Transmitting Utilities, 61 Fed. Reg. 21,540,
21,668 (May 10, 1996) (stating that the new rules do "not address stranded cost recovery by
BPA under the Northwest Power Act").
643 See Second Annual Conference Tracks Changes in Regional Water and Energy Policy, BIG RIVmR NEWS, Summer 1996, at 1, 3-4. (BPA Administrator and NMFS'Regional Director advocating integration of fish and wildlife governance and regional energy reviews);
COUNCIL GOVERNANCE REPORT, supra note 27 , app. 5 at 17 (Angus Duncan, former Council
Chairman, advocating integration).
644 See Boor & APPELGATE, supra note 637, at 4-6 (recommending 1) elimination of "below cost transactions" benefitting aluminum companies, irrigators, and barging companies;
2) opposition to separating the federal transmission system from federal power sales "without assurances regarding allocation of nuclear debt and secure financing for fish and wildlife
obligations"; 3) cancellation of BPA's obligation to support all customer power demands
(because elimination of "the obligation to serve" would reduce alleged BPA fish and wildlife
costs); 4) exit fees, system benefits charges, other surcharges on transmission services, or
some combination to ensure equitable allocation of nuclear costs; 5) separate sale of the
power generated by BPA's only producing nuclear power plant, in order to ensure that consumers are willing to pay for its costs; 6) that hydrosystem operators be required to meet
fish needs first and make power marketing decisions only after the fish plan has been satisfied; and 7) elimination of the Army Corps of Engineers' responsibility for implementing
fishery operations at Columbia Basin dams).
645 See, e.g., John Etchart & Stan Grace, Salmon Plan DisregardsEvidence, SEATrLE
POST-INTELUGENCER, Jan. 12, 1995, at A15 (two Council members from Montana, who voted
against the 1994 amendments to the Council's program, claiming they did so because the
amendments were based on "flimsy evidence or no evidence at all"); Joan Laatz Jewett,
CorporateGiants Launch Salmon Plan, THE OREGONIAN, Feb. 17, 1996, at Al, A14 (discussing an "induwtry-supported public information campaign" that derided the employment of
spill, drawdowns, and inriver migration (over the use of barging) in the Council's program
and the tribal plan because of the lack of any scientific evidence to justify the expenses of
these measures); Brian T. Meehan, Industry CoalitionBlasts FederalPlan to Save Salmon,
TIM OREGONIAN, Feb. 10, 1995, at C3 (Bruce Lovelin, of the Columbia River Alliance, denouncing the BiOp: "We simply do not accept that there is any scientific basis for the NMFS
plan; it is a whim and a caprice."); John C. Merkel, Power Planning Council Doesn't Do
Right by Salmon, SEAvrLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Dec. 28, 1994, at A7 (editorial by attorney
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Northwest Power Planning Council established an Independent Scientific
Group.(ISG) to evaluate the scientific underpinnings of its program and to
646
help oversee the implementation of its mainstem passage experiment.
Subsequently, the Council and NMFS signed an interagency agreement establishing an Independent Scientific Advisory Board to provide scientific
advice and recommendations to both agencies. 647 Although the board is to
supersede the Council's scientific group, the latter completed an important evaluation of the program in September 1996. At the same time, under
the leadership of Senator Slade Gorton (R-Wash.), Congress amended the
Northwest Power Act to require independent scientific evaluation of program measures.6 48 This subpart discusses these developments.
1. The Report of the Independent Scientific Group
In 1994, the Northwest Power Planning Council formed the ISG,
which was charged with conducting a biennial review of the science underlying the Council's program and developing a conceptual foundation
for the program-that is, an overall set of scientific principles and assumptions upon which the program would be based and against Which it
would be evaluated. 649 Two years later, in September 1996, in its report
entitled Return to the River,650 the ISG alleged that the Council's program
lacked an adequate conceptual foundation. The ISG report proposed an
ecologically based framework that called for reestablishing what the report referred to as "normative river conditions." 65 1 If policy makers take
its recommendations seriously, 65 2 the ISG report could lead to substantial

changes in the operation of the Columbia Basin hydroelectric system.
representing the Columbia River Alliance, claiming the Council's program "lacks scientific
basis"); Cyrus Nod, Draft BO and Recovery Plan Show Little Science, CLEARING Up, Jan. 9,
1995, at 3, 5 (claiming there is no scientific consensus on the efficacy of drawdowns or spill).
But compare supra notes 298-299 (on the danger of "studying salmon to death").
646 1994 PROGRAM, supra note 9, at 3-9, 5-14.
647 Council/NMFS Agreement, supra note 30.
648 Energy and Water Development Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 104-206, § 504, 110
Stat. 2989 (1996) (Formerly H.R. 3816).
649 1994 PROGRAM, supra note 9, at 3-7 to 3-11, 5-13.
650 ISG REPORT, supra note 7.
651 Id. at xvii ("Key among the conditions we define as normative is the availability of a
continuum of high-quality habitat throughout the salmon life cycle, from freshwater streams
along the entire migratory path into and back out of the Pacific Ocean."); see also id. at 5
("We stress the need to restore the natural functions of the Columbia River ecosystem that
produce salmonid fishes, as opposed to circumventing natural ecological processes."); id. at
7 (defining "'a more normative state' as therestoration of natural ecological processes consistent with the needs of native fish and wildlife species."); id. at 19-20 (defining a "normative ecosystem"); Carlotta Collette, Interview with Rick Williams, Chairof the Independent
Scientific Advisory Board, NORTHwEST ENERGY NEWS, Summer 1996, at 7, 8 (distinguishing a
"normative" river from a "pristine" river).
652 The report expressly declined to make "specific prescriptions" necessary to implement its recommendations because it would have to "incorporate social and economic concerns" beyond the scope of a scientific study. ISG REPORT, supra note 7, at 6. The report
recommended that "[t]he potential social, economic and biological costs and benefits of
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The report's ecological perspective implicitly criticized the Northwest
Power Act's concentration on the effects of hydroelectric development
and operations on the decline of Columbia Basin salmon. The report em-

phasized that successful salmon restoration will be a function of upland
management, estuarine protection, and ocean conditions, as well as mainstem passage and flow measures. 653 The report contained more explicit
criticism of the Council's fish and wildlife program, which the report
faulted for lacking an overarching, coherent set of assumptions about the
interaction of the physical and biological components of the salmon
ecosystem. 65 4 This "fundamental shortcoming," as the report termed it,

was the product of the fact that the program is essentially "a collection of
individual measures proposed by a diverse constituency" that are based on
the "fundamentally flawed" assumption that "economically desirable fish

populations can be managed in isolation from other components of- the
ecosystem."65 5 The report concluded that the program's emphasis on technological fixes, such as hatcheries and barging and trucking juvenile
salmon, as substitutes for lost ecosystem functions had failed. 656 As a re-

sult, the report urged fundamental change: "[w]e must move from a view
implementing normative conditions should be determined and become part of the regional
debate regarding salmon restoration." Id. at 7.
653 Id. at 5A fig. 1.2, 18-20.
654 Id. at 4. The report was critical of the Council's use of adaptive management,
concluding:
In our view, adaptive management has [been used by the Council] to justify a variety
of actions on the premise that they may provide new information. We contend that
adaptive management is intended as a much more rigorous scientific approach. The
term should only be used in reference to explicit management experiments that include hypotheses, test conditions and a detailed experimental design. The concept of
adaptive management should not be used as a justification for every action about
which the outcome is uncertain.
ISG REPORT, supra note 7, at xxii. For discussion of the Council's use of adaptive management, see supra notes 171-172, 217-218 and accompanying text
655 Id. at 4.
656 Id. at 5 ("Despite decades of effort, the present condition of most populations in the
Columbia River Basin demonstrates the failure of technological methods to substitute for
lost ecosystem functions."); see also id. at 506 (citations omitted):
Indeed, salmon restoration in the Columbia River emphasizes the use of hatcheries,
complex bypass systems, artificial habitat structures and'other fundamentally technological operations, in part, because managers and policy-makers have adopted the
machine metaphor. These technologies' evolved over the years and have been used
almost exclusively to mitigate, not correct, habitat degradation caused by decades of
cultural development. The belief that habitat degradation can be technologically mitigated, as opposed to restoration of normative habitats for all life history stages of
samonids, is ingrained in the Fish and Wildlife Program. The prevailing belief is that
the primary problem for anadromous fish is mortality associated with juvenile passage through the dams and reservoirs. The prevailing solution is a combination of
hatchery technology, to maximize the number of smolts produced, combined with
flow augmentation, to move them as rapidly and efficiently as possible through the
hydropower system. This strategy is reflected in restoration expenditures and in the
assumptions implied in the Fish and Wildlife Program.
• Unfortunately, the restoration program based on the machine metaphor has
failed to curtail the decline of salmonid fishes.
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that the Columbia River is largely a vehicle for economic development to
one that accommodates [both] short-term economic gain and the longer65 7
term regional benefits of a functional salmonid bearing ecosystem."
The ISG's alternative conceptual foundation contained the following
three fundamental principles: 1) restoration must address the entire natural and cultural ecosystem, including freshwater, estuarine, and ocean
habitats as .well as human developments; 2) sustainable salmon productivity will require a network of complex and interconnected high-quality
habitats; and 3) managers must recognize that salmon adapt to their
habitat through diversity of life history and genetic and metapopulation
organization. 658 These principles led the report to some surprising conclusions, including a focus on the mainstem and away from headwaters
streams for spawning, a concentration on maintaining healthy populations, and a bias against technological solutions to salmon restoration unless and until they proved themselves effective.
On the surface, the ISG report seemed to lend support to critics bf the
current assumptions that alteration of mainstem flows is the key to
659
salmon restoration, and that ocean conditions may be largely ignored.
While the report found fault with both assumptions, 660 it did endorse restoration of high flows in the spring, and it acknowledged that ocean conditions (except for harvest regulation) are not controllable. 66 1 What the
report found objectionable about the mainstem flow assumption was not
so much that it was flawed, but that it was thought to be sufficient to
restore the runs. 662 While calling for a restoration of the spring freshet, the

ISG report warned that the mainstem should not be merely considered a
conduit for salmon; the report advocated restoration of mainstem habitat
like that which exists in the undammed Hanford Reach on the mid-Columbia. 66 3 Perhaps the most arresting element of the report was its suggestion
Id. at 508.
658 Id. Salmon metapopulations are "spatially-structured groups of local populations
linked by dispersal of individuals." Id. at 29 (citation omitted). The ISG report contended
that salmon metapopulations exhibit c ore-satellite populations, with historic Columbia Basin. core populations in large alluvial mainstem reaches functioning as buffers against environmental change and supporting colonizing populations in neighboring areas. Id. at 30.
659 See, 'e.g., James L.Buchal, Some Fallacies About Salmon Restoration, 25 ENVTL. L.
375 (1995).
660 See ISG REPORT, supra note 7, at xix-xx.
661 Id. at xxiv, xxv, 266, 513; see also id. at 55 ("[W]e advise focusing on the restoration
of a riverine velocity structure as close as possible to the pre-impoundment hydrograph.").
The report did object to nonseasonal flow augmentation (providing summer flows in the
lower Columbia by drawing down Hungry Horse reservoir in Montana), suggesting that summer flushingflows may do more harm than good and may adversely affect food web productivity in the reservoir. Id. at 265.
662 See id.at xxi, 19, 240, 248. In fact, the report noted that high spring flows may benefit
some salmon stocks while disadvantaging others. Id. at 53-57 (distinguishing between yearling and subyearling chinook).
663 Id. at xx; see also id. at 509 (citations omitted):
Available historic evidence, the current high abundance of fall chinook in the Hanford
Reach, and principles of large river ecology, suggest that large alluvial reaches in the
mainstem and lower sections of many tributaries were the fish factories of the Colum657
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that mainstem habitat could be restored by permanent reservoir
drawdowns that would expose and revitalize drowned alluvial reaches,-especially behind John Day and McNary Dams. 66 It was the mainstem, not
headwaters tributaries, that historically supported metapopulations of
salmon, and sb the report argued that restoration efforts should seek to
reestablish ecological conditions where such a metapopulation could reas6 65
sert itself.
With respect to its conclusion that ocean conditions could not be ignored, the report stressed the linkages between freshwater and ocean conditions, noting that periods of warm ocean temperatures coincide with
adverse freshwater conditions, putting Columbia Basin salmon in a kind of
"double jeopardy." 666 Far from reducing the importance of freshwater
measures, this observation led the ISG to suggest that more protective
efforts may be necessary to maintain stock diversity, even during periods
of high productivity, in order to maintain a sufficient genetic reserve to
withstand subsequent productivity declines. 6 67 The report was especially
critical of the assumption that the marine environment is static, concluding that oscillating periods of ocean productivity and infertility under668
scored the importance of stock-specific regulation of ocean harvests.
The report also called into question the use of traditional harvest models
which assume that oceanic changes are insignificant. 669 Altogether, the
report's recognition of the relationships between the marine and freshwater environment hardly deemphasized the need to pursue rehabilitative
670
measures in the latter.
The ISG report also advocated a sweeping change in the amount of
scientific proof required before technological fixes are implemented.
Whereas traditionally technical responses to declining salmon on runs,
like hatcheries and trucking and barging juvenile salmon, were adopted
bia River ecosystem. Mainstem spawning populations may have functioned as vital

core populations important in sustaining metapopulation persistence. Furthermore,
alluvial mainstem areas likely were important rearing areas for juvenile salmonids
moving downstream. Although critically important with respect to biodiversity, many
tributaries in the headwaters of subbasins Were probably not significant production

areas, owing to their smaller size, lack of nutrients to support food webs, steep gradients, long distances from the ocean and other considerations.
664 Id. at 268-69, 513. The report did not endorse temporary drawdowns because they
tend to concentrate predators and adversely affect shallow water habitats, id. at 268, but it
did call for the stabilization of daily flow fluctuations (done to meet peak hydropower demands) in order to protect food webs in shallow-water habitats important for juvenile rearing areas, id. at xxiv.

665 Id. at 509 (noting that the basin contains "few remaining headwater salmon populations, many of which historically never were very productive."); see also supra note 663
(describing "metapopulations").
666 Id. at 483.
667 Id. at 490.
668 Id.
"669 Id. at 485.
670 For example, the report noted that river flows may play an important role in improving conditions in the estuary, including pollution abatement and wetlands restoration. Id. at

xxiv, 518.
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with little or no scientific study, the report'suggested shifting the burden
of proof to advocates of such measures to show that they will be effective
before being implemented on a widespread basis: "[tiechnology that attempts to circumvent the normative river (e.g., hatcheries and transportation) should only be implemented on a large scale basis ifter intensive
67
evaluation." 1
Neither transportation nor hatcheries underwent this careful evaluation prior to implementation. The report concluded that "[a]vailable evidence is not sufficient to identify transportation as either a primary or
supporting method of choice for salmon recovery in the Snake River Basin."6 72 The ISG also noted that, despite "large-scale hatchery efforts and
massive outplantings of hatchery-reared fish, the hatchery program has
failed to replace or mitigate for lost natural reproduction of [salmon]." 673
Although the report did not rule out hatcheries, it recommended that they
be used cautiously and be integrated into restoration strategies focusing
on habitat restoration, reduction of human-induced mortalities, and conservation of genetic diversity.6 74 The report was doubtful as to whether
there was a role for large-scale hatchery production in the future. 675
Return to the River may well change the nature of the discussion
concerning the type and timing of salmon restoration measures. It would
be unfortunate, however, if the report became a vehicle for dismantling
current restoration efforts while interested parties debate whether to
erect the ISG's conceptual foundation as the new paradigm. Although the
report challenged the assumption that a direct relationship exists between
river flows and salmon survival, it endorsed river operations that restore a
more natural hydrograph, which is what current proposed operations attempt. In addition, the political and economic feasibility of permanently
drawing down John Day and McNary Dams seems quite unlikely in the
short run.676 There is a distinct danger that the report's more provocative
suggestions may be used by those defending the status quo as an excuse
not to pursue interim measures, such as the rather modest proposed
drawdown of the John Day pool to MOP. 677 Thus, while Return to the
River may signal a new era in salmon restoration, that new era is likely to
671

Id. at 510. In this respect, the ISG report evinced sentiments remarkably similar to the

Ninth Circuit in the NRIC case, where the court interpreted the Northwest Power Act to
require decision makers to shift the burden of uncertainty to favor salmon restoration. See
Northwest Resource Info. Ctr. v. Northwest Power Planning Council, 35 F.3d 1371, 1377-78
(9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 116 S.Ct. 50 (1995); supra note 137 and accompanying text.
672 ISG REPORT, supra note 7, at 328.
673 Id. at 397.

674 Id. at 397-98.
675 Id. at 398 ("It remains to be seen, however, if there is a role for large-scale production
hatcheries that is compatible with conservation and long-term management of many of our
imperiled stocks.").
676 One question that requires examination is whether such permanent drawdowns would
disrupt navigation, an authorized purpose of the dams, and if so, the feasibility and cost of
maintaining navigation with a permanent drawdown or providing substitute transportation.
677 See supra 291 and accompanying text; infra text accompanying notes 713 and 720.
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see a fusion of the report's scientific principles and the political and economic realities reflected in current restoration efforts.
2. Senator Gorton's Science Rider
Through the efforts of Senator Slade Gorton, an early and enthusiastic supporter of imposing a legislative cost cap on salmon restoration, 6 78
Congress included a rider in the 1997 energy and water development appropriations bill aimed at requiring scientific evaluation of the Council's
program measures. This effort was largely redundant, since the Council
had already taken steps to ensure independent scientific evaluation of its
program measures. 67 9 Despite its redundancy, the effects of this rider
could prove to be problematic if it is interpreted to substantially change
the process of funding program measures.
The rider amended section 4(h)(10) of the Northwest Power Act to
give the Council a statutory role in the funding of measures implementing
its program, requiring the Council to make recommendations to BPA concerning funding priority measures implementing the program.68 0 These
recommendations must be based on "sound science principles; benefit fish
and wildlife; and have a clearly defined objective and outcome with provisions for monitoring and evaluation." 68 1 In this regard, the Council must
establish an Independent Scientific Review Panel, which, in conjunction
with Scientific Peer Review Groups (also called for by the rider), wilrreview fish and wildlife projects proposed for BPA funding. 682 The rider directs the Council to "fully consider" the panel's recommendations
concerning priorities for project funding and, if the Council does not adopt
the panel's recommendations, to explain its reasons for rejecting them in
writing. 683 This resembles the process that the Council must employ if it
chooses to reject program'measures recommended by the fishery agencies
678 See supra note 600.
679 See supra notes 610, 646-163 and accompanying text.
680 Energy and Water Development Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 104-206, § 504, 110
Stat. 2984, 3005-06 (1996) (adding new § 4(h)(10)(D)(iv) to the NorthwestPower Act).
681 Id. § 504. Presumably, all measures must also be consistent with the Council's program, since BPA must fund measures consistent with the program. 16 U.S.C.

§ 839b(h)(10)(A) (1994).
682 16 U.S.C. § 839b(h)(10)(D)(i), (ii) (1994). The rider directed the Council to select the
members of both the Independent Scientific Review Panel and the Scientific Review Panels
from nominations submitted by the National Academy of Sciences, although "Pacific Northwest scientists with expertise in Columbia River anadromous and non-anadromous fish and

wildlife and ocean experts shall be among those represented on the Panel." Id. Members of
the interagency Independent Scientific Advisory Board, see supra notes 30, 647 and accompanying text, are not excluded from membership in the new panels, and Council staff has

recommended consolidating functions. See Memorandum from John Volkman, John Shurts,
and Mark Walker to Council. Members 2 (Sept. 16, 1996) [hereinafter Volkman

memorandum].
683 Energy and Water Development Appropriations Act § 504, 110 Stat. at 3005-06 (adding
a new § 4(h)(10)(D)(vi)). The rider specifies that project recommendations must be "based
on sound science principles; benefit fish and wildlife; arid have a clearly defined objective

and outcome with provisions for monitoring and evaluation of results." Id. (adding new
§ 4(h)(10)(D)(iv)).
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and tribes. 68 4 In fact, the rider might be viewed as an effort to impose a
check on fishery agency and tribal recommendations, which the Ninth Cir685
cuit ruled are entitled to a "high degree of deference" from the Council.
However, since the Council must only "fully consider" the panel recommendations, it does not appear to be required to give them the same defer68 6
ence accorded to agency and tribal recommendations.
The implementation of the rider's requirements is likely to slow the
process of funding fish and wildlife restoration because it imposes a new
level of administrative review and requires an opportunity for public comment on panel recommendations.68 7 Moreover, the rider directs the Council to consider "the impact of ocean conditions" and to "determine
whether the projects employ, cost-effective measures to achieve program
objectives." 68 8 Opponents of restructuring hydroelectric operations often
point to ocean conditions as the chief determinant of the health of salmon
runs. 68 9 Still, industrial users of BPA power were unsuccessful in their attempt to convince the Ninth Circuit to require program measures to satisfy
690
a cost-benefit analysis.
I While the rider may be a response to the Ninth Circuit's decision in
the NRIC case, it does not appear to overturn that decision. The rider does
not amend section 4(h)(7) of the Act,691 which was the basis for the

court's rulings on deference. 692 Although the rider establishes an additional level of review of program recommendations, it does not change the
criteria that program, measures must meet under section 4(h)(6) of the
Act.693 Also, the rider does not change the principle of "textual consistency" by which the courts give effect to all applicable statutory provisions.694 Consequently, the cost effectiveness test required by the rider
does not supplant section 4(h)(6)(C), which makes cost considerations a
secondary factor to biological effectiveness. 69 5 If the rider is in fact consti684 Section 4(h)(7) of the Northwest Power Act requires the Council, when rejecting recommended fish and wildlife measures, to explain in writing why the recommendation was

inconsistent with the statutory criteria established in section 4(h)(6) of the Act, giving "due
weight" to the expertise of the fish and wildlife agencies and Indian tribes. 16 U.S.C.
§ 839b(h)(7) (1994).
685 See supra notes 143-146 and accompanying text.
686 In particular, the rider contains no mention of the "due weight" language that the
Ninth Circuit interpreted in the NRIC decision. See supra notes 143-144, 684 and accompanying text.
687 Energy and Water Development Appropriations Act -§ 504, 110 Stat. at 2984 (adding

new § 4(h)(10)(D)(v) of the Northwest Power Act).
688 Id. (adding new § 4(h)(10)(D)(vi)).
689 See, e.g., Who Runs the River?, supra note 79, at 420 (comment by James Buch~d).
690 Nofthwest Resource Info. Ctr., Inc. v. Northwest Power Planning Council, 35 F.3d
1371, 1394-95 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 116 S.Ct. 50 (1995); see supra.note 147 and accompanying text.
691 16 U.S.C. § 839b(h)(7) (1994).
692 See supra notes 143-146, 150-162 and accompanying text.
693 16 U.S.C. § 839b(h)(6) (1994).
694 See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
695 16 U.S.C. § 839b(h)(6)(C) (1994) (discussed supra notes 157-158 and accompanying
text); Blumm, F4filling Parity,supra note 1, at 131-32.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2982177

1997]

COLUMBIA BASIN SALMON

tutional, 696 its chief substantive effect will be to elevate the consideration

of ocean conditions as an express factor in the'evaluation of salmon restoration measures and require all measures to have clearly defined objectives and monitoring and evaluation provisions. 69 7 However, the additional
process and new bureaucracy the rider creates could complicate salmon
698
recovery efforts.
VII.

CONCLUSION: THE BURDEN OF UNCERTAINTY AND SALMON RESTORATION

If salmon recovery is now the primary environmental issue in the nation, 699 this distinction is due to repeated failures to achieve what Congress ordered a decade and a half ago: parity between hydropower and
salmon in the operation of Columbia Basin dams. 7°° The program formulated by the Northwest Power Planning Council to fulfill the parity promise proved unable to fundamentally restructure hydroelectric operations,
largely because the Council failed to defer to the biological opinions of the
region's fish and wildlife agencies and Indian tribes 701 and failed to attempt to enforce the program it approved. 70 2 The failure of the Council's
program led to the ESA listings of 1991 and 1992.703

The ESA listings changed the dynamic of salmon restoration efforts,
but in unexpected ways. The listings prompted the Council, in 1991, to
promulgate the first improvements in mainstem flows since the program's
696 There is some question as to whether Congress may unilaterally alter the marching
orders of the Northwest Power Planning Council, which the Ninth Circuit upheld as an interstate compact in Seattle Master Bldrs. Ass'n v. Northwest Power Planning Council, 786
F.2d 1359, 1363 (9th Cir. 1986) (discussed in Symposium, 17 ENvTL L. 767-999 (1987)).
Although the Council was authorized by section 4(a)(2) of the Northwest Power Act, 16
U.S.C. § 839b(a)(2) (1994), it was not created until three of the four Northwest states accepted Congress's offer and authorized the appointment of Council members pursuant to
state law. See Roy Hemmingway, The Northwest Power Planning Council: Its Origins and
FutureRole, 13 ENVrL. L. 673, 688 (1983). Since the Ninth Circuit concluded that creation of
the Council required action of both Congress and the states ("[tihe Council is an operational
body established by reciprocal legislation whose effectiveness is conditioned upon binding
legislative commitments by the states," Seattle Master Bldrs. Ass'n, 786 F.2d at 1363), and
since the effect of the Gorton rider is to change the obligations of the state-created Council,
the states may have to approve the rider in order to satisfy the Constitution's compact
clause.
697 See supra notes 688 (ocean conditions), 681 (clear objectives and monitoring and
evaluation criteria) and accompanying text. See also supra note 8 for an earlier discussion
of the effect of ocean conditions.
698 The rider expressly applied only to measures implementing the Council's program, not
to measures implementing the NMFS BiOp. Council staff found that the effect of the rider on
projects that implement both the Council program and the NMFS BiOp was unclear, as was
its effect on projects funded by Congress, not BPA, such as measures to modify Corps of
Engineers dams. See Volkman memorandum, supra note 682, at 6.
699 Michael Spear, Remarks at the 2d Annual Northwest Water Law and Policy Conference (May 9, 1996) (materials available at the Northwest Water Law & Policy Project, Northwestern School of Law of Lewis & Clark College).
700 See generally Blumm & Johnson, PromisingParity, supra note 1.
701 See Blumm, Reviving Parity,supra note 108, at 356-59.
702 See supra note 631 and accompanying text.
703 See supra notes 91-92 and accompanying text.
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inception in 1982.704 In. 1992, NMFS determined that these improvements
satisfied the ESA. 705 But when NMFS made essentially the same determination in 1993, the state of Idaho sued. The results of that suit, 70 6 coupled
with a successful judicial challenge to the Council's 1991 amendments by
environmentalists and the Yakama Indian Nation,70 7 ushered in a new era
of salmon restoration efforts.' This new era has witnessed the development
of three competing salmon restoration plans. 70 8 Unfortunately, the plan
thought to have the greatest binding effect, the NMFS BiOp,' was the least
protective of salmon in the river and postpones the critical decision about
whether to allow salmon to migrate inriver until 1999. 7o9 Worse, the region
710
apparently lacks the will to fully implement any of the plans.
In a larger sense, the story of Columbia Basin salmon restoration efforts in the 1990s belies the concerns of those who decry ESA decision
making as inflexible and absolutist. 71 1 In fact, in implementing the ESA,

NMFS appeared to be quite sensitive to economic factors in, for example,
71 2
1) establishing flow targets that were more modest than the Council's;
2) making no commitment to reservoir drawdowns other than to lower the
John Day reservoir~to MOP, and then subsequently eliminating that requirement; 713 3) calling for maximum barge and truck transportation
under low-flow conditions;71 4 and 4) suggesting that the Council's call for
7 15
an additional one million acre-feet of water purchases was "unrealistic."
Indeed, the record reveals that NMFS decision making under the ESA was
actually more sensitive to economic and political concerns than Council
716
decision maling under the Northwest Power Act.
The Council's 1996 report to Congress on fish and wildlife governance
recognized the need to establish a process to reconcile the three plans, but
See Blumm, Saving Idaho's Salmon, supra note 87, at 692.
See supra notes 102-104 and accompanying text.
706 See supra notes 109-126 and accompanying text.
707 See supra notes 127-165 and accompanying text.
708 See supra Part IV.
709 See supra notes 403-429 and accompanying text (BiOp the least protective plan); 288,
293-305, 345, 416, 419 and accompanying text (postponing until 1999).
710 See supra Part V.
711 See, e.g., Davina Kari Kaile, Evolution of Wildlife Legislationin the United States: An
Analysis of the Legal Efforts to Protect Enda gered Species and the Prospectsfor the Future, 5 GEO. INV'L ENvTL. L.REv. 441, 443 (1993) (examining proposed amendments to the
ESA in 1993 and recommending that Congress adopt a new ESA that would "infuse some
flexibility into the dogmatic policy mandated by the current [ESA]"); Ike C. Sugg, Caught in
the Act: Evaluating the Endangered Species Act, Its Effects on Man and Prospectsfor Reform, 24 CuMB. L. REV. 1, 6 (1993) (concluding that the ESA is "ineffective, arbitrary, unconstitutional, and, thus, unsustainable as a public policy").
712 See supra notes 282, 406-409 and accompanying text.
713 See supra notes 291-292, 298-305, 416, 607 and accompanying text; infra note 720.
714 See supra notes 309, 326-329, 419 and accompanying text.
715 See supra notes 517-518 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 319-322 and
accompanying text.
716 See NORTHWEST SALMON CIUSIS, supra note 90, at 320 (describing the great administrative discretion existing under the ESA).
704
705
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was vague about the details of how to accomplish it.717 Until such a reconciliation is achieved, or until Congress rewrites the operative statutes, Columbia Basin salmon restoration will be largely a function of the NMFS
BiOp, as limited by the fish and wildlife "budget,"718 deals'between NMFS
and the state of Montana regarding storage reservoir levels, 71 9 and NMFS's
acquiescence to the Corps' unwillingness to proceed with John Day and
lower Snake River reservoir drawdowns. 720 This compromised approach
represents a significantly weaker path than those charted by either the
Council's 1994 amendments or the tribes' 1995 restoration plan. In 1995,
72 1
these compromises resulted in failure to meet mainstem flow targets,
widespread failure to shape flows to maximize salmon migration, 722 and a
723
wholesale commitment to barging and trucking salmon on the Snake. If
these results are not the product of a "lowest common denominator" approach, 724 they hardly reflect a "major overhaul." 725 Indeed, they invite
726
renewed judicial scrutiny.
Both the ESA and the Northwest Power Act require decision maling
based on "best available" science. 727 It seems unlikely that river operations under the "compromised" BiOp satisfy this standard. True, a number
of scientific studies have apparently reached contradictory conclusions
concerning the efficacy of mainstem flow velocity improvements in terms
of increasing salmon survival. But upon close inspection, the study results
do' not reveal significant scientific dispute. Rather, they disclose different
approaches to the issue of how to proceed in the face of scientific uncertainty, a willingness to allow economic factors to dominate supposedly
scientific conclusions, and an apparent conflict of interest in the case of
one study.
NMFS, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, and a 1994 report of independent scientists commissioned by the Council all endorsed the idea
that a positive relationship exists between increased flow velocities and
increased salmon survival. 72 8 On the other hand, a NMFS-appointed recov717 See supra notes 627-629 and accompanying text. The report also missed an important
opportunity to explain how a lack of perceived enforcement authority hampered program,
implementation. See supra notes 635-636 and accompanying text.
718 See supra notes 604-619 and accompanying text.
719 See supra notes 490491, 494-499 and accompanying text.
720 See supra notes 289-291, 607, 713 and accompanying text. The Corps did not in fact
implement the John Day drawdown in 1996.
721 See supra notes 462, 466, 469472 and accompanying text.
722 See supra notes 444449, 453-458, 463466 and accompanying text.
723 See supra notes 323-335 and accompanying text.
724 Northwest Resource Info. Ctr., Inc. v. Northwest Power Planning Council, 35 F.3d
1371, 1395 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 116 S.Ct. 50 (1995).
725 Idaho Dep't of Fish & Game v. National Marine Fisheries Serv., 850 F. Supp. 886, 900
(D. Or. 1994).
726 See generally supra notes 13, 21, 36, 285, 494, 503, 514, 520 and accompanying text
(discussing American Rivers v. NMFS, No. 96-384MA (D. Or. filed Mar. 13, 1996)).
727 16 U.S.C. § 839b(h)(6)(B) (1994); 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (1994) (ESA); see also supra
notes 300-301 and accompanying text.
728 See supra notes 41, 49 and accompanying text.
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ery team and the 1996 report of the Council's independent group of scien-

tists questioned whether there were sufficient data to conclude that such a
relationship exists. 729 The National Research Council also rejected reservoir drawdowns, but it did so on economic cost grounds, coupled with
scientific uncertainty regarding the effectiveness of drawdowns. 73 0 This is
not, however, a scientific conclusion. Rather, it is a policy choice consistent with the long tradition of requiring something approaching scientific
certainty before restructuring river operations to benefit migrating salmon
in the Columbia Basin. 73 1 Yet the opponents of flow increases and reservoir drawdowns touted the recovery team's policy decision as the epitome
of sound science. 73 2 Although it is true that there are little scientific data
on the effects of reservoir drawdowns, 733 this is because drawdowns have
not been systematically tried. On the other hand, there is a good deal of
experience with the chief alternative to increased flow velocities and
drawdowns-the Corps' barging and trucking program 7 4-and a 1994 independent peer review of the artificial transport program concluded that

virtually no evidence existed suggesting that the transportation program
73 5
benefits salmon when river flows are close to normal.

Perhaps the greatest scientific challenge to the efficacy of flow increases and drawdowns was levied by the report of the National Research
Council, 73 6 which Senator Hatfield tried to elevate to the "Supreme Court
of Science." 73 7 But not only were the ultimate conclusions of that report

influenced heavily by economics, 738 the principal author of the mainstem
729 See supra notes 49, 196.
730 See supra notes 47, 65.
731 See, e.g., Blumm, FulfillingParity,supra note 1, at 108-12 (discussing decision making prior to the enactment of the Northwest Power Act).
732 See, e.g., Lynn Francisco, Schmitten PraisesBevan Plan, Promises Few Changes,
CLEARING Up, June 20, 1994, at 6 (NMFS director calling the recovery team's recommendations a "recipe for recovery," while the Columbia River Alliance deemed the recommendations "science-based and balanced"); Slade Gorton, Panic Won't Save the Salmon,
WENATCHEE WoRLD,Jan. 16, 1994, at A8 (editorial by Washington senator endorsing the recovery plan as "tough" and "comprehensive," and emphasizing the recovery team's deternuination that there is no scientific justificaiton for spill or drawdowns); Cyrus Noi, Senators
Ignore Power Council and Urge Administration to Follow Bevan Plan, CLEARING Up, Dec.
26, 1994, at 6-7 (discussing a letter from seven of the eight Northwest senators to President
Clinton that endorsed the recovery team's draft recovery plan, claiming it was the only
slamon recovery plan that represents "regional, scientifically peer reviewed measures"); Cyrus Noe, Fish Wars at Mid-1994: There Will Be No Peace Without a Science Treaty, CLEARING UP, May 30, 1994, at 3, 5 (calling the recovery team's recommendations a "balanced and
accountable" salmon restoration plan and claiming that flow improvement and spill measures "fly in the face of science"); Cyrus Not, Judge Marsh: Reinventing the Endangered
Fishwheel:ID, OR & Yakamas Nix MT, CLEARING UP, May 13, 1994, at 3 (calling the recovery
team's efforts "the best science for fish issues").
733 See supra notes'47, 49.
734 See supra note 58.. •
735 See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
736 See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL,supra note 8, at 207-211. But see supra notes 32, 47,
65 (disputing the validity of the study).
737 'See supra note 32.
738 See supra notes 47, 65.
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recommendations was a biologist who has largely spent his career in the
service of BPA's industrial users and regional utilities-fierce opponents
of inriver measures like increased flows and drawdowns. 73 9 A more therapeutic consequence of the National Research Council report was its recommendation to establish an independent scientific advisory board to
guide salmon restoration efforts with a more disinterested, less economically oriented "science" in the future.7 40 The Council and NMFS acted
quickly to implement this recommendation, creating an interagency scienthat made Senator Gorton's subsequent
tific advisory board,7 4 1' an effort
742
science rider seem redundant.
The most recent contribution to the science of salmon recovery, the
report of the Council's Independent Scientific Group, 743 may signal a new
era. The report's call for a "normative" river, a restoration of ecological
conditions supplying a continuum of high-quality habitat throughout the
salmon life cycle, 74 4 could revolutionize salmon-restoration if taken seriously by policy makers. Permanent reservoir drawdowns (like those recommended in the tribal plan) 74 5 to expand mainstem spawning,
restoration of the spring freshet to facilitate migration, and imposing the
burden of proof on technological fixes like artificial transportation and
hatchery production were among the report's more provocative recommendations.74 6 The latter recommendation recalled the Ninth Circuit's
conclusion that the Northwest Power Act shifted the burden of proof in
favor of salmon restoration measures.7 47 Pursuit of the Independent Scientific Group report's vision of a "normative" river should not, however, become an excuse to avoid making more modest reforms, such as drawing
748
down the John Day reservoir to MOP in.the interim.
BPA's efforts to cap its fish and wildlife expenditures, which led to
the administratively approved fish and wildlife "budget" in 1995, 749 clearly

illustrate that economics, not science, is driving (or retarding) salmon restoration efforts. In truth, the chief impediment to effective restoration of
Columbia Basin salmon has always been the resistance of those who have
benefitted economically from the construction and operation of Columbia
Basin dams to paying the full fish and wildlife costs the dams continue to
739 See Koberstein, supra note 32, at 13 (discussing the background and influence of
Donald Chapman).

740 See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 8, at 12-13, 299-306.
741 See supra notes 30, 647 and accompanying text.
742 See supra note 679 and accompanying text.
743 ISG REPORT, supra note 7; see supra notes 649-677 and accompanying text (discussing
the ISG Report).
744 ISG REPORT, supra note 7, at xVii.
745 See supra notes 290, 713 and accompanying text.
746 See supra notes 661 (restoration of spring freshet), 664-665 (permanent drawdowns),
671-675 (burden of proof against technological fixes) and accompanying text.
747 See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
748 See supra notes 291, 713, 720 and accompanying text.
749 See supra notes 604-619 and accompanying text.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2982177

. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

[Vol. 27:21

impose.7, The fish and wildlife "budget" not only singles out the hydropower "costs" of fish and wildlife measures, as no other resource is singled out,, but seems to administratively elevate hydropower as the
dominant use of the dams in the absence of legislative approval. 75 1 Yet, if
the budgeted amount were sufficient to carry out a biologically based res-

toration program, the concept could work to increase the discretion of
fish and wildlife managers to structure a restoration program without

power interest interference. Unfortunately, this is now merely an academic prospect, for critical measures like John Day and lower Snake reservoir drawdowns and increased water purchases in the upper Snake
7 52
basin are excluded from the budget.

The current fish and wildlife budget may prove to be substantively
inadequate for successful Columbia Basin salmon restoration, but that is
hardly the only worry of salmon advocates. The very existence of the current budget has been cast into doubt by ongoing efforts to restructure
BPA's role in the Northwest electric power system. 75 3 If the region's re-

sponse to the new era of electric competition is to separate BPA's transmission and power sales functions, while relieving the former from

repaying the stranded costs of BPA's nuclear program or fish and wildlife'
750 The Northwest Power Act's policy is that electric ratepayers are to pay the full cost of
developing and operating Columbia Basin hydroelectric dams, including fish and wildlife
costs. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 839(4), (6), 839b(h)(8)(B) (1994); supra note 594.
751 See supra notes 597-598 and accompanying text. But fish costs:are fairly modest. BPA
estimated that a natural river drawdown of the four lower Snake River reservoirs and operation of John Day at MOP would result in a "change in total annual systems costs" of $266$336 million, see SOR SUMMARY, supra note 340, at 22, while BPA's preferred alternative in
the SOR, which is merely the measures contained in the 1995 NMFS BiOp, cost $164 million,
ici. at 35. The SOR estimated that moderate drawdowns would incur costs of $784145 million. Id. at 27; cf. i4fra note 755 (environmentalists claim that a drawdown to natural river
level would increase electric rates by only 8.5%).
752 See supra notes 616 and accompanying text.
753 See 1996 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 191, at 22-25 (discussing the 1996 Northwest
energy review initiated by the governors of Idaho, Montana, Oregon, and Washington to
recommend changes in the institutional structure of the basin's electric utility industry). On
September 10, 1996, the regional energy review issued a preliminary draft report for public
review. The report suggested dividing BPA into two separate legal entities and asked for
public comment on a variety of issues, such as the future of the Northwest Power Planning
Council; whether the region should continue to support conservation, renewable resources,
and low-income energy assistance or leave such matters to the market; and whether BPA
should be able to use transmission revenues to pay for nontransmission costs. See Designing a Competitive Electric Industry for the 21st Century (Sept. 1996) <http://
www.newsdata.con/enernet/review/documents/ftcpt.html> (discussed in Jude Noland, Regional Review Releases Draft Report on NW Energy System, CLEARING UP, Sept. 16, 1996, at
14). The last question seemed to assume that fish and wildlife costs and nuclear costs are
"non-transmission costs," a highly debatable proposition, since, for example, expansion of
BPA's transmission services was an integral part of the Hydro-Thermal Power Program that
produced the nuclear debt. See Blumm, Hydroelectric Heritage,supra note 23, at 222 (noting that federally funded hydroelectric and transmission facilities were estimated to cost $5
billion of the $7 billion the program was thought to originally cost). Moreover, in requiring
that electric customers pay all the fish and wildlife costs of the development and operation
of the hydroelectric system, see supra note 594, Congress hardly intended to exempt transmission services from fish and wildlife obligations.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2982177

19971

COLUMBIA BASIN SALMON

costs, the result will make BPA power uncompetitive and salmon restoration unaffordable. 754 A more sensible result would be to ensure that the
transmission system pays its fair share of the costs of developing and operating the power system, which still produces the cheapest electric rates
in the nation.755 Fish and wildlife advocates should embrace the BPA administrator's call for a "system benefit charge," which would ensure that
nonfederal electric producers using federal transmission lines are charged
rates that reflect the true cost of constructing and maintaining the power
system. 756 A restructured Northwest electric power system should also

eliminate "below cost" subsidies to aluminum companies, irrigators, and
barging companies 757 because these subsidies violate the Northwest
Power Act principle of paying the full cost of electric power development
758
and generation.
In the end, neither science nor economics will spare endangered Columbia Basin salmon from extinction. Resolution of the question of how
much scientific uncertainty is tolerable in salmon restoration is not an answer scientific studies can provide. That is fundamentally a question of
values, a subject in which scientists possess no special expertise. Similarly, economists can offer no special insights as to how much the region
should be willing to pay for restored Columbia Basin salmon runs. That is
a policy question that ought not to be left to specialized technicians. Instead, it is a question to be resolved by the public, and not just those who
live in the Columbia Basin, because restoration of Columbia Basin
salmon-like other issues involving endangered species, federal subsidies,
and Indian treaty rights-is a national issue.
At this point, after over a decade and a half of largely unsuccessful
restoration efforts, the public should demand that decision makers lower
the burden of scientific proof demanded of mainstem passage measures
and practice the adaptive management policies the Council has preached
(but only intermittently implemented).7 59 This would enable the pursuit of
the experimental measures necessary to keep juvenile salmon in the river
(and out of barges and trucks), like reservoir drawdowns and augmented
flows, as well as the close monitoring necessary to determine their efficacy. But given the salmon life cycle, the truth is that such experiments
must persist for a decade or more to produce meaningful results. The public ought to be as patient with these inriver, measures as it has been with
754 See Remarks of William Stelle, supra note 641.
755 See CHANGING THE CURRENT, supra note 7, at 33 (report of the Natural Resources
Defense Council, Sierra Club, and American Rivers stating that in 1993, average residential

rates in the Pacific Northwest were under 4.8 cents per kilowatt-hour, 3.6 cents under the
national average; also estimating that a complete reservoir drawdown scheme to natural
river level would increase rates only 8.5%).
756 See supra note 642.
757 See supra notes 578, 644.
758 See supra note 594.
759 See supra notes 216-218 and accompanying text
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the Corps' barge and truck program, 760
which has shown little or no positive
results during the past two decades.

Perhaps a better time frame for measuring tolerable patience in
salmon restoration is that supplied by the Columbia Basin Indian tribes.
76 1
Promised the "right to take fish" in the Stevens Treaties 140 years ago
and told by the Supreme Court that this promise entitled them to a fishing
"livelihood-that is to say, a moderate living," 762 the tribes still await ful-

fillment of this promise. In 1996,, the Chairman of the Columbia River Inter-Tribal Fish Commission reported that the average tribal fisherman in

the Columbia Basin lost $7,000 annually,7 63 which seems to be a blatant
violation of the treaty promise. If those charged with restoring Columbia
Basin salmon cannot find the vision and courage to pursue an effective

restoration program, the best course of action for the tribes-as well as
for the region's signature natural resource-would be to employ their
764
treaty rights to save the salmon that is their lifeblood.

760 See supra notes 57-66 and accompanying text.
761 See Jack Landau, Empty Promises: Indian Treaty Fishing Rights in the Pacific
Northwest, 10 ENVTL. L. 412 (1980); NATURAL RESOURCES L. INsT., 12 ANADROMOUS FISH L.
MEMO 1 (Apr. 1981).
762 Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S.
658, 686 (1979) (stating that "Indian treaty rights to a natural resource that once was thoroughly and exclusively exploited by the Indians secures so much as, but no more than, is
necessary to provide the Indians with a livelihood-that is to say, a moderate living").
763 Ted Strong, Chairman, Remarks at 2d Annual Water Law and Policy Conference (May
9, 1996) (transcript available at Northwest Water Law & Policy Project, Northwestern School
of Law of Lewis & Clark College).
764 Several court decisions suggest that implicit in the treaty "right to take fish" is the
right to have fish'in the river for taking. See, e.g., Blumm, Saving Idaho's Salmon, supra
note 87, at 704-07; Gary D. Meyers, United States v. Washington (Phase II) Revisited: Establishing an Environmental Servitude ProtectingTreaty Fishing Rights, 67 OR. L. REV. 771,
783-97 (1988) (concluding that treaty fishing rights create a vested environmental servitude
for tribes); Michael C. Blumm & Brett M. Swift, The Indian Piscary Profit: Treaty Fishing
Rights and Environmental Protection in the Pacific Northwest (unpublished draft paper, on
fie with authors). For an argument that Columbia Basin salmon restoration under the ESA
has breached the federal trust obligation to the tribes, see Mary Christina Wood, Fulfilling
the Executive's Trust Responsibility Toward the Native Nations on EnvironmentalIssues:
A PartialCritique of the Clinton Administration'sPromises and Performance,25 ENvTL.
L. 733, 794-99 (1995).
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